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ABSTRACT 
 
For nearly 60 years since rich countries started channeling foreign aid resources to Nigeria, aid 
effectiveness is still being contemplated. This study sought to determine the impact of national 
culture on aid effectiveness, in order to develop frameworks for aid effectiveness in Nigeria. A 
combination of the Geert Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture; the Paris Declaration’s 
principles of aid effectiveness as well as the Easterly and Pfutze’s best practices of aid were 
used to underpin the study.  The analytic survey research design was adopted. Data was 
collected through computerized self-administered Qualtrics web-based survey, using Likert scale 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed to all 846 aid workers that composed the 
sampling frame across the six geographic regions of Nigeria. Out of this number, 416 were 
returned valid and analyzable. Descriptive (frequencies) and inferential (Chi-square and 
ANOVA) statistics were utilized for data analysis. In order to increase statistical rigor and control 
for biases, the Kruskal Wallis test of variance and Mantel-Haenszel procedures were conducted. 
Of the five principles deployed in this study, participants perceived aid effectiveness in four 
principle areas. That is, aid alignment to country systems, managing aid for results, country 
ownership of aid, and mutual accountability of aid. Harmonization of aid emerged from this study 
as ineffective. Of the four principles of aid effectiveness that were perceived to be effective, 
iii 
 
country ownership of aid had significant relationship with national culture. Therefore, culture 
sensitive institutional framework, as well as a conceptual framework for aid effectiveness were 
proposed for implementation to improve the effectiveness of aid; particularly, promoting culture 
sensitive ownership and harmonization of aid in Nigeria. 
 
Key terms: Aid, aid effectiveness, national culture, impact, Nigeria, institutional framework, 
ownership of aid, harmonization of aid, alignment of aid, managing aid for results, mutual 
accountability of aid. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY 
  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The measurement of national cultures has triggered renewed interests in aid effectiveness 
and transnational research (Gouveia, Clemente & Espinosa 2003; Bond 2002; Bearden, 
Money & Nevins 2006). This interest is the result of growing concern to analyze the impact 
of national culture on various aspects of macro-level phenomena, such as aid donation and 
aid receiving by rich and poor countries, respectively. Moreover, the values of national culture 
have been shown to impact consumer behavior in specific receiving countries (Aaker & 
Williams 1998) and on individual perceptions of the effect of country of origin (Gurhan-Canti 
& Maheswaran 2000).  
In spite of the vision of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which 
sought to attain a more peaceful, prosperous and just world, most observers agree that the 
effectiveness of much of the spending in Nigeria is still dismal. Thus, this study investigates 
the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness in order to inform the development of 
culture sensitive conceptual and institutional frameworks for aid effectiveness in Nigeria. In 
this study, impact refers to the effects or consequences that national culture has on aid 
effectiveness, including political, economic, gender, religious, geographical and any other 
tangible or intangible consequences. Aid effectiveness refers to the impact that aid has in 
reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, and accelerating 
achievement of global targets set by the international community (World Bank 2016). This 
was measured from the successes of each of the five principles of aid effectiveness, as 
perceived by the research participants. National culture on the other hand, was viewed as 
the mental programming of the mind (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010) and a way of life 
of a group of people – the behaviours, beliefs, values, and symbols that they accept, 
generally without thinking about them, and that are passed along by communication and 
imitation from one generation to the next (Merriam-Webster 1828).   
The conceptual and institutional frameworks are necessary to improve aid effectiveness, 
despite variations in national culture. To develop the frameworks, a combination of the Geert 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture, the Paris Declaration’s principles of aid 
effectiveness, as well as the Easterly and Pfutze’s best practices of aid were used to underpin 
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the study. The analytic survey research design was adopted in the study. Out of 846 
questionnaires distributed to aid workers across the six geographic zones of Nigeria, 416 
were returned valid and analyzable. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were adopted 
to analyze the data. 
It emerged from the descriptive analysis of data that of the five principles of aid effectiveness 
deployed in the study, four were perceived by research participants as effective. These 
include aid alignment to country systems, managing aid for results, country ownership of aid 
and mutual accountability of aid. The fifth principle of aid effectiveness, harmonization of aid, 
emerged from this study as ineffective. In order to determine the impact of national culture 
on aid effectiveness, the data was further subjected to rigorous analysis using inferential 
statistics (ANOVA and Chi square). It emerged from the inferential statistical analysis that 
there was no significant impact of national culture on mutual accountability of aid, alignment 
of aid to country systems, and managing aid for results. No further tests were conducted to 
determine the impact of national culture on harmonization of aid since it was already 
determined ineffective through descriptive analysis. Therefore, the results showed significant 
impact of national culture on country ownership of aid, alone. That means a culture that 
encourages selective focus of aid on the poor can improve country ownership of aid by 
reducing inequality or acceptance of power distance between the rich and the poor. Osoba 
(2009) describes power distance as the extent of inequality that exists between the rich and 
the poor. Nigeria scores high on this dimension (score of 80), which means that people 
accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further 
justification (Hofstede – no date). As set out in Table 19, a Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the various variables 
that compose the principles of aid effectiveness. Overall, there was perfect, positive 
correlation between all five principles of aid effectiveness. This means all the principles are 
interdependent and therefore, collectively necessary for aid effectiveness. 
In order to apply this new knowledge in international business administration to improve aid 
effectiveness in Nigeria, the researcher recommended a new conceptual framework set out 
in Section 6.2. This led to the recommended institutional framework with a set of eight 
guidelines for improving country ownership of aid, as well as aid effectiveness in Nigeria, as 
set out in Section 6.3. In the guidelines, the researcher recommends enhancement of the 
eight parameters for the country ownership of aid principle from their current observed 
baseline values to 95 per cent, in order to achieve the desired aid effectiveness. For the 
purpose of applying the recommendations in this study, the procedure was tagged “the 95 
per cent rule,” in order to differentiate it from the original concept of Confidence Interval (CI). 
From the new conceptual framework, the researcher further distilled five general conclusions 
which represent the primary output from this study, as set out in Section 7.2. 
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Finally, the researcher distilled eight general recommendations from the research findings to 
promote country ownership of aid and improve overall aid effectiveness in Nigeria. This has 
been set out in Section 7.4. As a management staff of an aid implementing partner himself, 
the researcher applied the recommendations to his day-to-day aid management practices in 
Nigeria, and achieved positive results. The contributions to the body of academic knowledge 
set out in Section 6.5.5, as well as the recommendations of this study as set out in 6.3.1 were 
implemented by the researcher while on his line of official duties as Country Director for an 
international non-governmental organization in Nigeria. The intervention enabled more than 
a million people in Akwa Ibom State to know their HIV status, and improved their quality of 
lives in lasting ways through targeted interventions.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE SOURCE OF THE 
PROBLEM 
 
1.2.1 Source of the problem 
 
This section highlights the core issues that stimulated the researcher’s interest to investigate 
on this topic. 
Lack of intercultural understanding and cooperation has caused the effectiveness of aid to 
Nigeria to be largely ineffective (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010, Andrew 2009). 
International development critics have argued that the aid donor countries have significantly 
shaped development thinking and have acquired a quasi-monopoly on institutional 
knowledge in the field of economic development (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). They 
contend that aid donor countries do not just give aid and produce ideas; they package the 
ideas and the money together, combining giving with selectivity and conditionalities (Santiso 
2001). Attaran and Sachs (2001) assert that most projects are those that are not wanted by 
the recipient countries; not within the capacity of the host country to perform; and several are 
not scientifically sound for a given culture, in that there is no scientific evidence that the 
selected interventions are effective within the local context. Aid donors assume that what has 
worked in one part of the world will work in another, not minding the cultural diversity that is 
obtainable even in a single country like Nigeria (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). Santiso 
(2001) laments that the affiliation of certain donor countries to particular aid recipient 
countries may be associated to some cultural similarities between the two countries, beyond 
what is seen physically. Secondly, Santiso (2001) contests that foreign aid will not yield the 
desired results unless the recipient countries are credibly committed to reform and 
development. External support to policy change has all too often failed to offset a lack of local 
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commitment and ownership of development and reforms (Santiso 2001). The use of financial 
leverage, Santiso (2001) adds, is not a substitute for weak domestic institutions or feeble 
political will, rather, aid has been associated with an increase in corruption, deterioration in 
the quality of bureaucracy and a weakening of the rule of law (Erbeznik 2011). Njeru (2003) 
asserts that governments in aid recipient countries view foreign aid like any other source of 
revenue and consequently use it for increased consumption, tax reductions or reduced fiscal 
deficits (future tax obligations). Therefore, critics of this model have argued that foreign aid 
substitutes domestic resources through declined savings, reduced government tax revenue 
and increased government consumption (Njeru 2003).  
In retrospect, Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) report that the nineteenth century and 
the first half of the twentieth century was the age of Europe. Europeans and their offspring 
overseas were the “lords of humankind” who colonized most of the outside world while wealth 
flowed from outside to inside. The World War II, Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) 
added, was the breaking point that completely changed the relationships between continents 
and between rich and poor countries. In the thirty years after the war, nearly all former 
colonies became independent. Freedom from want became recognized as a fundamental 
human right, and around 1950 programmes of development aid were gradually started, 
financed by the rich countries and with the poor ones as receivers (Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov 2010). Ghosh and Kharas (2011) account that in 2009 alone, net disbursements of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) were $140.2 billion, and over $3.76 trillion between 
1960 and 2009, respectively.  
During the Gleneagles G-8 summit in 2005, large donor countries stated their intention to 
both double aid to Africa by 2010 and write off the debts of a number of low-income countries 
under what became the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). However, the outcomes on 
human development are still dismal (Powell & Bird 2010). Powell and Bird (2010) add that 
consideration was given to new methods of financing development in sub-Saharan Africa 
countries, including Nigeria. That is, through direct foreign aid (including budget support, 
project grants, and concessional loans) and debt relief. However, no specific considerations 
were made on addressing the impact of recipients’ national culture on aid effectiveness. 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) opine that nobody can develop a country but its own 
population. Foreign aids are effective only to the extent that they can be integrated into local 
knowledge, local context or national culture (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). The 
dominant philosophy of development cooperation has too rarely recognized this need for 
local integration, at least, in practice. Developing a country has for decades been considered 
primarily an economic and technical problem, a matter of transferring money and technology. 
Decisions about spending were made by politicians advised by technocrats at the giving end 
and often also at the receiving end. The existence of cultural mental programmes on either 
5 
 
side received lip service at best, conceptual and institutional frameworks for aid receiving 
were non-existent, and the only mental programmes used in development planning were 
those of the donors (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). 
As a result, after half a century of channeling foreign aid resources to Nigeria, little 
development has taken place. In spite of the aid money flow, the income gap between rich 
and poor countries has not been reduced. Cultural and religious traditions that resist 
population control, besides threatening regional and global peace, are development’s worst 
enemies (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). In Nigeria and even almost all of sub-Saharan 
Africa countries, there is a high degree of indebtedness, high unemployment, absolute 
poverty and poor economic performance (Njeru 2003). Yet, very little has been done on 
studying the mutual relationship between national culture and aid effectiveness, although 
researchers for decades had shown culture’s crucial impact on aid results.  
Anecdotal evidence shows that donor objectives are in conflict with local preferences and 
culture, which leads to unsustainable aid projects and failure of development paradigms 
(Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom & Shivakumar 2005; Moyo 2009; Altaf 2011; Marchesi, Sabani 
& Dreher 2011; Escobar 2011). Debrat (2009) argues that underestimation of the role of 
cultural factors in the development of human societies is what makes development 
programmes fail.  Against this backdrop, ActionAid (2011) argues that when aid is given in 
such a way that it supports poor countries to lead their own development, be more 
accountable to their own people, and mobilize more of their own resources, then aid itself 
contributes to reducing aid dependency. The role of national culture in promoting the 
effectiveness of aid to Nigeria is yet unknown. This is largely because culture sensitive 
conceptual and institutional frameworks for aid effectiveness is non-existent.  
Nigeria is the most populous nation in sub-Saharan Africa. With more comprehensive data 
available from 2005 to 2011 in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) database, Nigeria ranked highest among the top 20 ODA receiving countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (in USD millions), closely followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ethiopia and Sudan, respectively. It is against this background that Nigeria was chosen from 
other sub-Saharan Africa countries in the study of the impact of culture in aid effectiveness. 
It is against the foregoing that the researcher sought to analyze and explain the impact of 
national culture on aid effectiveness in Nigeria, and to develop conceptual and institutional 
frameworks that will guide both the donor and receiving countries on ensuring the 
effectiveness of aid in Nigeria. 
 
  
6 
 
1.2.2  Background of the problem 
 
Various studies carried out on national cultures demonstrate culture as the collective mental 
programming of the human mind which distinguishes one group of people from another 
(Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). This mental programming influences pattern of thinking 
which are reflected in the meaning people attach to various aspects of life and which become 
crystallized in the institutions of a society.  Santos, Canada and Oliveira (2012) elucidate 
that cultural dimensions measure cultural differences based on a factor analysis. The cultural 
dimension when studied, could have impact on aid effectiveness in Nigeria. 
To identify cultural differences among countries, several studies have used the work of 
Hofstede (1991) as a starting point (Bond 2002), using the Values Survey Questionnaire 
1994 (VSM 94) as an analytical tool (Bearden, Money & Nevins 2006).  It also noted other 
studies that dispute the scales used (Spector, Cooper & Sparks 2001) and wonder how they 
built dimensions of culture (Gouveia, Clemente & Espinosa 2003). Blodget, Bakir and Rose 
(2008), for example, sought to test the validity of Hofstede’s methodology, arguing that the 
issue is important for understanding consumer behavior `in different cultural contexts: 
nationalities, religions, regions, and countries, concluding that it lacks validation when applied 
to an individual level of analysis. However, Santos, Canada and Oliveira (2012) conclude 
that they cannot fail to recognize the essential and pioneer contributions of Hofstede in 
intercultural studies and in the conceptualization of national culture. 
This study is necessary because after half a century of channeling foreign aid resources to 
Nigeria, little development has taken place. In spite of the aid money flow, the income gap 
between rich and poor countries has not been reduced. The number of poor people in a 
country and the average quality of life depend on how equally or unequally income is 
distributed across the population (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). 
Cultural and religious traditions that resist population control, besides threatening regional 
and global peace, are development’s worst enemies (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). 
Similar to other sub-Saharan Africa countries, there is a high degree of indebtedness, high 
unemployment, absolute poverty and poor economic performance in Nigeria (Njeru 2003). 
For example, World Bank (2014) reports that while some countries bordering Nigeria (such 
as Cameroon, Niger, Togo, etc) experienced a positive change, Nigeria experienced a 
negative change in the total population of people living below $1.25 per day, from 63.1 per 
cent in 2005 to 68 per cent in 2010.  Yet, very little effort has been put into studying the 
mutual relationship between national culture and aid effectiveness, although researchers for 
decades had shown culture’s crucial impact on aid results.  The study of Hofstede’s 
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dimensions of culture could expose the impact of culture on aid effectiveness. The outcomes 
of this study will contribute to shaping the future of foreign aid administration in Nigeria. 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
For nearly 60 years since rich countries started providing development assistance to Nigeria, 
no substantial result has been shown to demonstrate its effectiveness. Nigeria is a populous 
and multi-cultural setting. Evidence that demonstrates the role of national culture on aid 
effectiveness or otherwise in Nigeria is non-existent. In other words, it is unknown whether 
culture has an impact on people’s perception of aid effectiveness. A culturally sensitive, 
recipient country driven institutional framework to guide aid administration is near absent, 
weak or dysfunctional in Nigeria. Thus, professionals working on aid funded programmes 
adopt different and inconsistent models to administer aid; most of which are considered alien 
and unwanted by the aid recipient country (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Likewise, 
a conceptual framework for the study of the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness is 
dismal. Where available, it is not comprehensive enough to address the tenets of both culture 
and aid effectiveness at once. Thus, the unanswered research question: What is the impact 
of national culture on aid effectiveness in Nigeria? 
 
1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY 
 
1.4.1  Research purpose 
 
To develop a culturally appropriate, recipient country driven conceptual and institutional 
frameworks for aid effectiveness in Nigeria. 
In order to attain this research purpose, the following research objectives guided the conduct 
of the study:  
 
1.4.2  Research objectives 
 
i. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of country’s ownership 
of aid in Nigeria 
ii. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of mutual accountability 
of aid in Nigeria 
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iii. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of aid alignment to 
country systems in Nigeria 
iv. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of managing aid for 
results in Nigeria 
v. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of harmonisation of aid 
in Nigeria 
 
1.4.3 Research null hypothesis 
 
Variations in culture does not impact aid recipients’ perception of aid effectiveness. 
  
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Research hypothesis 
 
Therefore, the various research null hypothesis for this study has been identified as follows: 
i. H01: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of aid 
alignment to country systems in Nigeria 
ii. H02: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of managing 
aid for results in Nigeria 
iii. H03: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of country’s 
ownership of aid in Nigeria 
iv. H04: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of mutual 
accountability of aid in Nigeria 
v. H05: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of 
harmonisation of aid in Nigeria 
Independent variable 
 
Variation in aid recipient’s 
culture  
Dependent variable 
 
Aid recipients’ perception of 
aid effectiveness 
does not impact 
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1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
It is envisaged that the conceptual and institutional frameworks once put into place and 
applied effectively, will positively change the recipient countries’ perception of aid 
effectiveness. It will make people to view aid as complementary and gap filling, rather than 
replacement of country owned priorities and plans. The conceptual and institutional 
frameworks for aid will serve to foster the sustainability of programmes supported through 
foreign aid, redefine aid selectivity and conditionality, and build local commitment and 
ownership of development and reforms in Nigeria. The framework, once developed, will be 
used as training resource for programme managers, technocrats and politicians to integrate 
local knowledge, context and culture into foreign aid to the country. The aid conceptual and 
institutional frameworks will guide the development of programme designs that foster 
capacity building of aid recipient countries to deliver quality, people focused development 
programmes that contribute to poverty alleviation and livelihood improvement. It will also 
contribute to building a body of academic knowledge contributing to the study of national 
culture and their influences on the effective management of aid resources. 
 
1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
1.6.1 Theoretical framework  
 
The Geert Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture (Hofstede 1991) was utilized as the main 
theoretical framework for the study. To enrich its suitability for the study, two other 
frameworks were blended with the Hofstede’s dimensions to form a conceptual framework 
that underpinned the study. These were the Easterly and Pfutze’s best practice dimensions 
of quality aid (Easterly & Pfutze 2008) as well as the five principles that make aid effective 
(Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005). Each framework as well as the eventual 
conceptual framework are briefly discussed below. 
1.6.1.1 Geeƌt Hofstede͛s diŵeŶsioŶs of ŶatioŶal Đultuƌe 
 
The dimensions of the different national cultures studied by Hofstede (1991) try to group the 
fundamental problems of humanity, which had repercussions on the functioning of societies, 
of groups within societies, and on individuals within the groups. Mooij and Hofstede (2010) 
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elucidate that the Hofstede’s model of national cultures distinguishes cultures according to 
five dimensions: power distance, individualism/collectivism (IDV), masculinity/femininity 
(MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UA), and long-/short-term orientation (LTO). The model 
provides scales from 0 to 100 for 76 countries for each dimension, and each country has a 
position on each scale or index, relative to other countries.  
 
1.6.1.2 EasteƌlǇ aŶd Pfutze͛s ďest pƌaĐtiĐe diŵeŶsioŶs of ƋualitǇ aid 
 
To monitor the quality of aid, five best practice dimensions were identified based on Easterly 
and Pfutze’s (2008) agency “best practices” which includes agency transparency, minimal 
overhead costs, fragmentation of aid, delivery to more effective channels, and allocation to 
less corrupt, more democratically free, poor countries. Easterly and Williamson (2011) 
elucidates that transparency is based on the ability to gather information such as employment 
numbers, budgetary data, and overhead costs. Specialization captures the extent to which 
aid is divided among many donors, many countries, and many sectors. Selectivity refers to 
aid delivery to the poorest countries while avoiding corrupt dictators. Ineffective channels 
measure the share of aid that is tied, given as food aid or as technical assistance. Overhead 
cost utilizes the data collected during the transparency stage and refers to an agency’s cost 
relative to aid disbursements. These concepts reflect standards identified over a number of 
years of research on the need to reform the allocation and management of foreign aid (Accra 
Agenda, 2008; Birdsall, Kharas, Mahgoub, & Perakis, 2010, Center for Development, 2007; 
Commission for Africa, 2005; Easterly, 2007; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Easterly & Williamson, 
2011; IMF, 2005, 2006; Knack & Rahman, 2007; Knack, Rogers, & Eubank, 2010; Paris 
Declaration, 2005; Rome Declaration, 2003; Roodman, 2009; United Nations Millennium 
Project, 2005; United Nations Development Program, 2005). 
 
1.6.1.3 The Paris Declaration principles of aid effectiveness 
 
The Paris Declaration takes its name from a meeting that took place in Paris in 2005, where 
over 100 developed and developing countries agreed to change the way they do business 
(Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005). More than a state of general principles, the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) lays out a practical, action-oriented roadmap 
to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It puts in place 56 partnership 
commitments for implementation, organized around five principles. Thus, ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, managing aid for results, and mutual accountability. It also 
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establishes performance indicators that assess progress over time. Additionally, it calls for 
an international monitoring system to ensure that donors and recipients hold each other 
accountable – a feature that is unique among international agreements. 
 
1.6.1.4 Conceptual framework for measuring the impact of culture on aid effectiveness 
 
In order to measure the impact of culture on aid effectiveness, the researcher developed a 
conceptual framework from the three sources of theoretical frameworks identified above. The 
term conceptual framework is used when concepts from various theories or/and research 
findings are used to guide the study (Unisa 2012). Conceptual models refer to use of a formal 
diagrammatical representation of concepts or theories to guide the study. The conceptual 
framework provided eclectic and dialectic reconstruction of the three sources of theoretical 
framework identified above, which assisted the researcher to determine and maintain the 
focus of the study. It also structured the study, the whole thesis for that matter; literature 
review; data collection instruments; presentation of data; discussion of the findings; 
formulation of recommendations; and the development of institutional framework for aid 
effectiveness.  
For the purpose of this study, only the Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture as well as 
the conceptual framework will be discussed in detail. Therefore, further explanation of the 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture as well as the conceptual framework are presented 
in Chapter 2, below. 
1.6.2  Definitions of key concepts 
 
1.6.2.1 Aid effectiveness: According to the World Bank (2016), aid effectiveness refers to the 
impact that aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, 
and accelerating achievement of global targets set by the international community. In this 
study, aid effectiveness was viewed from the perceived successes of each of the five 
principles of aid effectiveness, as obtained from the research participants. 
1.6.2.2 Foreign aid: According to Abdallah (2014) foreign aid, also referred to as development 
aid or development cooperation (or development assistance, technical assistance, 
international aid, overseas aid or official development assistance) is financial aid given by 
governments and other agencies to support the economic, environmental, social and political 
development of developing countries. In this study, foreign aid refers to development 
assistance that flows out from a rich donor country to a poor recipient country. 
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1.6.2.3 Donor country: The English Dictionary (1819) defines donor country as a country 
which provides aid to a developing country. The Resource Flows Project (2011) defines 
donor country as a country that gives (financial) aid to another, poorer country (the so called 
recipient country.) In this study, donor country refers to a rich country which provides aid to 
a poor country. 
1.6.2.4 Impact: According to the Business Dictionary (2016), impact refers to the measure of 
any tangible or intangible effects or consequences of an action, thing or influence, upon 
another. In this study, impact refers to the effects or consequences that national culture have 
on aid effectiveness, including political, economic, gender, religious, geographical and any 
other tangible or intangible consequences. 
1.6.2.5 National culture: National culture is viewed as the mental programming of the mind 
(Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010) or a way of life of a group of people – the behaviours, 
beliefs, values, and symbols that they accept, generally without thinking about them, and that 
are passed along by communication and imitation from one generation to the next (Merriam-
Webster 1828).   
1.6.2.6 Official Development Assistance (ODA): Resource Flows Project (2011) defines ODA as 
financial assistance given by a donor country’s government or government agencies to help 
the needy in poor countries. To qualify for ODA, the contribution must meet three 
preconditions (Resource Flows Project, 2011): be undertaken by the official sector (that is, 
government or government agency); have promotion of economic development and welfare 
as main objective; and be concessional in character (that is, with favorable loan terms.) For 
the purpose of this study, ODA refers to an international resource flow from a rich donor 
country to a poor recipient country, with the aim of achieving poverty reduction in the recipient 
country. 
1.6.2.7 Recipient country: When a country receives ODA but does not appear to donate any 
money, it is assumed to be a recipient country (Resource Flows Project 2011.) In this study, 
recipient country refers to developing countries in whose names money flows out from the 
donor countries, irrespective of how much the money eventually flows in to the developing 
country.  
1.6.2.8 Development Assistance Committee (DAC):  DAC consists of 29 member countries who 
work with each other to promote economic growth, prosperity, and sustainable development 
in needy countries. DAC promotes development co-operation and other policies so as to 
contribute to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic growth, poverty 
reduction, improvement of living standards in developing countries, and a future in which no 
country will depend on aid (OECD 2015).  
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1.7  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
1.7.1 Research design 
 
The analytic survey research design was adopted in this study. The use of this design in this 
study was justified to determine the relationship between national culture and the 
effectiveness of aid. Hence, in conceptualizing and structuring the research, there was an 
emphasis on specifying the independent, dependent and extraneous variables.  
The design is further elucidated in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
1.7.2 Research setting 
 
The research study was conducted among Nigerians working on aid supported projects 
across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. The six geopolitical zones represent the diverse 
cultures of Nigeria, including the three major cultures of Hausa in the north, Ibo in south east, 
and Yoruba in south west Nigeria, among others. These diverse settings are justified to enrich 
the study of the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness. Although there is a wide 
diversity of cultures in Nigeria, the outputs of this study categorized the diversities into 
northern and southern Nigeria cultures. Further details on the research setting will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
1.7.3 Research population 
 
The research population of interest to the study comprised over 10,000 Nigerian employees 
working on aid supported projects in the country.  However, the cost and time required to 
reach such a population were beyond the scope of the researcher.  Consequently, the target 
population for this study included about 846 employees working on aid supported projects 
across 24 states of Nigeria, representing various socio-cultural affiliations and ethnic 
groupings across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. The accessible population therefore, 
included 846 employees who were at the time of this study working on aid supported projects 
in Nigeria. The concept of the research population is further explained in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
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1.7.4 Data collection procedure 
 
Likert scale questionnaire was distributed to 846 aid supported project employees, through 
one approach to respondents using the Qualtrics Mailer survey platform. Of the 846 
questionnaires distributed, only 455 were returned, representing 53.8 per cent response rate. 
Out of the returned questionnaire, 416 were valid and analyzable. This was composed of 300 
(72.1%) males and 116 (27.9%) females, respectively.   
Aid employee survey was preferred in this study to elicit information from respondents who 
have at least, basic knowledge and experience in aid programming and administration of aid 
funds.  The data collection procedure is further discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
1.7.5 Data analysis 
 
Data was collected through Qualtrics web-based Likert scale questionnaire survey. The data 
obtained in this study was analyzed at the interval measurement scale. The researcher used 
both descriptive and inferential statistics, to test the null hypotheses: variation in culture does 
not impact aid recipients’ perception of aid effectiveness. In order to reduce type I and type 
II errors, the researcher set confidence interval (CI) at 95 per cent and Alpha at 0.05, while 
Beta (type II error) was set at 0.20. The Chi-square Test of Independence and one-way 
between subjects’ ANOVA techniques were used to analyse and compare results from two 
geographic regions of Nigeria (north, south), representing diverse cultures in Nigeria. To 
increase the analytic rigor of the study, responses were further analysed using the Kruskal 
Wallis test of variance. To control for confounding, the researcher adopted the Mantel-
Haenszel procedure to combine the various strata into a summary statistic that described aid 
effectiveness by the levels of the confounding factors. Results were presented in tables and 
graphics, and discussed in comparison with previous findings shown in the chapter on 
literature review. The data analysis procedure is further discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
1.7.6 Ethical considerations 
 
The researcher ensured strict compliance with ethical standards, relevant to protecting the 
rights of the respondents, institutions where data were collected and scientific integrity of the 
study. Approval was sought and obtained from both the University of Nigeria Teaching 
Hospital Health Research Ethics Committee (UNTH HREC) in Nigeria and the Sheffield 
Business School Research Ethics Committee (SBS REC); as well as the institutional heads 
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of the two aid implementing partners studied, before data collection commenced. Details of 
these are presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
To address the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness, Nigeria was chosen as the 
country to participate in the study. Employees of aid supported projects serving across the 6 
geographical zones of Nigeria, representing diverse cultural affiliations and ethnic groupings 
participated in the study. Employees who have not had working experience in aid supported 
projects were excluded from the study.  
Limitations faced by the researcher included delays in obtaining ethical approval, arising from 
cumbersome bureaucratic processes. Others include funding required to finance the 
research activities as well as limited capacity of aid workers to conceptualize the original 
culture of their local communities, due to culture diffusion arising from modernization and 
urbanization. 
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is presented in seven chapters, organised in the following order: 
Chapter 1: Orientation of the study, covering the background information relating to the 
research problem, statement of the research problem, aim of the study, significance of the 
study, theoretical framework of the study and definitions of key terms, research design and 
method, scope and limitations of the study and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2: Literature review, addressing the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness. 
This was presented using the theoretical framework of the study; Hofstede’s dimensions of 
national culture as well as the conceptual framework of the study. 
Chapter 3: Research design and methods, including research setting, research design, 
research methods, validity and reliability of the study. 
Chapter 4: Analysis, presentation and description of the research findings. 
Chapter 5: Discussion of research findings. 
Chapter 6: Conceptual and institutional frameworks for aid effectiveness in Nigeria 
Chapter 7: Conclusions, recommendations and limitations of the study. 
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1.10 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided the background information related to the focus of the study, which 
highlighted the core issues that stimulated the researcher’s interest to investigate on this 
topic. Lack of intercultural understanding and cooperation has caused aid to Nigeria to be 
unsuccessful. The aid donor countries have significantly shaped development thinking and 
have acquired a quasi-monopoly on institutional knowledge in the field of economic 
development. Therefore, this study aims to develop a culturally appropriate, recipient country 
driven aid conceptual and institutional frameworks for aid effectiveness in Nigeria. These 
frameworks are expected to improve aid performance, as well as effectiveness of aid in 
Nigeria. 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) will present a literature review on the impact of national culture 
on aid effectiveness in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to review and take a critical stance on the impact of national culture on aid 
effectiveness in Nigeria. To do this, applicable literature around culture and aid effectiveness 
were reviewed at global, regional and local (Nigeria) levels. This section also highlights the 
main theories and principles that formed the conceptual framework utilized in this study, as 
well as identified literature gaps that the researcher aims to fill in this study. 
People have become both too numerous and too clever for the limited size of our globe. 
Population explosion and its attendant effect on national culture is possibly one of the worst 
hindrances for aid effectiveness in Nigeria (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). The likely 
way toward survival is getting to understand our mental programming better as social beings, 
so that we may care for fellow human beings who are disadvantaged by poverty, disease or 
disabilities and control our technological cleverness and not use foreign aid in destructive 
ways. Intercultural cooperation between rich and developing countries could be a prime 
condition to facilitate the distribution of wealth and poverty across and within countries, and 
avoid use of aid to promote technology-induced problems. Osoba (2009) recounts that Karl 
Marx [1867-1987] and Max Weber [1930-1992] were the first to write about the link between 
culture and the economy. Although both hypothesized different directions of causality, Weber 
believed that culture influenced the economy, whilst Marx believed the opposite – they were 
in agreement that the topics were closely related.  
2.2 DEVELOPMENT AID TO NIGERIA 
 
Njeru (2003) depicts that the high flow of aid monies during the cold war era led to a 
dependency syndrome portrayed by many developing countries. Today external resources 
constitute an integral part of development expenditure in the developing countries. These 
countries sometimes face major budgetary constraints and use aid inflows to cover any 
deficits within the exchequer (Njeru 2003). The average per capita income in the region has 
fallen since 1970 despite the high aid flows. This scenario has prompted aid donor agencies 
and experts to revisit the earlier discussions on the effectiveness of foreign aid (Njeru 2003). 
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Development aid rose by 6.1% in real terms in 2013, to reach the highest level ever recorded, 
despite continued pressure on budgets in Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries since the global economic crisis (OECD 2014). In all, OECD 
(2014) reports that 17 of the Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) member countries 
increased their Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2013, while 11 reported a 
decrease. Net ODA from DAC countries stood at 0.3% of gross national income (GNI). Five 
countries met a longstanding UN target for an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7%. The United Kingdom 
increased its ODA by 27.8% to hit the 0.7% target for the first time. The United Arab Emirates 
posted the highest ODA/GNI ratio, 1.25%, after providing exceptional support to Egypt. 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden continued to exceed the 0.7% ODA/GNI target. 
The Netherlands fell below 0.7% for the first time since 1974 (OECD 2014). All donors 
provided a total of USD 134.8 billion in net ODA in 2013, marking a rebound after two years 
of falling volumes, as a number of governments stepped up their spending on foreign aid. 
The largest donors by volume were the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan 
and France (OECD 2014).  
Aid to developing countries grew steadily from 1997 to a first peak in 2010. It fell in 2011 and 
2012 as many governments took austerity measures and trimmed aid budgets. The rebound 
in aid budgets in 2013 meant that even excluding the five countries that joined the DAC in 
2013 (Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia), the 2013 DAC ODA 
was still at an all-time high (OECD 2014). OECD (2014) states that bilateral aid to sub-
Saharan Africa was United States Dollars (USD) 26.2 billion, a decrease of 4.0% in real terms 
from 2012. Aid to the African continent fell by 5.6% to USD 28.9 billion. Excluding debt relief, 
which was high in 2012 due to assistance to Cote d’Ivoire, net aid in real terms rose by 1.2% 
to sub-Saharan Africa but fell by 0.9% to the continent as a whole (OECD 2014). 
Omotola (2014) regrets that it is a travesty that almost sixty years after the first wave of 
independence that saw as many as seventeen countries gain independence, a vast number 
of countries are still dependent on aid. Omotola (2014) adds that since the 1940s, 
approximately $1 trillion of aid has been transferred from rich countries to Africa. This is 
nearly $1000 for every man, woman and child in the world today. Despite huge resources 
such as oil and gas, copper, platinum and diamonds most African countries are still heavily 
reliant on aid from western countries to fund projects in almost all sectors of their economy. 
The dependency or rather over-dependency on aid has created a culture or cycle of poverty. 
Omotola (2014) asserts that aid is on its own a good idea; citing example with The Marshal 
Plan by the United States (US) to Europe, after the Second World War that took place in 
1945. Between 1948 and 1952 the US transferred over $13 billion in aid for the reconstruction 
of post-Second World War Europe. By most historical accounts the Marshall Plan not only 
guaranteed economic success but reestablished political and social institutions crucial for 
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Western Europe’s ongoing peace and prosperity. The case in Nigeria is different. Thus, the 
essence of this study to examine the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness. 
 
2.3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
In order to select a theoretical framework that underpins the study to understand the impact 
of national culture on aid effectiveness, several models were reviewed.  
Firstly, the researcher reviewed models addressing national culture. These include the 
Hofstede Model (Hofstede 1991), Scwartz and Bilsky (1987), Trompenaars (1993), and 
GLOBE Model (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta 2004). Aside from the Hofstede 
model, all others were found to be of limited scope to address the demands of the current 
study. Also, the Hofstede Model was noted to have been most applied in international 
business (Mooij & Hofstede 2010), and at a scope and complexity similar to the current study. 
Additionally, the cultural model developed by Hofstede and the much more recent GLOBE 
Model have both provided scholars with much-needed insights into the structure of national 
cultures. His impact in the fields of international business and management remained 
undeniable despite the criticisms that have voiced against his study for so long time (Shi & 
Wang 2011). The GLOBE cultural dimension model is considered to be one of the most 
recent studies (Chokar, Brodbeck & House 2007) on organizational values and cultures 
(Pramila 2009). The major purpose of the GLOBE study was to increase available knowledge 
that is relevant to cross-cultural interactions (House et al 2004). The GLOBE study is less 
criticized than Hofstede’s work, not because there are fewer controversial issues, but more 
because it is much more recent, and therefore researchers have not yet fully analyzed and 
tested it (Shi & Wang 2011). Therefore, the researcher selected the Hofstede’s Model as the 
main theoretical framework for the study. Noting that it was insufficient to cover the study of 
the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness, the researcher explored other models to 
complement the development of a robust conceptual framework that underpinned the study.  
Therefore, the researcher reviewed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. It is 
formulated around five fundamental pillars to base development efforts on first-hand 
experience of what works and does not work with aid. Thus, ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability of aid (Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness 2005). Also reviewed was the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the Third 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which had an even greater number and wider 
diversity of stakeholders. The Accra Agenda for Action reaffirms commitment to the Paris 
Declaration and calls for greater partnership between different parties working on aid and 
development.  
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Finally, the researcher reviewed the Easterly and Pfutze’s best practices of aid (Easterly and 
Pfutze 2008). This model monitors the quality of aid and compose of five best practice 
dimensions which includes agency transparency, minimal overhead costs, fragmentation of 
aid, delivery to more effective channels, and allocation to less corrupt, more democratically 
free, poor countries. These concepts reflect standards identified over a number of years of 
research on the need to reform the allocation and management of foreign aid (Easterly and 
Pfutze 2008). 
Of all these, no single model or principle was deemed adequate to cover the requirements 
for this study on its own. That is, while the Hofstede’s model was deemed most adequate for 
the study of national culture, it was by itself not suitable for the study of aid effectiveness. 
Likewise, while the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness works well for aid effectiveness 
studies, it was not suitable for highlighting best practices of aid as best as Easterly and 
Pfuze’s (2008) best practices of aid would do. Both were also individually or collectively not 
suitable to underpin the study of national culture. Therefore, the researcher applied critical 
thinking skills to draw from the comparative strengths of the Geer Hofstede’s dimensions of 
national culture, the Paris Declaration’s principles of aid effectiveness, as well as the Easterly 
and Pfutze’s best practices of aid to develop a conceptual framework that underpinned the 
study. Each item of the research objectives, research questions, as well as the data collection 
tool used in this study were derived from the conceptual framework, based on the 
combination of the three models that formed it.  
The Geert Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture (Hofstede 1991) and the conceptual 
framework that underpinned the study are discussed below. 
2.3.1 Geert Hofstede͛s diŵeŶsioŶs of ŶatioŶal Đultuƌe 
 
The Hofstede’s dimension of national culture was developed by Geert Hofstede, through his 
study conducted among employees at the International Business Machines (IBM). By virtue 
of the range of countries in which the survey was carried out, Hofstede (2001) believed that 
a quantitative analysis of the survey responses allows differences to be identified between 
national cultures and distinctions to be made between them. From his painstakingly detailed 
and methodological analysis, Hofstede (2001) derives a total of five dimensions of culture 
(four from the first study and one additional dimension added to the 2001 publication from 
previous empirical work). These dimensions are classified as follows: Power Distance; 
Individualism versus Collectivism; Masculinity versus Femininity; Uncertainty Avoidance; and 
Long versus Short-term Orientation (Hofstede 2001; Osoba 2009). 
Power Distance (PD) is a concept that relates to inequality (Osoba 2009). PD describes the 
extent of inequality that exists between rulers and those that are ruled, along with the level 
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of acceptance of that inequality within the culture. The PD dimension was elaborated by Mooij 
and Hofstede (2010) as the extent to which less powerful members of a society accept and 
expect that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but 
defined from below, not from above. It suggests that a society’s level of inequality is endorsed 
by the followers as much as by the leaders. According to Hofstede (2001), the hierarchical 
distance or PD can also be defined as the measure of the degree of acceptance by those 
who have less power in the society or a country. An asymmetric and unequal distribution of 
power is thus a factor that shows the relationship of dependency (Santos, Canada & Oliveira 
2012). Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) hold that in large PD countries, inequalities 
among people are expected and desired; less powerful people are dependent and 
emotionally polarized between dependence and counter dependence. People place greater 
weight on their own personal ethical codes when determining their behaviours (Thorne & 
Saunders 2002, Dang 2014); inequitable distribution of power may be perceived as not only 
acceptable but beneficial as it encourages an orderly and structured society where 
individuals know their place (Frijns, Gilbert, Tourani-Rad 2011). The reasoning is that 
individuals from low PD nations would be more likely to act spontaneously in choosing self-
employment than individuals from high power distance countries, who may believe approval 
from a higher authority is required to take such an action (Osoba 2009). This continued 
dependency on aid by Nigeria can be connected to her high PD rating. While most donor 
countries (except France) score low on power distance, most developing countries (Nigeria 
inclusive) score high on this dimension of culture. For example, Hofstede (1980) elucidates 
that while rich countries such as Denmark, Germany, and Great Britain scores 35, Australia 
(36), Netherlands (38), Canada (39), and USA (40) poor countries in East Africa scores 64, 
Arab countries (80) and West Africa (77), respectively. Hofstede (no date) report that Nigeria 
scores high on this dimension (score of 80) which means that people accept a hierarchical 
order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further justification. Hierarchy in 
an organization is seen as reflecting inherent inequalities, centralization is popular, 
subordinates expect to be told what to do and the ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat. 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) assert that differences in PD and certainty avoidance 
affect primarily the political processes. Larger PD implies political centralization, lack of 
cooperation between citizens and authorities, and more political violence. Although Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) opine that PD has no impact on national wealth, its impact on 
decisions to make aid commitments, disburse aid or ensure aid effectiveness in Nigeria has 
not been determined by previous studies. Likewise, although not within the scope of this 
study, the impact of high PD inherent in sub-Sahara African countries and the continued 
dependency on aid from countries lower on PD is yet to be determined. This will be a good 
subject for future investigations. 
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Individualism versus Collectivism: According to Hofstede (2001), some cultures have higher 
Individualism (IND). Individualism characterizes societies in which ties between individuals 
are not very strong; each one takes care of him/herself, and the closest family members only. 
Individualism represents a preference for autonomy and competitiveness, and it encourages 
a generally adversarial approach to conflict (Trubinsky, Ting-Toomey & Lin 1991). 
Individualistic countries are more likely to have Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems, 
which focus on shareholders’ interests (Griffin et al 2012). Collectivism, by contrast, 
characterizes societies in which people are integrated from birth into strong cohesive groups 
that protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Santos, Canada & Oliveira 2012). 
Mooij and Hofstede (2010) elucidate individualism/collectivism as people looking after 
themselves and their immediate family members only, versus people belonging to in-groups 
that look after them in exchange for loyalty. Individualistic cultures are universalistic, 
assuming their values are valid for the whole world. They also are low-context communication 
cultures with explicit verbal communication. Osoba (2009) notes that high individualism 
countries tend to focus on the concept of “economic man”, where every agent seeks to 
maximize his own utility. Thus, as self-employed individuals are more independent and self-
reliant, it might be expected that higher individualism levels would also result in higher self-
employment (Osoba 2009).  
In collectivistic cultures, people are ‘we’-conscious. Their identity is based on the social 
system to which they belong, and avoiding loss of face is important. Collectivistic cultures 
are high-context communication cultures, with an indirect style of communication. 
Collectivism cultures focus more on team decision-making and the welfare of the collective 
(Hofstede 2001). Collectivistic countries are more likely to have relation-based corporate 
governance systems, which attach more importance to the interests of a firm’s different 
stakeholders (Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li & Shao 2012). 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) elaborate that individualism-collectivism and 
masculinity-femininity affects primarily the issues that countries will defend. Individualism 
implies concern with human rights, political democracy, and market capitalism; collectivism 
implies concern with group interests. In other words, individualism-collectivism is about “I” 
versus “we,” independence from in-groups versus dependence on in-groups (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkov 2010). Hofstede (no date) asserts that Nigeria, with a score of 30 is 
considered a collectivistic society. This is manifest in a close long-term commitment to the 
member ‘group,’ be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a 
collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules and regulations. In 
collectivist societies offence leads to shame and loss of face, employer/employee 
relationships are perceived in moral terms (like a family link), hiring and promotion decisions 
take account of the employee’s in-group, management is the management of groups. 
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Masculinity versus femininity: The degree of masculinity or femininity meets together in a 
single factor, a number of issues that were systematically answered differently by men and 
women. Osoba (2009) posits that countries with high levels of masculinity are more 
concerned with ego-enhancing activities (e.g., earnings, recognition) than those activities 
promoting the strength of relationships (e.g., better workplace relations with boss and 
colleagues, etc.). Thus, Hofstede (2001), designated that in male societies where the roles 
are clearly differentiated, the man must be strong to impose himself and become interested 
in material success, while the women should be modest, tender, and concerned with the 
quality of life. Feminists prefer societies in which social gender roles overlap, both men and 
women should be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life (Santos, Canada & 
Oliveira 2012). Mooij and Hofstede (2010) view that dominant values in a masculine society 
are achievement and success while the dominant values in a feminine society are caring for 
others and quality of life.  
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) highlight that masculinity implies a focus on economic 
growth and competition and a belief in technology. Femininity implies a focus on supporting 
needy people in the country (welfare) and in the world (developing cooperation) and on 
preservation of the global environment. Masculinity and femininity relates to political 
processes in that in masculine cultures the political discourse is more adversarial, in feminine 
cultures more consensus oriented. Masculinity-femininity is about a stress on ego versus a 
stress on relationship with others, regardless of group ties. Compared with women, Dang 
(2014) elucidates that men may be more aggressive about defaults, especially if the money 
is owed mainly to foreigners or aid donors that they do not like. Men may also have a better 
chance of getting away with delinquent debts as they seem to be more effective than women 
in negotiation (Dang 2014). In terms of negotiation skills, Babcock and Laschever (2003) 
suggested that women hold a number of beliefs that prevent them from engaging effectively 
in negotiations. Women are concerned about maintaining professional relationships and fear 
of destroying the relationship with their negotiation counterparts (Dang 2014).  Women 
prefer a ‘relational’ style of negotiation whereas men use a ‘competitive’ style (Miller & Miller 
2002). Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) elaborate that what differentiates femininity 
from collectivism is that the relationships in collectivist cultures are basically predetermined 
by group ties: “groupiness” is collectivist, not feminine. The biblical story of the Good 
Samaritan who helps a Jew in need – someone from another ethnic group – is an illustration 
of feminine and not of collectivist values. Hofstede (no date) laments that Nigeria scores 60 
on this dimension and is thus a masculine society. With this dimension, aid coming from rich 
countries with feminine cultures may lead to certain controversies, if not properly guided. For 
example, Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) report a study of “sexual harassment” in 
four countries in the 1990s, Brazilian students of both sexes differed from their colleagues in 
Australia, the United States, and Germany. They saw sexual harassment less as an abuse 
24 
 
of power, less as related to gender discrimination, and more as a relatively harmless pastime. 
Brazil in the IBM research scored lower on masculinity-femininity scores than the three other 
countries (49, versus 61, and 66, respectively). Attitudes toward homosexuality are also 
affected by the degree of masculinity in the culture. In a comparison among Australia, 
Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, it was found that young homosexuals had more problems 
accepting their sexual orientation in Ireland and Australia, less in Finland, and least in 
Sweden. This is the order of the countries on masculinity-femininity scores. Homosexuality 
tends to be felt as a threat to masculine norms and rejected in masculine cultures, such as 
in Nigeria; this attitude is accompanied by an overestimation of its frequency. This could 
explain the challenges of implementing interventions among homosexuals in Nigeria, arising 
from high stigma and discrimination. In feminine cultures, homosexuality is more often 
considered a fact of life. 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA): Osoba (2009) elucidates that the dimension of UA relates to the 
level of structure that a society expects and is comfortable with in its everyday dealings. The 
control of uncertainty measures the degree of concern of individuals against the unknown or 
uncertain situations (Santos, Canada & Oliveira 2012). This sentiment is expressed, among 
other forms, by stress and need for predictability: a need for written rules or not. This factor 
includes the tendency of individuals to think that what is different is dangerous. Mooij and 
Hofstede (2010) view uncertainty avoidance as the extent to which people feel threatened 
by uncertainty and ambiguity and try to avoid these situations. In cultures of strong 
uncertainty avoidance, there is a need for rules and formality to structure life. This translates 
into the search for truth and a belief in experts. Uncertainty avoidance cultures try to minimize 
the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, and 
on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth: “there can only be one 
Truth and we have it.” People of high uncertainty avoidance are less open to change and 
innovation than people of low uncertainty avoidance cultures. The opposite type, uncertainty 
accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to; they 
try to have as few rules as possible, and on the philosophical and religious level they are 
relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. People within these cultures are more 
phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express emotions. 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) elucidate that stronger uncertainty avoidance implies 
more rules and laws, more government interventions in the economy, and perceived 
incompetence of citizens versus authorities; stronger uncertainty avoidance implies more 
perceived corruption, after elimination of the effect of national poverty. Rules in fact are often 
better followed, and investor legal rights are stronger in countries low on uncertainty 
avoidance (Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz 2005). On the other hand, the development and 
existence of the laws is not enough; enforcement matters (Pistor, Raiser & Gelfer 2000, 
Perotti 2002). Dang (2014) reports that laws can still fulfil a need for security even if they are 
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not followed in countries high on uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoiding countries are 
more likely to have a bank-based rather than market-based financial system (Kwok & 
Tadesse 2006, Chui & Kwok 2008, Aggarwal & Goodell 2009, Aggarwal & Goodell 2010). 
Additionally, Tsakumis, Curatola and Porcano (2007) note that tax evasion is associated with 
high uncertainty avoidance. Nigeria scores 55 on this dimension and thus has a preference 
for avoiding uncertainty (Hofstede (no date)). Countries exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance 
maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and 
ideas. In these cultures, there is an emotional need for rules (even if the rules never seem to 
work), time is money, people have an inner urge to be busy and work hard, precision and 
punctuality are the norm, innovation may be resisted, security is an important element in 
individual motivation. 
Long- versus Short-term Orientation: For the Confucian dynamism, Hofstede (2001) 
considers that this dimension is associated with the pursuit of truth, opposing a long-term 
orientation in life and facing short term orientation. This dimension was developed by 
Confucius, a thinker of Chinese origin who lived in China in 500A.C, and tried to serve many 
local lords in divided China in this period. The teachings of Confucius consist of lessons in 
ethics without religious content. They are set of practical guidelines for everyday life that 
Confucius drew from Chinese history (Santos, Canada & Oliveira 2012). Mooij and Hofstede 
(2010) refer Long-term versus short-term orientation as the extent to which a society exhibits 
a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional historic or short-term point 
of view. Values included in long-term orientation are perseverance, ordering relationships by 
status, thrift, and having a sense of shame. The opposite is short-term orientation, which 
includes personal steadiness and stability, and respect for tradition. Focus is on pursuit of 
happiness rather than on pursuit of peace of mind. Long-term orientation implies investment 
in the future. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) illuminate that long-versus short-term 
orientation relates to pragmatism in politics versus fundamentalism: the latter means a focus 
on principles, even ineffective ones, and vested rights.  According to Hofstede (no date), 
Nigeria scores 16, making it a short term orientation culture. Societies with a short-term 
orientation generally exhibit great respect for traditions, a relatively small propensity to save, 
strong social pressure to “keep up with the joneses,” impatience for achieving quick results, 
and a strong concern with establishing the Truth. 
Using indigenous knowledge of Chinese culture and philosophy, Fang (2003) argues that a 
number of drawbacks exists in Hofstede’s fifth national culture dimension. First, long term 
orientation (Confucian dynamism) divides interrelated values into two opposing poles. Values 
labeled as ‘short-term oriented’ or ‘negative’ may not necessarily be so, and values labeled 
as ‘long-term oriented’ or ‘positive’ may not necessarily be so either. Fang (2003) calls this a 
philosophical flaw because the Chinese Yin Yan principle is violated by the concept. Second, 
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Fang (2003) says a number of values either mean essentially the same thing or are highly 
interrelated. Thus, leading to the fact that the two ‘opposite’ ends of Confucian dynamism are 
actually not opposed to each other. Third, the values used in the study focused too much on 
Confucianism; the Taoist and Buddhist values were not considered in the design of the 
constructs leading to Hofstede’s fifth dimension (Fang 2003). Fourth, inaccurate English 
translation has been found in some values of the Chinese Values Survey (CVS) which may 
have, in part, resulted in mis-interpretations in the cross cultural surveys and eventual 
meaningless findings (Fang 2003). Finally, compared to the first four dimensions, Fang 
(2003) reports that the fifth does not result from the same techniques of factor analysis as 
used earlier to validate the results; it does not have the same sampling background (students 
versus IBM employees). 
2.3.1.1 CƌitiƋues of the Hofstede͛s diŵeŶsioŶs of ŶatioŶal Đultuƌe 
 
Osoba (2009) poised that critiques present some rather poignant arguments for avoiding 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture. The most popular of these arguments are 
presented below. One argument, presented by Myers and Tan (2002), Baskerville (2003) 
and McSweeney (2002), is that ‘national cultures’ do not exist, since individuals from different 
nations may share one of the numerous cultures in each country. Thereby, contending that 
attributing a single culture to a nation is an anomaly that will only lead to measurement errors. 
In addition, McSweeney (2002) argues that Hofstede’s dimensions are completely and 
fundamentally flawed, the results of which are statistical anomalies. Another major issue with 
any cultural index is that – assuming it measures culture in the first place – the index 
immediately begins to become obsolete due to the dynamism of culture (Myers and Tan 
2002, Baskerville 2003, Osoba 2009). According to Hampden-Turner and Tompenaars 
(1997), Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture are linear, whilst true cultures are not. 
Therefore, even individuals who think similarly may act differently. Since culture includes 
various thoughts and various actions (and possibly other components, depending on the 
definition), a single number will not suffice. Most objectors to Hofstede argue that culture 
itself is not quantifiable.  Others contend that since cultures consist of interdependent, self-
organizing values by dimension, no truly independent variable exists (Hampden-Turner and 
Tompenaars 1997). Baskerville (2003) and others argue that culture is difficult or impossible 
to measure. One criticism of previous quantitative studies of culture is the lack of support for 
using mathematical indices to measure culture. Osoba (2009) notes that whilst 
anthropologists have utilized matrices, such matrices are not derived mathematically. 
Instead, they are used as a form of rubric qualitatively to categorize certain ethnographic 
attributes. Baskervile (2003) argues that anthropologists and ethnologists “measure” culture 
by residing in a particular region and observing and noting values, beliefs, behaviors, and 
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symbols over a period of time. The main issue brought up by critics of mathematical indices 
is that the measures are typically compared based on political subdivisions. While many of 
the arguments are convincing, the alternatives available for scientifically studying culture and 
aid effectiveness are few. Cultures, however, do not follow such neat boundaries (Baskervile 
2003).  
Hofstede (2001) argues against critics who claim that the instrument used in generating the 
dimensions of culture is not reliable, and thus, describing the whole concept as mere rhetoric. 
Responding to the critics, Hofstede (2001) argues that the dimensions of culture compares 
cultures, not individuals in countries. Forgetting this fact, some novice researchers try to 
apply reliability calculations (like Cronbach alpha) on individual scores and find very low 
values. However, the reliability of a cross-country test can only be tested across countries. 
This requires data from a sufficient number of countries, say, 10 or more, without which the 
reliability of the instrument can simply not be tested in the textbook way and has to be taken 
for granted based on the literature. The best proof of the reliability of the dimension scores 
is their validity in explaining outside phenomena according to some kind of theory or logic. 
An unreliable test (one in which the measures contain too much random noise and too little 
information) cannot produce valid results, so if validity is found, reliability is proven too 
(Hofstede 2001). 
Another major assumption fielded by Osoba (2009) is that, even if the prior assumption holds 
up, each country’s culture has not changed since the late 1960s and/or early 1970s, when 
the questionnaires were completed. As is discussed by McSweeney (2002) and Myers and 
Tan (2002), whatever culture may be, it is definitely dynamic. Thus, it is possible that these 
measures may be somewhat obsolete for studying current-day trends. However, Osoba 
(2009) argues that even if the cultures have changed, if each nation’s culture has changed 
in approximately the same direction and magnitude as that of every other country, then the 
indexes may still measure some relative aspects of each country’s culture. 
2.3.1.2 JustifiĐatioŶ foƌ usiŶg the Hofstede͛s diŵeŶsioŶ of ŶatioŶal Đultuƌe 
 
The researcher chose to use the Hofstede’s dimension of national culture because of its 
robustness in the study of culture. Hofstede (2001) highlights that the Hofstede’s dimension 
of national culture are actually central tendencies for every nation and has been used by 
researchers in four categories. That is, mere mentioning, without referring to its contents 
(name-dropping); reviews and criticisms; replications and extensions to other countries; and 
paradigmatic applications, relating the conceptual framework to empirical phenomena in 
various fields (Sondergaard 1994). The contribution of the citations to the state of the art in 
social sciences and the comparative study of cultures increase from zero from the first 
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category to potentially dramatic in category 4. Although the country scores were originally 
produced in the early 1970s, many replications of Hofstede’s study on different samples have 
proved that the country ranking in his data is still valid (Mooij and Hofstede 2010). Hofstede 
(2001) describes more than 200 external comparative studies and replications that have 
supported his indexes. Hofstede (2001) explains that psychologists most often refer to 
individualism/collectivism, and more recently also to masculinity/feminity, but authors from 
other disciplines pick other dimensions. Sociologists and management researchers more 
often refer to power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Long/short-term orientation, 
because of its association with economic growth, appeals most to political economists. 
Although Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture have been criticized for relying too much 
on one American corporation’s employees (IBM), it has also been cited several thousand 
times due to its significant availability of data. By virtue of the Hofstede’s dimensions of 
national culture being cited so frequently, the results will also be easier to compare when 
applied to other regions and/or nations. Additionally, although Hofstede’s study (Hofstede 
2001) reports national cultures only, Osoba (2009) concedes that the cultural boundaries 
provided in his study – at the state level – were artificially imposed. Osoba (2009) reports 
that the analysis used in his study could be improved using data at the country level. Since 
country-level data could yield significantly more interesting results, “culture” will be allowed 
to cross state lines. Moreover, the country-level data can be summed up to either the 
metropolitan area or labor market area. These areas may provide more distinct and useful 
cultural boundaries than states. Such a study may more effectively respond to critics of 
quantitative cultural measurement, like Baskerville (2003). 
Although using Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture may raise the concern that the data 
are outdated (Zheng, Ghoul, Guedhami and Kwok 2012), Hofstede contends that these 
measures retain their validity over a long period because: national culture is extremely stable 
over time which is consistent with Williamson’s (2000) framework; and country scores along 
these dimensions do not provide a country’s absolute position but rather its position relative 
to other countries, which rarely shifts even if cultural changes occur (Hofstede 2001). 
Moreover, several recent cross-cultural studies have validated Hofstede’s work (Zheng, 
Ghoul, Guedhami and Kwok 2012). For example, in their review of recent advances in the 
culture and international business literature, Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, and Gibson 
(2005) indicate that most of the cultural dimensions suggested by recent studies are 
conceptually related and empirically correlated with Hofstede’s dimensions, suggesting that 
the latter are quite robust (Zheng, Ghoul, Guedhami and Kwok 2012). 
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2.3.1.3 Manageƌial ƌeleǀaŶĐe of Hofstede͛s diŵeŶsioŶs of ŶatioŶal Đultuƌe 
 
Taras, Steel and Kirkman (2012) lament that Hofstede’s cultural scores have been 
successfully used to explain and predict a wide range of business and economics 
phenomena and processes in human resource management (Ramamoorthy & Caroll 1998), 
international trade and cooperation (Kogut & Singh 1988), marketing (Yeniyur & Townsend 
2003), accounting and audit (Yamamura, Frakes, Sanders & Ahn 1996), entrepreneurship 
(Mueller & Thomas 2001) and many more. As a result, Hostede’s work provided a foundation 
for a wide range of corporate cross-cultural training programmes. It has become an integral 
part of international business administration and management curricula (Bhawuk & Brislin 
2000; Landis, Bennett & Bennett 2006). The indices proved especially useful in pre-departure 
training for expatriates and multi-cultural workgroup development programmes (Littrell, 
Salas, Hess, Paley & Riedel 2006). 
2.3.2 Conceptual framework for measuring the impact of national culture on aid 
effectiveness 
 
In order to measure the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness, the researcher 
developed a conceptual framework from a combination of three sources of theoretical 
frameworks identified above. These were the Hofstede’s five dimensions of national culture 
(Hofstede 1991), the Paris Declaration’s five principles of aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness 2005) as well as the Easterly and Pfutze’s five best practices of aid 
(Easterly & Pfutze 2008). An attempt was made to select and use one of the three theories 
but none was competent to contain the subject of study on its own. Thereby, warranting a 
combination of all three to develop one robust conceptual framework which sufficiently 
underpinned the study. 
The term conceptual framework is used when concepts from various theories or/and 
research findings are used to guide a study (Unisa 2012). The conceptual framework 
provided eclectic and dialectic reconstruction of the three sources of theoretical framework 
identified above, which assisted the researcher to determine and maintain the focus of the 
study. Unisa (2012) adds that conceptual models refer to use of a formal diagrammatical 
representation of concepts or theories to guide the study. Therefore, the diagrammatic 
representation in Figure 2, below, was the main framework that underpinned the entire study. 
That is, the conceptual framework developed served as the main structure for the whole 
thesis. These includes, literature review; data collection instruments; presentation of data; 
discussion of the findings; formulation of recommendations; and the development of 
institutional framework for aid effectiveness.  
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In development aid transactions, culture can be an important factor not only on the part of 
the donor but also on the part of the recipient. Recent findings on role of culture in economic 
transactions show that culture matters for economic outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 
2009; Sapienza, Zingales & Guiso 2006). However, anecdotal evidence shows that donor 
objectives are in conflict with local preferences and culture, which leads to unsustainable aid 
projects and failure of development paradigms (Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom & Shivakumar 
2005; Moyo 2009; Altaf 2011; Marchesi, Sabani & Dreher 2011; Escobar 2011). Debrat 
(2009) argues that underestimation of the role of cultural factors in the development of human 
societies can make development programmes fail. Adding that it must be borne in mind at 
the outset that any development project is first and foremost a political project sustained by 
cultural references and based on myths. It should not be forgotten that culture provides 
politics with the myths and utopia without which it is nothing (Debrat 2009). Hence, this 
conceptual framework aims to highlight the structural linkages between national culture and 
the effectiveness of aid. The conceptual framework shown in Figure 2, below, is elucidated 
as follows: 
i. Understanding the dimensions of national culture: The process of aid effectiveness 
starts with understanding the five dimensions of national culture as purported by 
Hofstede (1991). They include the following: 
• Understanding the relationships and variations between the rich and the 
poor, the powerful and the less powerful in the society (power distance). 
• Understanding the relationships between ‘I’ and ‘We’ concepts among the 
local population (individualism versus collectivism) 
• Understanding the relationships between the concepts of ‘ego enhancing’ 
and ‘caring for others’ (masculinity versus femininity) 
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FIGURE 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURE ON AID EFFECTIVENESS 
 
• Understanding how people are threatened by uncertainties as well as their 
coping mechanisms (uncertainty avoidance) 
• Understanding people’s reaction towards pursuit of happiness versus peace 
of mind (long versus short term orientation) 
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ii. Applying the five principles of aid effectiveness: The next level after understanding 
the local culture is application of the five principles of aid effectiveness as defined by 
the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (2005). A good understanding of each 
dimension of national culture contributes to a sound understanding of at least a 
principle of aid effectiveness.  
The five principles of aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness 2005) 
and their relationships with the five dimensions of national culture (Hofstede 1991) 
are explained as follows: 
• Ownership: The ability of the less powerful (or the poor) in the society to believe that 
some members of the society are more powerful (or richer) than them enhances their 
willingness to own aid programmes. Thus, a good understanding of ‘power distance’ 
dimension of national culture espouses a learner to understanding the ‘ownership’ 
principle of aid effectiveness. Therefore, the two segments of the population (rich and 
poor) work together to pursue the ownership of aid, aimed at improving the quality of 
life of the poor in the society. This principle therefore, relates to the ability of 
developing countries to set their own development strategies, improve their 
institutions and tackle corruption.  
• Mutual accountability: A sound understanding of the way individuals in the society 
value themselves (‘I’) versus the way they value others (‘We’), goes a long way in 
determining the effectiveness of aid. This relates to individualism versus collectivism 
dimensions of national culture. Strategies for developing mutual accountability is 
better appreciated when the donor understands whether they are dealing with an 
individualist or collectivist society. Thus, whether people are more concerned about 
their immediate family members and themselves or for the larger society. With this 
understanding, donors and developing countries develop culturally appropriate and 
mutually accountable strategies for development results. For example, the Institute 
of Medicine - IOM (2014) notes that evaluations can be used to hold governments, 
funders, and other stakeholders accountable for the use of donor resources that are 
dedicated to large initiatives that have proliferated and have high political visibility. 
IOM (2014) adds that the US President’s Emergency Plan for AID Relief (PEPFAR) 
did an extraordinarily good job of this. While monitoring was target oriented and not 
designed to measure impact, every year, stakeholders could say exactly what had 
been done and how many people had been reached. The Global Fund on the other 
hand, established a ten-million-dollar fund for investing in data infrastructures in 
target countries to enable rigorous analysis; disaggregation of data by time, person, 
and place; and inclusion of comparison groups where feasible (IOM 2014). Economic 
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and the outcome of an initiative and should be tracked. It is also important to think 
about how to understand issues of leadership, power, trust, communication, and 
community engagement (IOM 2014). Mutual accountability can be hampered by a 
lack of quality routine data collected within countries, reflecting a need for 
management expertise to help countries collect better data, including process data, 
outcome data, and financial data. Against this background, IOM (2014) recommends 
that mathematical modelling can provide interesting and useful information for 
understanding the potential impact of an intervention in different epidemiologic 
settings. This type of modeling also can be used to create counterfactual situations 
to predict the course of an epidemic in the absence of a particular intervention. The 
counterfactual projections can then be compared to the projected outcome with the 
intervention implemented. Thus, donors need to ensure that they are providing the 
data that local stakeholders need, in the manner that is most useful to them (Oxfam 
Research Report 2015). Dietrich (2013) concurs that a locally driven programme 
approach needs to change the fundamental relationship with partners from “control” 
to “autonomy.” Knack and Eubank (2009) elucidate that within the context of the Paris 
Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, donors agreed to set a standard to shift 
ownership of development programs to the country level. 
• Alignment: An understanding of a country’s ‘ego enhancing’ versus ‘caring for others,’ 
(masculinity versus femininity) characteristics determines how aid can be aligned to 
support local systems. Masculine countries are more concerned about ego 
enhancing issues, while feminine countries are more amenable to caring for others. 
With these understanding, donor countries and organisations bring their support in 
line with local context, and use local systems towards local capacity building for 
sustainability. Lensu (2003) postulates the conceptual and practical implications of 
the commitment to respect culture for international humanitarian assistance both at 
the level of principles and policy. The Education for all Global Monitoring Report 
(2009) maintain that progress on aligning aid with government programmes has been 
minimal. Adding that even in countries with good systems, donors are not necessarily 
making more use of them, indicating that quality is not the only factor influencing 
donor choices. For example, although Mongolia’s financial management system was 
ranked one of the highest among the fifty-four countries monitored, only 17 per cent 
of all aid to the country was managed through its national system (Education for all 
Global Monitoring Report 2009). WHO (2009) alludes that often cultural and social 
norm interventions are integrated with strategies, such as training in conflict 
resolution skills, role modelling or community-based activities (e.g. micro-loans). This 
makes it difficult to isolate the independent effects of interventions for changing 
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norms related to violence. Rarely, however, are they thoroughly evaluated, making it 
currently difficult to assess their effectiveness (WHO 2009).  
• Managing aid for results: People in a country may feel threatened by a variety of 
uncertainties and take steps to cope with the uncertainties. Understanding these 
fears of the unknown and their coping mechanisms relate to uncertainty avoidance 
dimension of national culture. The ways a government cope with uncertainty and 
address important issues belong to the cultural heritage of the country (Dang 2014). 
For example, Dang (2014) asserts that the U.S during 2007 to 2009 and Japan in 
1990s faced a similar banking crisis. However, the citizens and the governments in 
the two countries responded in different ways which reflect their distinct national 
cultures. Japan, which has a collectivist and long term oriented culture, relied on the 
state role and tried to rescue every failing firm. In contrast, the U.S., which has an 
individualistic and short term oriented culture, let investment giants go bankrupt and 
employed strong measures to quickly cut spending and increase tax. The result was 
that while Japan had experienced a slow recovery the U.S made stable progress (Lu 
2013). In order to improve aid effectiveness, the country must develop effective 
systems for managing results, to improve certainty of actions and use information 
generated for management decision making. Kenny and Savedoff (2014) reports that 
results-based aid programmes are criticized for being more vulnerable to corruption 
than input-based programs that monitor inputs and impose specific procedures for 
procurement and financial accounting. The critical factor in choosing among aid 
modalities is to recognize that failure costs, the foregone benefits of a program that 
has been defrauded, are the true costs of corruption (Kenny & Savedoff 2014). By 
focusing on whether or not a programme is achieving results, it is possible to make 
programmes achieve more and limit the impact of corruption on development (Kenny 
& Savedoff 2014). Therefore, developing countries and donors must focus on 
producing – and measuring – results, to improve transparency of aid. 
• Harmonization: A sound understanding of people’s ‘pursuit for happiness’ versus 
‘pursuit for peace of mind’ determines whether the country has a long or short term 
orientation culture. This background information assists donor countries and 
organisations to co-ordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information 
to avoid duplication of actions. Ohler (2013) postulates that the coordination efforts 
among bilateral donors seem rather limited, suggesting that their political and 
economic interests prevent closer coordination. In this light, Lawson (2013) explains 
that USAID issued guidance to field missions on compliance with Paris Declaration 
commitments on donor coordination in March 2006. The guidance emphasized that 
the commitments made by the United States and other donors in Paris was to “look 
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for ways to complement and mutually reinforce one another’s programs in support of 
partner plans,” and encouraged field staff to “join other donors in endorsing local 
agreements to the fullest extent possible.” A July 2012 update to USAID’s Automated 
Directives System (ADS), covering grants and contributions to bilateral donors, 
appears to reflect increasing acceptance of coordination efforts that involve joint 
funding (Lawson 2013). Coordination efforts are also necessary to address both short 
and long term country interests, in line with the people’s specific priorities. To 
increase harmonization of aid and reduce aid dependency, ActionAid (2011) 
recommends that donors and recipients should jointly design (recipients) and support 
(donors) strong national development strategies based on democratic ownership. 
Additionally, they should give preference to local procurement and accelerate aid 
delivery (ActionAid 2011). 
iii. Applying the five best practice dimensions of aid effectiveness: A good understanding 
of the dimensions of national culture, as well as the Paris Declaration principles of 
aid effectiveness helps donors and developing countries to work towards application 
of the best practices for aid effectiveness. The five best practice dimensions of aid 
effectiveness were identified by Easterly and Pfutze (2008), thus; 
• Selectivity: an understanding of ‘power distance’ dimension of national 
culture as well as the ‘ownership’ principle of aid effectiveness helps donors 
and developing countries to make informed decisions on allocating aid 
towards those really in need (pro-poor). Thereby, increasing aid impact and 
yielding aid effectiveness. 
• Moderate overhead costs: A good understanding of a developing country as 
either individualist or collectivist society informs the development of 
strategies for mutual accountability between the donor and recipient 
countries. This in turn, helps in the determination of increased cost efficiency 
and beneficiary focused strategies, such as reducing contractors’ overhead 
costs in order to channel more direct resources to the beneficiaries. 
Individualist cultures are more amenable to allow for high overheads while 
collectivist cultures are more likely to channel more resources towards the 
poor (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkon 2010). 
• Preventing ineffective aid channels/untying aid:  Masculine countries are 
more focused on building egos while feminine countries are concerned about 
caring for the poor (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkon 2010). Therefore, an 
appreciation of a country as a masculine or feminine society and aligning 
strategies to the country’s local context and systems prevents ineffective aid 
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channels; thereby, reinforcing local capacity building and eventual aid 
programme sustainability. 
Transparency: Where information is used for aid management decision 
making, uncertainties are reduced or avoided, and transparency is ensured. 
Also, the unknowns become known and fears are reduced. Zhao, Seung and 
Du (2003) report that based on a cross-sectional data of 40 countries in 7 
years, statistical results show that the presence of low transparency (and high 
corruption) significantly hindered the inflow of foreign direct investments to 
host countries. Demelew (2014) agrees that except corruption, institutional 
variables have insignificant effect on the flow of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) into sub-Saharan Africa region. Thus, transparency reduces corrupt 
practices in aid management; thereby, increasing aid effectiveness. African 
Development Bank (2009) posits that accountability has worked best when it 
has combined strong community based monitoring with high-level 
representatives such as parliamentarians, policymakers or officials being 
prepared to be held to account. 
• Aid specialization: The pursuit for happiness versus pursuit for peace of mind 
(long versus short-term orientation) makes developing countries to either 
want to enjoy everything ‘now’ or invest for the ‘future.’ Thus, an 
understanding of the long/short-term orientation dimension of national culture 
will reinforce harmonization of aid (aid specialization) towards reducing aid 
fragmentation in the country. Well-coordinated and harmonized aid creates 
efficiency and effectiveness in the aid space, thereby, reaching many more 
beneficiaries. 
iv. Attainment of aid effectiveness: Consistent approaches towards understanding the 
national culture, applying the principles of aid effectiveness and the best practices of 
aid are more likely to attain increased aid focus towards the poor; increased efficiency 
of aid; increased local capacity for programme sustainability; transparency and 
reduction in corrupt practices; as well as reduced fragmentation of aid. These in turn, 
culminates in aid effectiveness. 
 
2.4 ROLE OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN AID EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Recent findings on the role of culture in aid effectiveness show that culture matters in aid 
outcomes.  
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Minasyan (2013) alludes that cultural differences between donors and recipients may give 
rise to increased information asymmetry problem between the two and negatively affect aid 
effectiveness. Anecdotal evidence shows that often donor objectives are in conflict with local 
culture and preferences, which may result in unsustainable aid projects and failure of 
development paradigms (Moyo 2009; Altaf 2011; Marchesi, Sabani, Dreher 2011; Minasyan 
2013). Alkire (2004) on the other hand, identifies four distinct criticisms that are commonly 
raised against foreign aid on the grounds of their alleged neglect of culture:  
i. Inefficient or failed projects: aid activities failed or not realized potential gains 
because staff did not accurately understand cultural influences and made 
inaccurate assumptions about beneficiary behaviors or values. 
ii. Unrealized resources: foreign aid activities have not realized the potential 
pro-poor economic gains from cultural industries and culture-based skills and 
knowledge, be it performance or handicrafts or tourism industries in niche 
markets. Not only might these activities be lucrative and labor intensive; they 
may also have an aspect of “meaning” and history that some jobs lack. 
iii. Imposition of values: foreign aid activities have deliberately tried to change 
cultural norms or practices that staff considered negative (nomadic lifestyles, 
gender discrimination, nonmarket worldviews, caste barriers) to those it 
supports (markets, individualism, materialism). 
iv. Valuable cultural aspects undermined: foreign aid activities – at both the 
project and policy level – have had unintended and unanticipated cultural 
impacts that are widely viewed to be negative. Some groups judge that the 
negative cultural impacts outweigh or deeply compromise the positive 
outcomes of certain activities. This criticism is common among those who 
oppose globalization, westernization, or materialism on cultural grounds 
(Alkire 2004). 
Against this background, Sen (2004) suggests that it is important to study how culture affects 
aid and development. Two processes that are useful in addressing the role of culture in aid 
effectiveness has been highlighted by Alkire (2004) as thus; comprehensive development 
framework (CDF), and informed participation and the approach to indigenous people. The 
CDF, developed by the then World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, is based on the 
following principles: 
• A long-term holistic vision of needs and solutions 
• Ownership by the country 
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• Country-led partnership among internal and external actions, and  
• Focus on development results 
Alkire (2004) reports that within the World Bank’s operational directives (OD) for example, 
the OD requires that all Bank projects should respect persons’ “dignity, human rights, and 
cultural uniqueness” and that participation is to be “informed” – which means that particular 
kinds of knowledge must be gained and/or shared with project beneficiaries. Particular 
attention to indigenous knowledge may increase project effectiveness. The OD’s elaboration 
of informed participation is of particular interest: The Bank’s policy is that the strategy for 
addressing the issues pertaining to indigenous people must be based on the informed 
participation of the indigenous people themselves. The elements of informed participation 
outlined by Alkire (2004) are as follows: 
• Full consideration [must be made] of the options preferred by the indigenous people 
• Participants must anticipate adverse trends 
• Local forms of organization, religious beliefs, and resource use must be respected 
• Production systems that are well adapted to the needs and environment of 
indigenous people must be supported 
• There must be early handover of project management to local people 
• There must be long lead times 
• Incremental funding (possibly) must be used. 
 
2.5 DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL CULTURE AND THEIR IMPACT ON AID 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
There is strong evidence that decades of foreign aid have done little in changing the destinies 
of many African states, most of which are currently experiencing low growth rates. For 
example, despite the transfer of about $5 trillion in gross official development assistance 
(ODA) to developing countries from 1960 through 2014, a substantial amount of the world 
remains in extreme poverty and stagnant growth. This suggests to some extent that there is 
more to the African problem than just sending money. Andrews (2009) argues that without a 
proper understanding of the culture of the people aid seeks to help, no effective impacts 
should be expected. Andrews (2009) adds that in many cases, people have certain 
fundamental belief systems and practices that impact their perceptions of what development 
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should entail. If these factors are ignored, one cannot have a holistic understanding of the 
dynamics of aid, politics and socio-economic development in Africa. 
Andrews (2009) argues that theorists such as Amin Peter Bauer and Andre Gunder Frank 
have blamed the global economic structure for the underdevelopment of the Third World.  
Andrews (2009) cites Frank (1966) who concluded in an article that “underdevelopment is 
generated by…the development of capitalism” and that the more a country is close to the 
centre, the more marginalized it is. Andrews (2009) also cites Bauer (2000) who argued that 
development aid promotes corruption and dependence on others as it creates the impression 
that emergence from poverty depends on external donations rather than on people’s own 
efforts, motivation, arrangements and institutions. The ways in which ODA could potentially 
exacerbate corruption and harm recipient governance has been well documented by Knack 
(2001, 2004) and Charron (2011). For example, when aid dependence increases (measured 
by ODA as a proportion of government consumption), it is expected that recipient states will 
become less accountable for their own actions, that incentives for domestic corruption will be 
increased by increasing conflict over aid funds, and that aid will essentially compensate for 
poor economic policies and weak government institutions by offering a crutch (Knack 2001, 
2004; Knack & Rahman 2007; Charron 2011). Knack and Rahman (2007) estimates the 
effects of several determinants of bureaucratic quality using the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) data and finds that the quality of bureaucratic services is negatively impacted 
as the proportion of a country’s ODA rises relative to Gross National Product (GNP). 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) reports that the overall international community continues to 
suffer from many problems of aid. As a result, the aid community now emphasizes improved 
quality of the delivery and allocation of official aid as a necessary means to achieve positive 
outcomes (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005, Accra Agenda for Action, 2008). 
Towards this direction, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends five 
principles for the attainment of aid effectiveness – ownership, mutual accountability, 
alignment, managing for results, and harmonization. To monitor the quality of aid, five best 
practice dimensions were identified based on Easterly and Pfutze’s (2008) agency “best 
practices” which includes agency transparency, minimal overhead costs, fragmentation of 
aid, delivery to more effective channels, and allocation to less corrupt, more democratically 
free, poor countries. These concepts reflect standards identified over a number of years of 
research on the need to reform the allocation and management of foreign aid (Accra Agenda 
for Action 2008; Birdsall, Kharas, Mahgoub & Perakis 2010, Center for Global Development 
2007; Commission for Africa 2005; Easterly, 2007; Easterly & Pfutze 2008; Easterly & 
Williamson 2011; IMF& World Bank 2005, 2006; Knack & Rahman 2007; Knack, Rogers, & 
Eubank 2010; Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005; Rome Declaration on 
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Harmonization 2003; Roodman 2009; United Nations Millennium Project 2005; United 
Nations Development Program 2005). 
Evidence from Easterly and Williamson’s (2011) study indicates that there has been 
substantial improvement in discontinuing ineffective channels of aid delivery, and a little 
improvement in transparency. However, aid fragmentation and selectivity favoring non-
corrupt democratic donors continue to show no improvement over very poor performance, 
despite the escalation of rhetoric and Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
commitments and Accra Agenda for Action (2008). 
Each of these principles of aid effectiveness and the best practices of aid are discussed in 
detail, within the context of the Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture, below. 
 
2.5.1 Impact of power distance on aid effectiveness 
 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) hold that in large PD countries, inequalities among 
people are expected and desired; less powerful people are dependent and emotionally 
polarized between dependence and counter dependence. This culminates in the powerful 
class aiming to become richer and more powerful. It is therefore desirable that aid funds 
should flow from the rich to the less powerful, less corrupt and poor countries. It is also 
desirable that developing countries set their own strategies, improve their own institutions 
and tackle corruption (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005). These entails 
demonstrating aid programme ownership. To achieve this, selectivity is required in aid 
administration. 
 
2.5.1.1 Selectivity as a best practice of aid in Nigeria 
 
Effective and efficient use of development financing requires both donors and partner 
countries to do their utmost best to fight corruption (Accra Agenda for Action 2008). This 
require trust, close collaboration and partnership between donors and recipients. Another 
best practice emphasized by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), IMF and 
World Bank (2005), Easterly and Williamson (2011), is selectivity. These statements posit 
that aid is more effective at reducing poverty when it goes to (a) those countries in most need 
of it (the poorest countries), (b) those countries with democratically accountable 
governments, and (c) those countries with less corrupt governments. Of course, the poorest 
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countries are more likely to be authoritarian and corrupt, so agencies must strike a balance 
between supporting the poorest countries and supporting those with the best governance. 
In a study to measure the overall selectivity by donors, Easterly and Williamson (2011) 
calculated the share of aid going to low-income countries, free countries (based on 
democracy scores), and less corrupt governments. Results of the study indicates that the 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Global Fund were the best performers. Their top 
scores on selectivity mainly reflects their successes at directing aid funds to “non-corrupt” 
poor countries. In contrast, the worst performers in Easterly and Williamson’s (2011) report 
were two major Scandinavian donors – Sweden and Norway – that have a strikingly high 
tolerance for non-democratic recipients. Perhaps reflecting the culture of Scandinavian aid 
going to more ideologically socialist regimes that perform badly on democracy measures. 
The USA was the largest donor in this group, perhaps reflecting the primacy of foreign policy 
objectives rather than aid selectivity in a superpower. 
On average, results from Easterly and Williamson’s (2011) study shows that 24% of aid 
flowed to free countries in 2008, and 20% to non-corrupt countries without much variation 
across bilateral, multilateral, or UN donors. Additionally, the study confirms that the share of 
aid flowing to corrupt countries actually increased from the mid-1990s through 2002 and then 
has fluctuated around the new higher level since then. Ironically, the period of increase is the 
same period over which donors began to openly condemn corruption, with the rhetoric 
implying that aid should increasingly shift from more corrupt to less corrupt countries. 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) found no evidence for either a positive shift or a perverse 
negative shift. Instead, they confirmed earlier findings that the increased share of aid going 
to corrupt countries was driven almost entirely by the increased corruption of the same aid 
recipients rather than by a shift from less corrupt to more corrupt countries. As a result, the 
poor countries has remained poor -  since 1990, the share of least developed countries and 
other low income countries has been fluctuating around a constant level; thereby, 
contradicting aid rhetoric that calls for an increased “poverty selectivity” (Easterly and 
Williamson 2011). For all agencies, the average share of aid flowing to low-income countries 
was 45%. Bilateral had a lower average share of low income countries than multilaterals and 
UN agencies. This may reflect greater success of the “poverty agenda” in multilaterals and 
UN agencies than in bilaterals, who often have cultural and traditional ties to certain countries 
for historical reasons. 
2.5.2 Impact of individualism/collectivism on aid effectiveness 
 
In high individualism cultures, countries tend to focus on the concept of “economic man”, 
where every agent seeks to maximize his own utility (Osoba 2009). Such country encourages 
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capitalism and thus, corruption. Most aid agencies in individualism countries are self-
centered, compared to how they care about others (aid beneficiaries) in developing countries. 
These agencies are more likely to charge extremely high overhead costs in order to keep 
their desire of remaining rich, compared to their counterparts in the same industry. The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) assert that to deal with this complex, donors and 
developing countries must demonstrate to be mutually accountable for development results. 
While the donors and their contractors ensure moderate overhead costs on aid funds, 
developing countries must demonstrate ownership and work towards greater aid 
effectiveness. 
2.5.2.1 Moderate overhead costs as a best practice of aid in Nigeria. 
 
Most agencies agree that extreme overhead costs should be avoided (IMF & World Bank 
2005, Easterly and Williamson 2011). Although optimal overhead ratio is not zero and there 
is no established benchmark for charging overheads, extreme charges on overheads could 
be considered as diversion of aid funds. Likewise, a well-managed aid requires funding of 
management activities such as fiduciary oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and project 
design and implementation costs (Easterly and Williamson 2011). IOM (2014) asserts that if 
you want good evaluation of a programme, you have to invest up to 20 percent of evaluation 
funds to go towards good design work. The Global Fund for instance, adopts programme 
impact review approaches that involve partners and build on in-country evaluation programs. 
They make the evaluations periodic so they occur at regular intervals coordinated with in-
country evaluations (IOM 2014). They also use plausibility design to provide evidence of 
impact, both positive and negative impact, and taking into account nonprogramme 
influences. They build country platforms that build on national systems and includes 
programme reviews; and produce practical results and recommendations for grant 
management, grant renewal, and reprogramming (IOM 2014). The definition of impact that 
Global Fund uses for its evaluation have two components: assessing final disease outcomes 
and impact, and assessing contributions and causation along the results chain (IOM 2014). 
The first asks if there has been a change in disease mortality and morbidity or incidence and 
prevalence and if that change has been positive or negative. The second asks if there has 
been a change in outcomes, positive or negative. 
Overall, transparency on overhead reporting is dismal, therefore, there are limited data 
available to compare across agencies.  
In summary, the extremely poor performance on overhead costs are the UN agencies, with 
very high costs driven by salaries. A secondary result is that multilateral agencies have higher 
salaries and other overhead costs relative to lending than do bilaterals. Easterly and 
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Williamson (2011) gave two plausible explanations for these patterns. The structure of 
ownership, also referred to as the culture of various countries involved in a partnership: 
ownership of multilaterals is diffuse, typically with ownership shared proportional to the 
donor’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Ownership is even more diffuse with UN agencies 
where every country has one vote at the UN. Diffuse ownership means that there is less 
effective control over salaries and other costs. This is similar to a diffuse culture, where ‘I’ 
and ‘We’ cultures come to play in a collaborative, such as between aid donor and recipient 
countries or various countries that make up a multilateral or UN agency.  
Mooij and Hofstede (2010) elucidate individualism/collectivism as people looking after 
themselves and their immediate family only, versus people belonging to in-groups that look 
after them in exchange for loyalty. When countries from individualism and collectivism 
cultures come together to form a multilateral or UN Agency, only a fraction of each country’s 
culture is experienced at the recipients’ country. While agencies from individualism countries 
imbibe the ‘economic man’ culture, by promoting extreme overhead costs, agencies from 
collectivism cultures focus on reducing overheads in order to invest more on the beneficiary 
and the welfare of the collective (Hofstede 2001). A diffused culture or ownership diffusion 
results in a hybrid of both individualism and collectivism cultures. For example, when the 
overall budget of a UN agency with N owners increases by $1, and N is large, each country 
only sees a small $1/N increase in its spending on the agency. An interesting special case, 
according to Easterly and Williamson (2011), is the European Union (EU), which is 
technically a bilateral but obviously has diffuse ownership and indeed has a remarkably high 
overhead cost ratio. 
2.5.3 Impact of masculinity/femininity on aid effectiveness 
 
Governments in masculine cultures are more likely to give priority to growth and sacrifice the 
living environment for this purpose. Conversely, governments in feminine cultures are more 
likely to give aid to developing countries (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). In democratic 
countries, cultural masculinity and femininity impact the likelihood that elected delegates and 
members of government will be women. This in turn, has an impact on the type of leadership 
and consequent foreign policies the governments will enact, as relevant to foreign aid. 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) recall that in a computation of twenty-one rich 
countries on a Commitment to Development Index (CDI), the CDI was significantly 
(negatively) correlated only with masculinity culture index. The correlation was weaker than 
for money flows, as policies on behalf of welfare and aid in the donor country sometimes 
conflict with policies on the receiving countries abroad. Correlation also exists between age 
and femininity/masculinity values, which when studied, might show some impact on aid. For 
example, when people grow older, they tend to become more social and less ego oriented 
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(lower masculinity). At the same time, the gap between women’s and men’s 
femininity/masculinity values becomes smaller, and at around age forty-five it has closed 
completely. This is the age at which a woman’s role as a potential child-bearer has generally 
ended; there is no more biological reason for her values to differ from a man’s (except that 
men can still beget). It is therefore likely that a rich masculine country with an ageing 
population is likely to increase in propensity of providing aid to developing countries.  
Donors in masculine countries are more likely to give aid through ineffective channels (tied 
aid), such as food aid and aid allocated as technical assistance, in order to prioritize growth 
of their internal economy. This goes against the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) which espouses that untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing 
transaction costs for partner countries and improving country ownership and alignment. In 
some cases, full implementation of this particular Paris Declaration may be challenging, when 
faced with local realities.  For example, Philip (2013) suggests that total foreign aid and food 
aid impact positively on poverty, while technical aid reduces poverty. To deal with this 
complex, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that donor countries 
and organisations bring their support in line with developing countries’ strategies and use 
local systems. This is referred to as aid alignment. The IOM (2014) asserts that if you really 
do want country ownership, you need to have time in which countries can change their 
management and information systems in line and not have different systems. Adding that 
local capacity building is central to development, because it is not the grand outsider who is 
going to bring about a change. The concept of tied aid is described in more detail, below. 
 
2.5.3.1 Untying aid (preventing ineffective channels) as a best practice of aid in Nigeria 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) describe tied aid as when it specifies that a certain 
percentage of the aid must be spent on the donor country’s goods or services. Mujajati (2014) 
says that tied aid consists of attaching strings to financial assistance packages for the benefit 
of the aid provider. This includes share of aid that is tied, food aid, and aid allocated as 
technical assistance to the recipient countries. Miquel-Florensa (2007) reports an evaluation 
of the differential effects of Tied and Untied aid on growth, and how these effects vary with 
the policy environment of the recipient country. It was found that aid effectiveness is not 
significantly different for the two types of aid. However, when conditioned on policies, untied 
aid had a greater impact on growth than tied aid.  
Most agencies agree that allocating aid in this manner does not promote the interests of the 
recipient country; instead, it is used as a means to increase the donor country’s exports 
(Commission for Africa 2005; IMF & World Bank 2005; United Nations Development Program 
2005; Easterly & Williamson 2011). Clay, Matthew and Luisa (2009) assert that tied aid raises 
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the cost of goods, services and works by 15% to 30% on average, and by as much as 40% 
or more for food aid. Charron (2011) posits that bilateral ODA is argued by many to be tied 
with the political agenda of the donor country and less focused on reducing the gap between 
the rich and the poor through “good governance” reform in the recipient country for its own 
sake. Abdallah (2014) echoed a report by Development Initiatives that at least 20% of the 
aid money rich countries claim giving to developing countries never actually leaves their 
shores. Adding that at least $22 billion of the over $100 billion (22%) reported by donors as 
bilateral ODA in 2011 was never transferred to developing countries. The money was spent 
on activities in donor countries, or put towards cancellation or rescheduling debts. 
Clay, Matthew and Luisa (2009) assert that the proportion of fully untied bilateral aid rose 
progressively from 46% in 1999-2001 to 76% in 2007, and for least developed countries 
(LDCs) it increased from 57% to 86%. Easterly and Williamson (2011) hint that despite 
decades of criticism, the largest bilateral, the United States, still ties a quarter of its aid. Since 
1996 when the US reported 72% tied aid, there was no data for 1997-2005, but resumed at 
37% in 2006, further decreasing to 25% by 2008. The tied aid for US is still maintained at 
25.3% in 2012 (OECD 2013). According to OECD (2013), the total tying status of ODA by all 
DAC member countries in 2012 was 14.3% (see Appendix A7). This average was largely 
made up by the following DAC countries: Greece (93.6%), Portugal (75.4%), Austria (62.6%), 
Czech Republic (54.9%) and Korea (50.3%), respectively. Two UN agencies also perform 
poorly on this measure by the very nature of their mission. United Nations Regular 
Programme for Technical Assistance (UNTA) reports donating 100% of its aid as technical 
assistance and WFP gives 84% of aid as food (Easterly & Williamson 2011). 
The changes over the past 10 years indicate that the 2001 recommendation on untying of 
aid, together with other international agreements such as the Paris Declaration, have had an 
overall positive impact on further untying aid. But there are important qualifications. Free-
standing technical cooperation (TC) and food aid were excluded from the recommendation 
and both remain significant grey areas, with 30% and at least 50% respectively still reported 
as tied, and the tying status of significant proportions not being reported by some donors. 
Clay, Matthew and Luisa (2009) elucidate that surveyed country partner stakeholders 
strongly affirmed that untying is about transferring responsibility for planning and managing 
funds from donors to recipients. Practically, untying is then a matter of contracts, modalities, 
use of country systems and offering local business an opportunity to compete successfully 
for contracts.  
They are less concerned about removing biases between donor partners in their trade, 
except where excessive inefficiencies of tying significantly reduce the resource transfer value 
of aid. Many formally untied projects were found to be de facto tied or to have only some 
untied components. In most investment projects the primary or head contracts and most of 
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the contract components were still procured from the donor country, even if procurement was 
channeled through recipient systems. Reasons for this de facto tying include: (i) donor 
regulations; (ii) lack of local capacity (iii) local and regional contractors being unable to 
compete internationally (especially if large-scale contracts are being procured, e.g, because 
of weak local secondary markets for credit and professional insurance); (iv) unequal access 
to information; (v) potential risk aversion at donor headquarters; and (vi) pressure for speedy 
implementation (Clay, Matthew and Luisa 2009). 
Clay, Matthew and Luisa (2009) contend that untied aid is cost-effective (value for money), 
and this was broadly confirmed by the study. In most cases procurement costs were 
competitive with local and international market prices. Occasionally costs were higher, 
reflecting small-scale tendering processes and social networks. The country studies found 
that a positive approach to the use of untied funds, including using programmatic modalities 
such as general budgetary support, sectoral basket funding and joint pooling by donors, as 
well as adopting country systems for procurement, were promoting ownership and facilitating 
alignment with partner country priorities. By untying, the balance of sourcing goods and 
services was shifted towards local suppliers, thereby promoting local business development 
(developmental impact). In addition, capacity building and knowledge transfer appear to be 
more likely where local and regional firms of medium capacity undertake project investment 
activities. However, the linkage effects are limited due to the low development of many local 
markets. 
Although food is often given to developing countries for humanitarian purposes, carrying hard 
food from the donor to recipient countries benefit the donor countries’ export program more 
than the aid itself. Donors ignore the strategic need to use cash to buy food from local or 
nearby producers to encourage sustainable economic development around the beneficiary 
communities. Easterly and Williamson (2011) lament that food aid is often tied, and in kind 
transfers are worse than cash transfers. Food aid is therefore an inefficient way to provide 
assistance. It is viewed as a way for higher income countries to shed their excess agricultural 
products without any concern for the local markets in the receiving country (IMF & World 
Bank 2006; United Nations Millennium Project 2005; Easterly & Williamson 2011). For 
example, the largest donors of food aid are the EU, US, and Australia, who are not 
surprisingly, the agricultural powerhouses. These three donors are also relatively large givers 
of humanitarian disaster relief, and this is significantly correlated with food aid across donors 
(Easterly and Williamson 2011) 
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2.5.3.2 When is aid not helpful?  
 
Shilgba (2014) argues that any foreign aid that frustrates entrepreneurship and job creation 
is bad for Africa. For example, if a development assistance loan is granted that requires 
importation of a particular commodity from a foreign destination and this stops local 
production of the commodity or results in the shut-down of local industries that produce that 
commodity, then it is bad aid. Uneze (2012) argues that aid uncertainty measured as the 
standard deviation over the mean has a negative impact on private investments and therefore 
weakens the value of foreign aid on domestic private investment. Van, Kristen, Bruce and 
Douglas (2005) contends that their results provide evidence of foreign aid ineffectiveness for 
recipient nations and that foreign aid negatively impacts changes in income equality over 
time. Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) examine the long-run effect of foreign aid on income 
inequality for 21 recipient countries using panel co-integration techniques to control for 
omitted variable and endogeneity bias. They reported that aid exerts an increasing inequality 
effect on income distribution. Dijankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querolet (2006) note that large 
literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid has found very little evidence that aid has any 
effect on economic development. To Bandyopadhyay and Vermann (2009), foreign aid is 
focused substantially on security concerns, marked especially by the watershed event of 
September 2011. Thus, Shilgba (2014) argues that if foreign aid secures jobs in the donor 
countries while taking away jobs in the recipient countries, then that is bad aid to the recipient 
countries. In this vein, Odi (2014) recommends implementation of policies that enhances 
economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. A study by Puig and Álvaro 
(2003) shows that aid, along with other associated institutions, had a catalyzing effect on 
economic development. Puig and Álvaro (2003) therefore, support the idea that less-
developed countries require the cooperation of aid donors to undergo the social change 
necessary for modern economic growth. 
 
2.5.4 Impact of uncertainty avoidance on aid effectiveness 
 
Mooij and Hofstede (2010) view uncertainty avoidance as the extent to which people feel 
threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and try to avoid these situations. Due to 
uncertainties about quality of life after today, African leaders engage in wide spread 
corruption in order to keep sufficient wealth for their families and themselves. To manage this 
menace, transparency of aid is required from both the donor and recipient countries. That is, 
to ensure that true values and conditions under which aid is given is made available to the 
general public. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that 
developing countries and donors must focus on producing and measuring results, as part of 
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the aid management strategies. The results must be made open and transparent to all 
stakeholders, in order to expose and reduce corrupt practices. This section therefore, 
presents a description of the impact of aid on corruption, as well as transparency as a best 
practice of aid in Africa. 
 
2.5.4.1 The impact of corruption on aid effectiveness in Nigeria 
 
Abdallah (2014) echoes a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report that more 
than $500 billion in foreign aid – the equivalent of four Marshall Aid Plans – was pumped into 
Africa between 1960 and 1997. Instead of increasing development, aid has created 
dependence. They blamed corruption and collusion by the international aid lobby group for 
much of Africa’s current underdevelopment. Against this backdrop, anti-corruption norm was 
instigated by leading international organizations in the mid-1990s and after proliferating to all 
other major international organizations during this time period, it was accepted by major 
actors in the international system. Though of course not apolitical, multilateral ODA is seen 
as relatively more impartial, and the program to fight corruption and improve governance in 
the developing world has been at the forefront of the agenda of each major Breton Woods 
organization since the mid-1990s, and thus might be associated with more effective results 
in curbing corruption.  
Charron (2011) tested the relationship of 82 ODA recipient countries (including Nigeria) from 
1986 to 2006. Using the two-stage generalized method of moments (GMM), he modelled a 
number of potential problems of endogeneity between corruption and ODA. The empirical 
results show that the anti-corruption movement adopted by all major international 
organizations since 1990s proved to be an effective strategy in combating corruption in 
developing countries, while the effects of multi-lateral ODA before this time period had mixed 
effects. Charron (2011) reveals that bilateral ODA is either a negative or insignificant 
determinant of corruption levels in recipient countries in both time periods. Upon multiple 
robust checks with alternative specifications and data on corruption, the results held strong 
(Charron 2011). Andrews (2009) relates this to the age-old saying that ‘you cannot bite the 
fingers that feed you;’ as African leaders are unable to speak out when ODA fuels corruption, 
or fake and unwanted goods from donor countries flood their markets. Charron (2009) reports 
that to a large extent Africa’s development depends on African private sector entrepreneurs, 
civic activists and political reformers… not on their leaders or donors. 
Charron (2011) states that some evidence has been reported by scholars to support the 
notion that ODA improves governance in African countries. For example, Charron (2011) 
reports a significant impact among major international organizations to shift attention to the 
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agenda of ‘good governance’ in the mid to late 1990s. Beginning with the OECD in 1994, 
discussions on bribery came to the forefront by 1996, when a binding convention on 
‘Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions’ was 
signed by all 36 OECD member states (Charron 2011).  Charron (2011) adds that the World 
Bank (WB) followed suit with a clear message about fighting corruption and in 1997 began 
working with the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Transparency International on 
combating such practices, along with establishing its own anti-corruption institution, the 
World Bank Institute (WBI). Goldsmith (2001) posits that an increase in ODA as a proportion 
of GDP is associated with higher levels of democratic performance and economic freedom 
in African countries. Ali and Isse (2007) agrees that foreign aid and trade are strong 
determinants of GDP per worker, albeit in opposite directions. Dunning (2004) replicates the 
results from Goldsmith (2001), but when disaggregated into Cold War and post-Cold War 
time periods, improvement in democratization was only seen in the later. Additionally, 
Tavares (2003) finds that when controlling for such factors as economic development, oil 
resources and political rights, ODA has a strong and statistically significant relationship with 
curbing corruption. 
2.5.4.2 Transparency as a best practice of aid in Nigeria 
 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) notes that transparency entails the ability for those outside 
the organization to obtain access to information about the operations of the agency. 
Transparency is based on the ability to gather information such as employment numbers, 
budgetary data, and overhead costs. Examples of information required include the number 
of employees and staff, a breakdown of overall agency expenditures, including aid 
disbursements, administrative costs, and expenditures on salaries and benefits. Without 
transparency, independent commentators cannot monitor aid agencies, aid recipients have 
no mechanism to hold agencies responsible and taxpayers in donor countries cannot monitor 
aid practices, as it is virtually impossible to track where the money goes (Easterly and 
Williamson 2011). The IOM (2014) argues that having both programmatic and financial 
information publicly accessible was crucial for value for money given the large number of 
actors in this space. While programmatic data is useful to assess the effectiveness of 
activities, financial data helps to assess the efficiency and value for money for all 
investments. 
The absence of feedback from aid recipients is widely regarded as one of the fundamental 
problems with aid effectiveness. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was 
launched in 2008 at a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra, Ghana (Accra 
Statement 2009). The initiative hopes to create transparency in the records of how aid money 
is spent. The initiative hopes to ensure that aid money reaches its intended recipients. 
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International donors at the Forum pledged to: publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely 
information on volume, allocation and when available, results of development expenditure to 
enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing countries; support 
information systems for managing aid; and provide full and timely information on annual 
commitments and actual disbursements (Accra Statement 2009). The Aid Transparency 
Index (2014) results demonstrate that donors’ progress with implementing their aid 
transparency commitments remains uneven. The majority of organisations still perform 
poorly in absolute terms (37 out of 68 in 2014 are in the poor or very poor categories, 
compared to 42 out of 67 in 2013). The average score for all organisations is 39%, up by six 
percentage points from 2013 (Aid Transparency Index 2014). Much of this increase is 
attributable to the top performing organisations, as the average score discounting the 
organisations in the good and very good categories is still low at 28%, only a two percent 
increase from 2013 (Aid Transparency Index 2014). 
As pointed out by Easterly and Williamson (2011), aid agencies lack the normal feedback 
loops available to democratic or market actors, who can observe dissatisfaction of voters or 
customers. Aid beneficiaries have no vote and no purchase decisions by which they could 
communicate dissatisfaction to aid agencies. Therefore, transparency is the most important 
component of aid agency best practices. The international aid community now calls for 
greater transparency to remedy the lack of feedback and to improve incentives for effective 
aid allocation. According to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), donors commit 
to enhancing donors’ and partner countries’ respective accountability to their citizens and 
parliaments for their development policies, strategies, and performance. Lack of 
transparency, which erode public support, impede effective resource mobilization and 
allocation and divert resources away from activities that are vital for poverty reduction and 
sustainable economic development. 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) summarize that transparency is still shockingly poor in most 
aid agencies. Comparing across bilateral aid agencies, the Scandinavian agencies do 
surprisingly poorly on this dimension. Comparing across multilateral agencies, many of the 
UN agencies have an extremely bad record on transparency, confirming the point that the 
UN agencies are among the least accountable aid agencies (Easterly and Williamson 2011). 
 
2.5.5 Impact of long/short term orientation on aid effectiveness 
 
Mooij and Hofstede (2010) refer Long-term versus short-term orientation as the extent to 
which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional 
historic or short-term point of view. The focus of short term orientation is on pursuit of 
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happiness rather than on pursuit of peace of mind. Long-term orientation implies investment 
in the future. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) illuminate that long-versus short-term 
orientation relates to pragmatism in politics versus fundamentalism: the latter means a focus 
on principles, even ineffective ones, and vested rights.  Aid that focuses on short term 
orientation is usually fragmented with high unsustainable costs. Thus, the effectiveness of 
aid is reduced when there are too many duplicating initiatives, especially, at country and 
sector levels (Accra Agenda for Action 2008). Easterly and Williamson (2011) describe such 
aid as aid fragmentation, and as suboptimal behavior in aid administration. 
When looked from a short term orientation, each of the fragments may look attractive and 
beneficiaries may seem happy with the support, but with long term orientation, such aid may 
be unnecessary, counterproductive and unsustainable. The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005) recommends that donor countries and organisations co-ordinate their 
actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication or unsustainable aid 
programmes. This refers to harmonisation of aid, to meet both the long and short-term goals 
of the beneficiaries.  
 
2.5.5.1 Aid specialization as a best practice of aid in Nigeria 
 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) assert that one of the biggest complaints in aid effectiveness 
is the lack of donor specialization. OECD (2011) reports an analysis of changes in aid 
allocation patterns in partner countries since adoption of the Paris Declaration of Aid 
Effectiveness in 2005 through 2009. The report shows that aid fragmentation is increasing, 
although generally also accompanied by an increase in country programmable aid (OECD 
2011, Annen & Moers 2012). It also shows growing donor proliferation is the dominant trend 
(OECD 2011), with claims of impact of poverty reduction in recipient countries (Annen & 
Moers 2012).  Annen and Moers (2012) argues that donors can view such impact in the 
dimension of poverty reduction in the recipient country in the dimension of their own 
geopolitics, commerce, and/or donor agent satisfaction, providing them with ‘incorrect’ 
incentives. The IMF and World Bank (2010) reports that reducing aid fragmentation and 
strengthening aid coordination is essential for enhancing aid effectiveness.  
2.6 DISPARITIES AND GAPS IN LITERATURE REGARDING AID FUNDING 
FRAMEWORK TO NIGERIA 
 
It emerged from the literature that between 1948 and 1952, the US supported the European 
Reconstruction Program, following the devastating impact of the Second World War 
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(Omotola 2014; Abdallah 2014). The Marshal Plan rebuilt the war-devastated regions, 
removed trade barriers, modernized industries, prevented the spread of communism, 
guaranteed economic success, and reestablished political and social institutions crucial for 
Western Europe’s ongoing peace and prosperity (Omotola 2014; Abdallah 2014). 
Conversely, nearly 60 years after aid flow to Nigeria, an institutional framework for aid 
effectiveness is still absent and the successes of aid are yet to be clearly documented in the 
literature. 
Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov (2010) assert that Nigeria, similar to many aid receiving 
countries  in sub-Saharan Africa, lack the institutional framework to make foreign aid 
effective. As a result, aid has remained ineffective. Also, the percentage of gross national 
income (GNI) that governments of rich countries have allocated to development cooperation 
has varied considerably. See Appendix A1-6 for details. It was unclear from the literature 
whether national culture had an influence or impact on the current state of aid effectiveness 
in Nigeria. Likewise, a culturally sensitive, recipient country driven institutional framework to 
guide aid administration in Nigeria could not be established from the literature. It emerged 
from the literature that professionals working on aid programmes adopt different and 
inconsistent models to administer aid in recipient countries (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 
2010). Also, there was no documented evidence that demonstrates the role of national 
culture on aid effectiveness. A robust conceptual framework for the study of national culture 
versus aid effectiveness did not exist in the literature reviewed. Likewise, there were no 
hypothetical strings connecting the various dimensions of national culture, the principles of 
aid effectiveness and the best practices of aid to the desired levels of aid effectiveness in 
Nigeria.  The researcher therefore, aims to close these gaps by answering the research 
question: What is the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness in Nigeria? 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter describes the relevant literature consulted to espouse background work done 
on the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness in Nigeria. The high flow of aid monies 
during the cold war era led to a dependency syndrome portrayed by many developing 
countries. Today external resources constitute an integral part of development expenditure 
in the developing countries. The wave of movement of people from different parts of the world 
is a symptom of search for equal grounds. 
In order to measure the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness, the researcher 
developed a conceptual framework from a combination of three theoretical frameworks. 
These were the Hofstede’s five dimensions of national culture, the Paris Declaration’s five 
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principles of aid effectiveness as well as the Easterly and Pfutze’s five best practices of aid. 
An attempt was made to select and use one of the theories, but none was competent to 
contain the subject of study. Thereby, warranting the combination of all three to develop one 
robust conceptual framework that sufficiently underpinned the study.  
The next chapter (Chapter 3) presents the research design and methods utilised in 
conducting the study.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the research design and methods utilised in conducting this study.  
The chapter also presents methods of data analysis, ethical considerations and steps taken 
by the researcher to ensure validity and reliability of the research study. Data was collected 
using Qualtrics web-based Likert scale questionnaire among employees of two aid 
implementing partners working across 6 geopolitical zones of Nigeria. The study followed a 
quantitative research approach. 
 
3.2 RESEARCHE‘͛S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION 
 
3.2.1 The nature of truth 
 
Gill and Johnson (2010) view the concept of truth and how we know whether or not some 
claim is true or false, as synonymous to the philosophical term epistemology. According to 
Gill and Johnson (2010), epistemology is a pivotal issue in any form of research for it is about 
how we know whether or not any claim, including our own, made about the phenomena we 
are interested in, is warranted. In other words, what is our theory of truth? Very often people 
think that processes of justifying knowledge claims are in principle straightforward. In judging 
the truth or falsity of any claim, all we need to do is look for the relevant evidence whose 
content will either support or refute the claim. Thus, it is often thought that what is true is 
something that corresponds with the given facts: the empirical evidence that we have 
collected by undertaking some form of empirical research. However, it is understandable that 
investigating truth in the context of culture would be challenging. While Johnson and 
Duberley (2000) argue that such view of truth arose out of various attacks upon what was 
construed as religious dogma, Gill and Johnson (2010) concur that recently, they have been 
subject to much dispute in both the natural and social sciences, wherein the positivist 
mainstream has come under considerable further attack. 
The literature identifies four theories of truth, that is, the coherence, consensus, pragmatic 
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and the correspondence theories of truth. Kirkham (1995) elucidates truth in line with the 
coherence theory of truth that a statement is true if and only if it stands in an appropriate 
relation to some system of other statements. A statement coheres with a system of other 
statements if and only if it follows logically from that system of statements, or logically implies 
some subset of the system. Coherence theory of truth is based on the premise that a set of 
two or more beliefs are said to cohere if and only if each member of the set is consistent with 
any subset of the others and each is implied (inductively, if not deductively) by all of the 
others taken as premises or, according to some coherence theories, each is implied by each 
of the others individually (Kirkham 1995).  
An ancient criterion of truth, the consensus gentium (Latin: agreement of the people), 
Johnson and Duberley (2000) argues, states that, that which is universal among men carries 
the weight of truth. Consensus theory argues that any judgement as to the truthfulness of an 
account or theory is the outcome of, and is nothing more than, socially established 
agreement, or convention, between those who share a particular paradigm or frame of 
reference. Truth therefore is a term attached to a set of beliefs that have managed to prevail 
in a particular social context (Johnson & Duberley 2000). Kuhn (1970) explained that 
scientific truth is not determined by consensus. In science the majority can be, and often 
have been, wrong. There is a great deal of peer pressure in the science community, which 
can stifle objections to a popular theory. New advances in science often begin with just a few 
scientists who are prepared to risk questioning the reigning paradigm. Any new interpretation 
of nature, whether a discovery or a theory, first emerges in the mind of one or a few 
individuals. It is they who first learn to see science and the world differently, and their ability 
to make the transition is facilitated by two circumstances that are not common to most other 
members of their profession. Invariably their attention has been intensely concentrated upon 
the crisis-provoking problems; usually, in addition, they are people so young or so new to the 
crisis-ridden field that practice has committed them less deeply than most of their 
contemporaries to the world view and rules determined by the old paradigm (Kuhn 1970; 
Johnson & Duberley 2000).  
Describing the pragmatic theory of truth, James (1907) asserts that truth is “a species of the 
good,” like health. Truths are goods because we can “ride” on them into the future without 
being unpleasantly surprised. They “lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as 
well as directly up to useful sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing 
human intercourse. They lead away from eccentricity and isolation, form foiled and barren 
thinking. Although James (1907) holds that truths are “made” in the course of human 
experience, and that for the most part they live “on a credit system” in that they are not 
currently being verified, he also holds the empiricistic view that “beliefs verified concretely by 
somebody are the posts of the whole superstructure (James 1907). To pragmatists, the 
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correspondence and coherence theories assume an unacceptably static view of truth. 
According to James (1907), we make propositions true or false by employing them in a fruitful 
search for meaning. This is sometimes called an instrumentalist theory of truth. Truth is an 
instrument to serve people, not vice versa. A true proposition leads us along prosperous 
verification paths, providing what James (1907) calls a worthwhile leading – it does not 
frustrate dynamic progression along intellectual pathways.  
According to Gill and Johnson (2010), correspondence theory of truth involves a relationship 
to reality. Items are candidates for truth only if they purport to describe reality. An item ‘X’ is 
true if and only if it is descriptively successful, that is ‘X’ purports to describe reality and its 
content fits reality. Therefore, for a statement to be true there must be some appropriate 
correspondence between true statements and actual features of the world. True statements 
correspond with and describe reality. False statements fail to correspond to how things 
actually are in the world. Truth arises from how things are in the world, independent of human 
beliefs.  
The correspondence theory of truth is the foundation against which this study is carried. Gill 
and Johnson (2010) illuminate that positivist epistemology limits its conception of valid or 
warranted knowledge (i.e. science) to what is taken to be unproblematically observable 
‘sense-data’. For both positivists and neo-empiricists (i.e. qualitative positivists), warranted 
knowledge about the world emanates from social reality, that is an external world directly and 
objectively accessible through human sensory experience provided that the correct 
methodology is used to, in effect, polish Rorty’s (1979) ‘mirror in the mind’ (Gill and Johnson 
2010). As such, warranted knowledge is that which has a correspondence with the world that 
has been established through our neutral and passive registration of various sensory inputs. 
If a theory corresponds with a researcher’s observations of these facts its truthfulness is 
taken to be established. If it fails to correspond, it is discarded as mistaken or false. Thus, 
the theory of truth used in this study, implicitly and explicitly, is the correspondence theory of 
truth. This view of truth is preferred for this study based upon the assumption that it is possible 
to observe facts about foreign aid neutrally and objectively by the application of rigorous 
methodological procedures and protocols aimed at testing the impact of national culture on 
aid effectiveness in Nigeria. This positivistic epistemology appears as eminently rational – 
indeed commonsensical. However, there seem to be major problems with this view of 
scientific endeavor: it seems self-contradictory; and the possibility of directly and objectively 
observing phenomenon, and thereby accumulating the facts of the world so as to test the 
truthfulness of a theory, seems dubious (Gill and Johnson 2010). These problems are 
discussed below: 
Positivist epistemological self-contradiction: Gill and Johnson (2010) lament that in order to 
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observe directly and objectively, the phenomena in which they are interested, positivists must 
assume what is called a dualism between ‘subject’ and ‘object’; that it is possible to separate 
the ‘subject’ (the knower, the observer, the researcher) from the ‘object’ (the known, the 
observed, what are taken to be the ‘facts’ of the world) by the application of scientific 
methodology. Therefore, by using rigorous methodology it is possible to have knowledge that 
is independent of the observer and uncontaminated by the very act of observation – this idea 
is central to positivism (Gill and Johnson 2010). Thus, it is only through the prior assumption 
that a dualism between subject and object is possible, and consequently that a theory-neutral 
observational language is available, that the correspondence criteria of the positivist (i.e. his 
or her epistemology) becomes viable. 
Is positivism’s theory-neutral observational language possible?  Positivism, with its 
articulation of a subject-object dualism, assumes that there is some point from which the 
observer can stand back and observe the world objectively. That is, the observations that are 
registered are independent of the very process of the observer observing and thus ‘truth’ is 
to be found in the observer’s passive registration of the ‘sensory givens’ or facts, that 
constitute reality (Gill and Johnson 2010). A correspondence theory of truth relies upon the 
received wisdom that the veracity of competing theories may be adjudicated through an 
appeal to their correspondence with the facts of an external objective reality that is ‘mirrored’ 
in the ‘Glassy Essence’ of the observer. It is important to note here that some interpretive 
management researchers share this commitment to a theory-neutral observational language 
– save that this would be construed as a subject-subject dualism where the observer can 
stand back and neutrally apprehend what other knowers subjectively know. For instance, 
here it would be assumed that it is possible for national ethnographers to neutrally describe 
members’ cultural attributes and how these subjective elements impel particular modes of 
national culture or behaviour. Thus, truth, as correspondence, is to be found through the 
observer’s passive registration of the facts that constitute reality. 
Unlike the positivists, neo-empiricists argue that in order to understand human behaviour in 
a country we must access their cultures through verstehen and the deployment of qualitative 
methods of data collection. So as to legitimate this interpretive methodological imperative, 
neo-empiricism questions the methodological unity of the sciences, grounded in erklaren, as 
proposed by positivists. Positivists have reciprocated by denying both the possibility and 
desirability of verstehen thereby restoring the methodological unity of natural and social 
sciences. 
Finally, while we cannot avoid making philosophical assumptions or commitments in 
undertaking any research, the philosophical assumptions made in undertaking this research 
entail the following stances: the nature of truth; the nature of human behaviour; the possibility 
58 
 
of neutral representation of the facts; and the independent existence of the social reality 
being investigated. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH SETTING 
 
Nigeria was the setting utilized for the study. On a land mass of 923,768 square kilometer 
lies Nigeria. Situated on the west coast of Africa, lies on latitude 4 degrees north of the 
Equator and latitudes 3 degrees and 14 degrees on the east of the Greenwich Meridian. 
Shares boundaries with The Republics of Benin and Niger in the west, Cameroon in the East, 
Niger and Chad in the north and the Gulf of Guinea in the South. The variety of customs, 
languages, and traditions among Nigeria’s 389 ethnic groups gives the country a cultural 
diversity. Census figures are used to determine regional funding and representation of ethnic 
and religious groups in government service. This provides an incentive for inflating local 
populations. 
Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones, including the north-east (NE), north-west (NW), 
north-central (NC), south-west (SW), south-east (SE) and south-south (SS) zones (see 
Appendix C1 & C2). Due to cultural diversity, it is usually challenging to draw a clear line 
demarcating where one culture ends and where another begins. For convenience purpose 
however, the country can also be divided into two, northern and southern geographic regions, 
with the predominant Hausa/Fulani culture in the north and Yoruba and Igbo in the south. 
The most numerous ethnic groups in the northern two-thirds of the country are the Hausa 
and the Fulani/Fulbe. Other major ethnic groups of the north are Nupe, Tiv and Kanuri. The 
Yoruba people are the overwhelming majority in the southwest, as well as parts of the north-
central region. The Igbo are found in the central parts of the southeast. The Efik, Ibibio, 
Annang, and Ijaw constitute other South-Eastern populations. 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a large and complex country with over 140 million 
inhabitants in 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. It is one of the world’s 
major oil exporters, yet a large part of the population lives in poverty and the non-oil economy 
is poorly developed (European Commission 2010). 
The Nigeria Human Development Report (2008-2009) highlights that up to eighteen states 
of Nigeria have lower per capita income than the global standard of less than $1.25 per day. 
Noting further that just 20 per cent of the population own 65 per cent of national assets while 
as much as 70 per cent of the same population are peasant rural workers and artisans. 
Concerns about inequality is strong in Nigeria. Changes in poverty and inequality move in 
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the same direction; economic growth and poverty move in opposite directions; and inequality 
and growth are positively correlated.  
With a national Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.513 and national incidence of poverty 
of 54.41 per cent, statistics show that poverty is more endemic in the northern part of the 
country, except the FCT (Nigeria Human Development Report 2008-2009). Comparatively, 
all the southern states have better human development index than the north. Of the top 10 
states with the highest HDI, eight are in the south; and of the bottom ten states with the 
lowest HDI, nine are in the north. Gender inequality has been a growing concern for a fairly 
long time; and is traditionally associated with socio-cultural and religious practices and 
patriarchy (Nigeria Human Development Report 2008-2009).  
The European Commission (2010) notes that Nigeria is a classical ‘rentier-state’ in which oil 
revenues are conducive to corruption and tend to reduce the dependency of the rulers on 
the ruled. Although Nigeria returned from military dictatorship to democracy in 1999, the 
political system’s articulation of the non-elite population is weak. The Nigeria Human 
Development Report (2008-2009) hints that the quality and effectiveness of governance in 
Nigeria is a major obstacle to development. Also, only a developmental path that combines 
higher growth with worsening governance – as seems to be the case based on existing 
evidence – is not compatible with a serious effort to reduce poverty and inequality in Nigeria. 
There is a lively civil society – which tends to see itself as the real opposition – and free 
quality media, yet governance problems prevail: corruption is widespread and human rights 
situation is problematic (European Commission 2010). The rentier nature of the State also 
reduces the Government’s dependency on foreign aid and sets the scene for a cooperation 
programme filled with challenges (European Commission 2010). 
 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The analytic survey research design was utilized in this study. Analytic or explanatory 
surveys attempt to test a theory by taking the logic of the experiment out of the laboratory 
and into the field (Gill & Johnson 2010). In this case, to determine the impact of national 
culture on aid effectiveness. In conceptualizing the research, there was an emphasis on 
specifying the independent, dependent and extraneous variables. A thorough literature 
review was conducted to help the researcher elaborate the various possible relationships 
that might have existed between, and impinged upon national culture and aid effectiveness. 
The control of variables in analytic surveys is not achieved through the use of physical 
controls, allocating subjects to control and experimental groups as is the case with 
experimental research (Gill & Johnson 2010).  Rather, Gill and Johnson (2010) assert that 
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in analytic surveys the control of extraneous variables are achieved through the use of 
statistical techniques, such as multiple regression, during data analysis.  
Critical methodological components that must be addressed in order to conduct sound online 
research devoid of challenges, were followed in this study, and briefly described below. 
 
3.4.1 Justification for using qualtrics electronic survey questionnaire 
 
Computerized self-administered Qualtrics web-based survey design was applied in this 
study.  Andrews, Nonnecke and Preece (2003) elucidate that electronic surveys have 
distinctive technological, demographic and response characteristics that affect how they 
should be designed, when they can be used and how they can be implemented. They 
continued that the technology provides an inexpensive mechanism for conducting surveys 
online instead of through the postal mail, and one in which costs per response decrease 
instead of increase significantly as sample size increases.  Electronic surveys are becoming 
increasingly common, and research comparing electronic surveys is starting to confirm that 
electronic survey content results may be no different than postal survey content results, yet 
provide strong advantages of speedy distribution and response cycles (Andrews, Nonnecke 
& Preece 2003). 
Relative to other type of surveys, Qualtrics web-based surveys entail major cost savings, are 
much quicker to conduct, non-responses are easier to identify and chase up, and responses 
are easier to analyse using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) because of their 
electronic form (Gill and Johnson 2010). Additionally, Gill and Johnson (2010) indicate that 
the possibility of accessing much larger research samples, and the ability to access 
previously difficult to contact research populations, present important opportunities for the 
management researcher. Also, cross-cultural samples may be more accessible via online 
surveys when internet access is available in the culture of interest (Reips 2002), as it was 
the case in this study. Unlike other survey methods, web-based surveys are more cost 
effective, as no need for printing or postage charges. Speed of data collection and precision 
of compilation are good (Reips 2002). Further, when an organization (or population of 
interest) is internet based, it becomes possible to recruit from the whole population, rather 
than a randomly selected sample.  
Major shortfalls of using the Web-based survey are questionnaire design challenges, online 
privacy and confidentiality issues, sampling and subject selection issues, and low 
questionnaire response rates. Web-based surveys can also bring with them particular 
sampling issues and non-sampling errors (representativeness) which require vigilance in 
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order to have confidence in the research findings (Couper 2000). Web-based surveys can 
only access those who have access to the internet and e-mail facilities, therefore, 
representativeness and sample bias may be eminent. Additionally, where internet and e-mail 
access is not universal in the population of study, especially, where study involves multiple 
organisations, representativeness could be exacerbated due to intranet versus internet 
factors. Where respondents’ e-mails are traceable in their responses, confidentiality and 
anonymity becomes a challenge – which seem to be the key ethical challenge facing this 
kind of survey research (Gill & Johnson 2010). This challenge may give rise to high non-
responses to survey questions; for example, respondents may systematically refuse to 
answer certain questions, or give incomplete answers, etc., due to fear of retribution and 
reprisal. In the online environment, it is possible for individuals to affect the quality of the 
results by deceptively or falsely answering questionnaire items (Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald 
2002) or by simply submitting their response multiple times.  
Each of these shortfalls were addressed in this study as discussed in greater detail, below: 
To address malicious practices by respondents, the researcher searched submissions for 
strings of identical responses and examined the internal consistency of responses (Gosling, 
Vazire, Srivastava & John 2004). 
To address the challenges of using Web-based analytic survey tool described above, the 
Qualtrics electronic survey questionnaire was designed with the following characteristics 
(Andrews, Nonnecke & Preece 2003): the platform was built to support multiple platforms 
and browsers. It was designed to prevent multiple submissions automatically; and presented 
questions in a logical or adaptive manner, for example, provided control of when and how 
questions displayed. The platform allowed saving responses before completion; provided 
automatic feedback with completion; provided automatic transfer of responses to database; 
prevented survey alterations and provided response control and economical displays. The 
questionnaire platform provided researcher control over question presentation; and did not 
require familiarity with survey software, in order to complete. 
Additionally, Qualtrics Mailer was utilized to distribute the questionnaire. The Qualtrics Mailer 
provides an easy and convenient way to distribute survey to large groups of people. By using 
the Qualtrics Mailer, the researcher set up an anonymous option using survey flow in order 
to anonymize all responses collected from the survey. This scrubs the response of identifying 
information, such as the internet provider (IP) address, before saving it in the results. The 
Qualtrics Mailer prevents fraud and abuse of the survey by any unauthorized person(s). The 
Qualtrics Mailer was directly managed by the researcher, through his personal password 
which was only known to him. No one other than himself had direct access to the Qualtrics 
Mailer. All reviews and readers could only have access to the analyzed results which shows 
only aggregate responses of groups of persons, and not individual persons. Additionally, 
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research participants were guided through the informed consent form not to include any 
personal information that will serve to identify them or their views in the data.  Thus, 
participants’ responses were accessed through the Qualtrics web, not through individual e-
mails sent to the researcher. 
To address anticipated low questionnaire response rates, the following actions were 
undertaken, as recommended by Andrews, Nonnecke and Preece (2003): Privacy and 
confidentiality issues were addressed, while also ensuring personal data were collected first. 
Participants’ private e-mail addresses were obtained from the records and cross tabulated 
against their names, to replace the official e-mail contacts obtained from the listserv. The 
private e-mail addresses were prepared on Microsoft Excel (ms.csv) files, to enable 
uploading on Qualtrics survey platform. The researcher uploaded the ms.csv files onto 
Qualtrics panels and used Qualtrics Mailer to distribute customized e-mail invitations to the 
selected research participants. Using Qualtrics Mailer, by default each participant received 
an individual link to the survey, which could only be used once. The link allowed the 
researcher to track progress of participants, send out reminders and ‘Thank You’ messages 
as well as automatically saved respondents’ data as they progressed through the survey. 
Participants could leave the survey before finishing and return to it on any internet enabled 
computer. By default, Qualtrics also prevented fraud and abuse of the survey. The researcher 
utilized a multi-step invitation and survey presentation process; including periodic reminders 
to complete the survey, using appropriate subject line on e-mail invitations. Researcher also 
used other multiple ways to contact and invite respondents, including customized types of 
notification media and follow-up processes. These included phone calls, e-mails, text 
messaging, one-on-one reminders at meetings and along the corridors, and generic, non-
specific reminders through office managers. The electronic questionnaire had fixtures to save 
responses to partially completed survey. 
 
3.5 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3.5.1 Population, sample and sampling 
 
3.5.1.1 Population 
 
Stommel and Wills (2004) define population as any universe of subjects, cases, units, or 
observations containing all possible members. Polit and Beck (2004) define a population as 
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the entire set of individuals (or objects) having some common characteristic(s) sometimes 
referred to as universe. The population of this study was all aid workers in Nigeria. 
Target population, according to Stommel and Wills (2004), refer to the population of all 
potential study units that meet the study inclusion criteria (that is, in whom or which the 
researcher is interested). Polit and Beck (2004) define target population as the entire 
population in which the researcher is interested and to which he or she would like to 
generalise the results of a study. Target population relates to accessible population, which is 
the study population defined in terms of geographic location, institutional affiliation, or study 
unit characteristics to which the researcher has access, given the available resources 
(Stommel & Wills 2004). Polit and Beck (2004) define accessible population as the population 
of subjects available for a particular study; often a nonrandom subset of the target population. 
Stommel and Wills (2004) on the other hand, define an accessible population as the 
population, often fixed in time and space from which the actual sample is drawn. The target 
population for this study included all aid workers in two purposively selected aid implementing 
partners in Nigeria. The two organizations were selected based on the strength of their wide 
geographic spread and number of staff sourced from and/or distributed across all geographic 
zones of Nigeria. Why Nigeria? Of the top 20 ODA receiving countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
between 2005 and 2011, Nigeria was the highest (in USD millions) across all sectors, 
followed by Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia (see Appendix A3 and Appendix 
A5). Additionally, with an estimated population of 140-180 million people, Nigeria stands out 
as the most populous country in Nigeria. Nigeria also has a large pool of aid workers, 
targeting the largest population of beneficiaries in any single country in Africa. Thereby, 
justifying the selection of Nigeria as focus country for this study. 
Stommel and Wills (2004) define study population as the subset of the target population that 
are accessible to the researcher, at least in principle, if there are sufficient resources. These 
accessible study populations are more limited in time and space and are also defined in terms 
of specific inclusion and exclusion criteria. Thus, the researcher included only aid workers, 
male or female, who at the time of data collection, were employees of the two purposively 
selected aid implementing partners in Nigeria (sub-population sample). This population was 
preferred because employees of the two institutions have the necessary knowledge and skills 
to express opinions regarding aid effectiveness.3.5.1.2 Sample and sampling techniques 
The census technique was adopted in this study. Thus, following written approval from the 
institutional heads to participate in the study, the researcher drew his sampling frame from 
the internet listserv of two purposively selected aid implementing partners with the following 
characteristics: working in the areas of health and human development; receiving funds 
directly from donor countries, supporting a variety of local civil society organizations, public 
and private sector organisations in Nigeria; have wide spread presence across multiple 
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states in Nigeria;  have a large network and database of local implementing agencies’ staff 
working on aid projects in Nigeria; and have been doing business in Nigeria for more than 
five years. Other characteristics were: the organization possess both internet and intranet 
facilities for all their members of staff; as well as a functional listserv. The two implementing 
partners were not specifically named in this report, to manage anonymity and confidentiality 
of the views expressed by their employees.  
The two implementing partners had a total number of about 846 active workers on their 
listserv, at the time of data collection (March 2015). All 846 persons in the listserv were given 
equal chance to participate in the study, using census, to address any anticipated shortfall in 
questionnaire response rates usually common with online surveys. This formed a sampling 
frame of 846 people working on a combination of aid projects across 24 states in Nigeria 
(sample). The researcher assigned the 24 states into the six geo-political zones of Nigeria, 
each zone serving as a cluster. Employees working in each state were listed as participants 
under the appropriate cluster where they held as their primary place of work. In order to 
ensure equal chances of participation in the study by everyone on the listserv of the two 
implementing partners, including government of Nigeria employees working on the aid 
projects, the researcher formed three strata, each representing the two implementing 
partners and the third stratum, the government employees.  With each geo-political zone 
serving as cluster, and each cluster composed of the three strata, the researcher allocated 
participants into the clusters based on their pre-existing geographic areas of residence, to 
participate in the study. This generated all 846 participants that made up the sampling frame, 
composed of everyone whose names appeared on the listserv (the two implementing 
partners and the government of Nigeria employees). The mixed composition of respondents 
across all geographic zones of Nigeria provided rich information that represents the various 
cultures of Nigeria. The sampling method began with knowledge of the sampling frame and 
with information on the process of recruitment that permits measurement of sources of non-
response, which can inform design-based adjustment approaches (Couper 2000). Stommel 
and Wills (2004) define a sample frame as the list or data bank that represents all 
elements/units/participants of an accessible target population; used as a basis for random 
sampling of participants. Polit and Beck (2004) on the other hand, define sampling frame as 
a list of all the elements in the population, from which the sample is drawn. Study sample on 
the other hand refer to the subset of cases, units, or observations from a larger population of 
cases, units, or observations (Stommel and Wills 2004).   
The biggest threats to inference from Web-based surveys to general population is its 
coverage error, (that is, the mismatch between the general population and the sampling 
frame) and random sampling within the sample frame (Couper 2000). First, people who 
participate in online surveys are different in characteristics from the general public. Second, 
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a sampling frame of all online users is difficult to be identified. Third, there is usually low 
response rates with Web-based surveys (Couper 2000). To address these challenges, the 
researcher selected the two implementing partners due to their robust internet infrastructure 
and systems. These are institutions where all their workers used the internet and e-mails 
regularly, in addition to their wealth of experience with aid administration. Thereby, forming 
a resourceful sampling frame. Additionally, selection of aid workers from the internet listserv 
ensured that important participants’ characteristics were not missed and any findings can be 
extrapolated (Gill & Johnson 2010). 
Gill and Johnson (2010) note that the sample sizes reflect the number of obtained responses, 
and not necessarily the number of questionnaires distributed. The researcher distributed 
questionnaires to all 846 participants that made the sampling frame. This was done in line 
with suggestions by Gill and Johnson (2010) to increase the sample size by at least 50% in 
the first distribution of the survey questionnaire; in order to address anticipated low response 
rates that are inherent in web-based surveys.  
Gill and Johnson (2010) assert that what is important is not the proportion of the research 
population that gets sampled, but the size of the sample selected relative to the complexity 
of the population, the aims of the researcher and the kinds of statistical manipulation that will 
be used in data analysis. To put it bluntly, larger sample sizes reduce sampling error but at 
a decreasing rate. 
 
3.4.2 Method of data collection 
 
3.4.2.1 Data collection process 
 
Data collection was executed through computerized self-administered Qualtrics web-based 
survey, using Likert scale questionnaires.  To increase representativeness of samples, 
construct sampling frames, increase response rates and manage anonymity and 
confidentiality, the researcher adopted three phased approach to data collection 
(preparatory, questionnaire distribution and questionnaire retrieval phases) as described 
below. 
 
The preparatory phase involved the researcher’s technical, emotional, psychological and 
logistical preparedness for the survey. The preparatory phase also included identification of 
four workplace colleagues, experienced in quantitative research methods, to assist with 
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review of the online questionnaire, as well as comment on any ethical issues in research/data 
collection and managing relationships with research respondents and other stakeholders. 
The review by knowledgeable colleagues were also to ensure question completeness, 
efficiency, relevancy and format appropriateness. Both international and local research ethics 
approvals were obtained. Additionally, the preparatory phase involved gathering adequate 
information about the investigation, including the rigorous integration of the research method, 
preparing and pilot testing the questionnaires with a sample of 10 aid workers in the 
researcher’s workplace. The small pilot emulated all the procedures proposed by the main 
study. Lastly, the questionnaire was shared with non-researchers to review for typos and 
errors inadvertently introduced during the last revision process. Based on comments 
gathered from the reviewers as well as results of the pilot study, the researcher revised the 
questionnaire for adequacy in the extent to which the questions covered the research 
objectives (focus) and whether the questions asked were intelligible to respondents 
(phraseology). The researcher also looked out for necessary forms of responses, to ascertain 
whether the questions permitted subsequent analysis; and sequencing and general 
presentation to ascertain whether the questions had natural and logical order. Some of the 
mistakes caught through the piloting process were lack of motivational techniques to 
complete the survey; technical vocabulary with no definitions; inaccurate or missing 
instructions; overlapping question scales or selection options; requesting inappropriate 
demographic data; inconsistent wording and spelling errors and bias in questions/answer 
wording (Andrews, Nonnecke & Preece 2003). Upon completion of the review process, the 
researcher uploaded the finalized questionnaire as panels on the Qualtrics survey World 
Wide Web site for subsequent distribution and accessing by the selected respondents.  
During the questionnaire distribution phase, the respondents were provided advance 
notification about the soon to come survey. They were provided information on why they were 
selected, as well as how they can participate in the study. The researcher persuaded them 
of the survey’s social utility, emphasizing on their importance to the project and the 
confidentiality of the study. Few hours following the advance notification e-mail sent out in 
March 2015, the researcher sent links through the Qualtrics web-based questionnaire to all 
selected research respondents that formed the study sample. Respondents were given one 
month to complete and return the questionnaire. Follow up e-mails were sent every one to 
three days, to chase non-respondents to complete the questionnaire. Reminders were made 
through diverse ways, including Qualtrics automated reminder systems, e-mails, phone calls, 
text messages, and one-on-one reminders along the corridors and in meeting rooms. 
Although reminders were also sent through e-mail, respondents were simply directed by links 
to the web-based questionnaire, where they filled the questionnaire and submitted without 
indicating their personal e-mails or any other form of personal identification to a third party.  
This facilitated increases in response to survey questions, due to reduction in fears of 
67 
 
retribution. The employees’ managers/team leaders were also utilized as collaborators to 
persuade selected respondents to complete and submit the questionnaire.  
The questionnaire retrieval phase witnessed online retrieval of questionnaires submitted by 
the respondents. The researcher monitored the questionnaire submission rates each day, 
and sent reminders and motivational messages to respondents every one to three days, to 
increase the response rates. After the set one month earmarked for responding to the survey, 
the researcher took a final stock of all submitted questionnaires. The numeric data from the 
questionnaires were downloaded immediately after closure of data collection, and up loaded 
into SPSS, enabling the researcher to conduct data analysis after the data collection was 
completed. 
Overall, Likert scale questionnaire was distributed to all 846 aid supported project 
employees, through one approach to respondents using the Qualtrics Mailer survey platform. 
Of the 846 questionnaires distributed, 455 were returned, representing 53.8 per cent 
response rate. Out of the 455 returned questionnaires, 416 were valid and analyzable. This 
was composed of 300 (72.1%) males and 116 (27.9%) females, respectively, representing 
49.2 per cent of the total questionnaires (846) distributed. 
 
3.5.2.2 Data collection method 
 
The Qualtrics web-based analytic survey was the data collection method utilised in this study.  
Once the researcher had finished considering the aims of the research; reviewed the current 
state of knowledge; and assessed the various resources available, he decided on using the 
analytic survey design. Thus, he established the independent variable (variations in culture), 
dependent variable (aid employees’ perception of aid effectiveness) and extraneous 
variables (selection bias, information bias, and confounding) for the study. The researcher 
determined the sampling strategy by defining the research population and designing a means 
of accessing a representative sample, using census technique. The researcher then made a 
determination and collected data through one approach to respondents (survey), refuting the 
need for repeated contact of a single sample or several equivalent samples. The Qualtrics 
web-based survey questionnaires were therefore administered and filled by the respondents 
(Gill & Johnson 2010). 
The Qualtrics web-based questionnaire was composed of the preliminary information section 
and the 40 Likert scale items. The preliminary information section was composed of consent 
information, providing information about what the study is all about, who was conducting it, 
consent to participate in the study and who to contact, in case a respondent had any concerns 
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or questions. It also composed of general instructions to respondents, on how to fill and 
submit the questionnaire. 
The preliminary information section also consisted of items requesting for participants’ 
characteristics or personal profile. The section on participants’ characteristics comprised 
gender, current state of occupation, state of origin, professional affiliation, membership of 
social or cultural association, duration of affiliation with donor project, type of employer, 
highest educational attainment, and religious affiliation. This information was deemed 
necessary for use during data analysis to isolate any biases arising from respondents’ 
characteristics. 
The 40 Likert scale items composed of eight Likert-type items under each of the following 
groups: Alignment of aid to country systems; managing aid for results; country ownership; 
mutual accountability of aid; and harmonisation of aid. These groups were preferred because 
they comprise the five generally accepted principles of aid effectiveness. Respondents were 
required to carefully read each Likert scale item and indicate their level of agreement about 
the statement, by indicating against numbers ‘1’ through ‘4’, depicting strongly agree (1), 
agree (2), disagree (3), and strongly disagree (4), respectively. The ‘Neutral’ option was not 
included in the questionnaire. Although the 4-point Likert scale is widely criticized for not 
giving a neutral option to respondents who feel uncomfortable responding to an item, 
respondents use the neutral option to shy away from answering needed questions by simply 
ticking ‘Neutral’. Therefore, the researcher assumed that in this study, the experienced aid 
workers will freely express their opinion about aid programmes without needing a neutral 
option. Thus, the 4-point Likert scale was provided to extract at least a specific opinion on 
each item from the aid workers, given their experience in aid work. Completed questionnaires 
were submitted and an automatic response sent to the respondent, thanking him/her for 
participating in the study. The web-based questionnaire was preferred for the study because 
of its completion speed, cost efficiency, ease of administration, and ease of analysis. 
Shortcomings of the online survey has been discussed in detail above. 
 
3.6    ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Belmont Report became the foundation for research regulations in federally 
sponsored research in the United States, thus, merits special mention (Stommel & Wills, 
2004). The researcher took steps to protect the rights of the respondents, institution and 
the integrity of the research process. The research was approved by the Sheffield 
Business School Research Ethics Committee, Sheffield Hallam University, United 
Kingdom (UK), and the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital Health Research Ethics 
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Committee, Enugu, Nigeria. Thus, the following ethical considerations were followed on 
the course of this study: 
The researcher avoided discrimination against aid workers on the basis of sex, race, 
ethnicity, or other factors that may jeopardize the validity and reliability of the study 
results. The researcher protected confidential communications, such as institutional 
information like personnel records, papers or grants submitted for publication, following 
acceptance of the thesis by the Sheffield Hallam University and Business School 
Netherlands. 
To address subject privacy and confidentiality, the following steps were taken (Andrews, 
Nonnecke & Preece 2003): respondents had the rights to designate conditions of release, 
use, retention and disposal of personal data; researcher did not obtain sample from non-aid 
workers. The researcher sent invitations to participate in the study and the surveys 
separately. Data were collected through web-pages, not through personal e-mails. Multiple 
response options were made available to the respondents. Cookies and links from 
personalized sites were avoided. Credible domains were used with encryption of sensitive 
materials and third party privacy certification provided. Transparent disclosures of sampling 
procedures were made, with hypertext links used for long disclosures. Institutional 
management leadership consent was sought and obtained prior to obtaining e-mail 
addresses of research participants from the database. “Rather not say” response option for 
sensitive questions was provided to respondents. Survey results were provided to the 
employees.  
In order to ensure confidentiality of the institutions participating in the study, the researcher 
took steps to avoid showing their internet provider (IP) addresses. Thus, further steps were 
taken to obtain each participant’s private e-mail addresses. The researcher utilized the 
private e-mail addresses to develop panels on the Qualtrics mailer, the web-based platform 
identified for the survey. By this approach, staff official e-mail addresses (and by extension, 
their official IP addresses) were not utilized in the survey, thereby, guaranteeing anonymity 
of the institutions that participated in the study. Also, this approach was aimed to ensure the 
results of the study were a reflection of the whole, and not the specific views of any single 
institution. Additionally, the participating institutions as well as participants were double 
blinded, such that no one (except the researcher, viewing from a neutral observational 
position) knew who else was participating in the study.  
The researcher strived for honesty in all scientific communications, by honestly reporting 
data, results, methods and procedures, and publication status after the thesis was 
accepted by the University.  
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3. 7 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS  
 
Burns and Grove (2009) describe data analysis as a process conducted to reduce, organize, 
and give meaning to data.  
The Likert scale data obtained in this study was analyzed at the interval measurement scale. 
Likert scale items were created by calculating a composite score (sum or mean) from 40 
Likert-type items, composed of eight Likert-type items under each of the following groups: 
Alignment of aid to country systems; managing aid for results; country ownership; mutual 
accountability of aid; and harmonisation of aid.  
 
3.7.1 Stages of data analysis 
 
Appendix D, shows a tabular presentation of the continuum of research objectives, 
hypothesis and data analysis techniques used in this study. The survey data using Likert 
scale was analyzed as follows: 
• The researcher got the data ready for analysis by coding the responses obtained 
through the questionnaire. This was done through allocation of numbers ‘1’ through 
‘4’, against strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), and strongly disagree (4), 
respectively.  
• The researcher eliminated the use of ordinal data in this study, and upheld only 
interval data analysis, as the two types required different analytical approaches. The 
interval data only tells a reader that the people with higher-numbered responses are 
more in agreement with the item in question than those with the lower-numbered 
responses. 
• To analyse the data, the researcher computed descriptive statistics (frequencies) of 
the four response categories obtained from the participants. The four categorical 
responses were then reduced to dichotomous responses by merging ‘Strongly 
Agree/Agree’ and ‘Disagree/Strongly Disagree’ to form new response categories 
called ‘Agree’ and Disagree’ respectively. Results were presented in frequency 
tables, as well as graphs. Of each of the 8 individual variable items listed under each 
principle of aid effectiveness, 4 were theoretically portrayed positively, while the other 
4 had negative connotations. Thus, the researcher utilized the recode function in 
SPSS to flip the response scales for all items with negative connotations to range 
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from 4 through 1 (that is, strongly agree to strongly disagree), instead of 1 through 4 
that was obtainable in the positive variable items. The researcher utilized compute 
function in SPSS to sum up all 8 individual variable items into group variable items. 
Therefore, five group variable items were obtained from the 40 individual variable 
items utilized in the questionnaire. Furthermore, the researcher utilized the recode 
function in SPSS to recode the group scores, using the number 10 as cut off point. 
Thus, any group score ranging from 1 through 8 was coded ‘1’, representing ‘Agree,’ 
while any group score from ‘11’ through highest was coded ‘2’, meaning ‘Disagree’. 
That means any group score of ‘8’ or ‘16’ points was referred to a perfect score of 
‘Agree’ or ‘Disagree’ respectively.  To obtain a ‘Neutral’ score or cut-off point of ‘10’ 
therefore, a participant must indicate ‘Agree’ or ‘1’ to at least 6 out of the 8 individual 
variable items. To further reduce the data, the researcher computed the mean value 
for each of the group variable item scores. Finally, the mean and standard deviations 
of all group means was computed and recorded.  • The researcher displayed the distribution of responses (percentages that strongly 
agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree) in graphics, such as bar chart, with 
one bar for each response category. This made the survey results much easier for 
the researcher to interpret descriptively.  • In order to guide interpretation of results, the following mean score (and percentage 
equivalent) scales were adopted: ‘0’ to 0.29’ meaning ‘Strongly Agree;’ ‘0.3 to 0.49’ 
meaning ‘Agree;’ ‘0.5’ meaning ‘Neutral’ or ‘Undecided;’ ‘0.51 to 0.79;’ meaning 
‘Disagree,’ and ‘0.8 to 1;’ meaning ‘Strongly Disagree.’ Therefore, any obtained score 
nearer to ‘0’ indicated greater strength of agreement while scores nearer to ‘1’ 
indicated greater strength of disagreement with the Likert scale item presented.   • Results generated from the dichotomous categories were treated as interval data and 
presented as frequency tables and histogram with skew graphs (see appendages, 
for the later). Participants’ response mean score and standard deviations were 
computed and reflected on skew graphs. Calibrated on the y-axis were the frequency 
of occurrence, while the x-axis had mean scores of responses. The calibrations 
ranged from ‘0’ to ‘1,’ with ‘0’ being coded to represent ‘Agree’ and ‘1’ coded to 
represent ‘Disagree.’  • The researcher envisaged that to compare results against the six geopolitical zones 
of Nigeria was going to be limited by the requirements guiding Chi-square Test of 
Independence: no cell has an expected frequency less than 1; no more than 20 per 
cent of cells have an expected frequency less than 5. Thus, in order to avoid 
misleading probabilities arising from violating this requirement, the researcher 
reduced data from the six geopolitical zones into two major geographic regions of 
Nigeria – southern and northern geographic regions of Nigeria. Thus, data from the 
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South-West, South-South, and south-East geopolitical zones of Nigeria were merged 
to form data for the southern geographic region of Nigeria. Similarly, data from the 
North-Central, north-West and north-East were reduced to form data for the northern 
geographic region of Nigeria. Each of these regions served as proxies for the 
northern and southern diverse cultures of Nigeria. Thus, the study assumed that 
participants’ culture (mental programme or way of life) is synonymous to their 
geographic region of origin, while controlling for their geographic region of residence, 
among other key confounding factors in this study. Comparison was therefore made 
for each variable item against geographic region of origin and geographic region of 
residence.  
• The researcher proceeded to conducting inferential techniques (analysis of variance 
- ANOVA), which test hypothesis posed by the researcher, as basis for making 
predictions. 
 
To increase the analytic rigor in order to reduce type I (false-positive conclusion) and type II 
(false negative conclusion) errors, the researcher set confidence interval (CI) at 95 per cent 
(α=0.05: a Z value equal to 1.96). Alpha was set at α=0.05, while Beta (type II error) was set 
at β=0.20. Power derives from beta error. The researcher used one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), to examine the potential effect of the variable of interest (variation of culture on 
aid recipients’ perception of aid effectiveness), while simultaneously controlling for the effect 
of many other factors. The ANOVA technique was used to analyze and compare results from 
two main geographic regions representing various cultures in Nigeria. Multivariate analysis 
involves the simultaneous consideration of at least three (and sometimes many more) 
variables and their relations to one another. Although the statistical models themselves 
usually do not make distinctions between independent variables that represent variation in 
intervention levels (as opposed to variation in confounding attributes), they can be used to 
separate the effects of the main variable of interest from the impact of other variables under 
study. A major advantage of these approaches was that they controlled for more factors than 
stratification alone, as association analysis required exclusion of plausible rival hypothesis 
(Schulz & Grimes 2006, Stommel & Wills 2004). The disadvantages of multivariate 
approaches, for some researchers, include greater difficulty in understanding the results, and 
loss of hands-on feel for the data. To address this, the researcher was deeply immersed in 
the data and obtained continued guidance from the research supervisors and learning set 
advisor. 
Responses from the geographic regions of Nigeria were further analyzed using the Kruskal 
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compared results from various Likert scale items to decipher the item that had more 
significant impact on the perception of aid effectiveness.  
With the level of significance set at α=0.05, any small p-value below <α=0.05 indicates 
significant difference in participants’ perception of aid effectiveness; while p-values above 
>α=0.05 indicates no significant difference in participants’ perception of aid effectiveness. 
It was envisaged that some extraneous (confounding) variables will emerge to distort the 
study results, therefore, they were addressed as described below: 
• Selection bias: do all participants have equal chances of participating in the study 
(Schulz & Grimes 2006)? To address this bias, the researcher gave no opportunities 
for participants to choose to participate in the study. They were selected using census 
approach; thereby, giving everyone in the sampling frame an opportunity to complete 
the questionnaire. 
• Information bias: in this study, also known as measurement bias (Schulz & Grimes 
2006). Is information about the impact of culture on aid effectiveness obtained in the 
same way for all study participants? To address this bias, the same questionnaire 
was administered in the same manner to all participants. Similarly, the method of 
data analysis and reporting was the same. 
• Confounding: could the results be accounted for by the presence of a factor in the 
participants (professional affiliation, membership of a professional association, sex, 
religious affiliation and respect for local tradition and ethics)? 
To address for confounding, the researcher restricted participation in the study to only those 
who met the eligibility criteria for inclusion in the study. That is, selection from employees 
who worked on aid supported projects in Nigeria. After the study was completed, the 
researcher adopted a post hoc restriction during data analysis by using the stratification 
approach. Additionally, the researcher considered that the results could be accounted for by 
the presence of an extraneous factor (e.g., participant has never participated in the 
implementation of aid supported projects or not interested in participating in the study) or any 
overriding influences of a dimension of culture? For example, professional affiliation (power 
distance), active membership in a professional association (individualism and collectivism), 
sex (masculinity and femininity), religious affiliation (uncertainty avoidance), and respect for 
local tradition and ethics (long term and short term orientation). To address for confounding, 
the researcher restricted participation in the study to those who were implementing aid 
supported projects as at the time of data collection, and were interested to participate in the 
study. 
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If the results were not explained by these three biases, could they be the result of chance?  
• What was the chance and 95 percent confidence interval (CI) that aid effectiveness 
was associated to the impact of culture? 
• Was the difference statistically significant, and, if not, did the study have adequate 
power to find an important difference? 
Furthermore, the researcher adopted the Mantel-Haenszel procedure to combine the various 
strata into a summary statistic that described aid effectiveness by the levels of the 
confounding factor (educational qualification, marital status, age group, duration of affiliation 
with aid funding, professional affiliation, membership of a professional association, sex and 
religious affiliation). Where the Mantel-Haenszel adjusted aid effect differed substantially 
from the crude aid effect, the confounding was deemed present. In this instance, the adjusted 
estimate of aid effectiveness was considered the better estimate to use (Schulz & Grimes 
2006). 
The researcher looked at the results from every step of the data analysis process and drew 
conclusions. Discussions were made with references to previous study results. 
 
3.8 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE STUDY 
 
According to Vanderstoep and Johnson (2009), a study is deemed valid and reliable if the 
measures of phenomenon in the study accurately reflect the constructs and yield the same 
results across time, circumstances and groups of people. In other words, the study must 
ensure that biases are eliminated or reduced to the barest minimum; and at the same time 
the findings from the study must generalize to other samples, populations or setting 
(Vanderstoep & Johnson 2009).  
 
3.8.1 Validity 
 
According to Gill and Johnson (2010), validity refers to the extent to which a scale encoded 
into a set of questions actually measures the variable it is supposed to measure. In order 
words, validity refers to the accuracy of the measurement process (Gill & Johnson 2010). A 
measurement procedure is said to be valid to the extent that it accomplishes its stated goal 
to be valid – content validity (Stommel and Wills 2004). In other words, does the 
measurement procedure indeed get at the concept in question? Newton (2009) laments that 
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validity represents that capacity of a particular statistical test to measure that which it is 
claimed to be able to measure. Validity is vital to quantitative research because only valid 
results can be interpreted and generalized (Newton 2009). The researcher immersed himself 
into review of relevant literature in order to ensure the measurement instrument and 
procedures were in line with the concept in question. The resultant instrument generated 
from various literature sources was subjected to reviews by quantitative research experts in 
his workplace and also the research supervisors and learning set advisors. 
Vanderstoep and Johnson (2009) defines construct validity as the extent to which the 
measure is on target to measure the construct being studied. Prior to the administration of 
the research instrument in the field, the researcher carried out a pre-test on 10 aid workers 
in his workplace; a sample population having similar characteristics with the ones proposed 
for the actual study. Pre-test participants were requested to share comments after submitting 
their completed questionnaire. Outcomes of the pilot study indicated that some questionnaire 
items required further review for clarity. The pilot study also informed the approximate 
duration taken by each respondent to complete the questionnaire. All technical anomalies 
identified through the pre-test were corrected and the instrument updated. Also, the 
approximate duration for completing the questionnaire was communicated in advance to the 
prospective respondents of the main study.  
 
3.8.2 Reliability 
 
Reliability of measurement refers to consistency; that is, the extent to which a measuring 
device will produce the same results when applied more than once to the same person under 
similar conditions (Gill & Johnson 2010). According to Stommel and Wills (2004), reliability 
refers to the reproducibility of results when several measurements are taken of the same 
phenomena. In other words, do repeated measurements on different occasions, at different 
locations, by different observers, using alternative methods, question, items, and so forth 
yield consistent results for phenomena that can be assumed to be stable and unchanging? 
Reliability is the consistency of a set of measurements or measuring instrument, often used 
to describe a test (Cortina 1993). Reliability does not imply validity. That is, a reliable measure 
is measuring something consistently, but not necessarily what it is supposed to be 
measuring. In terms of accuracy and precision, reliability is precision, while validity is 
accuracy. The most common internal consistency measure is Cronbach’s α (alpha), which is 
usually interpreted as the mean of all possible split-half coefficients (Cortina 1993). Internal 
consistency ranges between zero and one. A commonly accepted rule of thumb is that an 
alpha of 0.6-0.7 indicates acceptability, and 0.8 or higher indicates good reliability. 
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Cronbach’s alpha was the measure of reliability utilized in this study. It has an important use 
as a measure of the reliability of a psychometric instrument. It is a generalization and 
extension of an earlier version, the Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 (often shortened to KR-
20), which is the equivalent for dichotomous items. It generally increases when the 
correlations between the items increase. For this reason, the coefficient is also called the 
internal consistency or the internal consistency reliability of the test. 
Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of consistency and measures how well a set of variables or 
items measures a single, unidimensional latent construct. It is defined as; 
 
 
where N is the number of components (items or test),  is the variance of the observed 
total test scores, and   is the variance of component i. 
In this study, SPSS version 17.0 was utilized to calculate the internal consistency reliability 
of the questionnaire. A pilot study sample of n=10, generated Cronbach’s alpha .629, N of 
items = 42, mean 99.56 and standard deviation of 7.812. Cronbach’s alpha .629 was 
determined acceptable for the study, therefore, the 42 item questionnaire was utilized in the 
study. To satisfy the researcher’s curiosity, the internal consistency reliability test was 
repeated with all 416 responses obtained in this study. The Cronbach’s alpha remained 
acceptable at .629. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presents the research setting, design and methods utilised in conducting this 
study.  The chapter also presents methods of data analysis, ethical considerations and steps 
taken by the researcher to ensure validity and reliability of the research study. Data was 
collected using Qualtrics web based survey questionnaire. Likert scale questionnaire was 
distributed among aid workers from two aid implementing partners working in Nigeria.  
The next chapter (Chapter 4) presents the analysis, presentation and description of the 
research findings. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter described the methods used in carrying out this survey. This chapter 
describes the analysis, presentation and description of the research findings. The results are 
presented in accordance with the theoretical/conceptual framework and the research 
objectives. 
The quantitative research approach was applied in this study. Thus, analytic survey research 
design was utilized in this study. The analytic survey attempt to test a theory by taking the 
logic of the experiment out of the laboratory and into the field (Gill & Johnson 2010); in this 
case, to determine the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness. 
The Likert scale data obtained in this study was analyzed at the interval measurement scale. 
Likert scale items were created by calculating a composite score (sum or mean) from 40 
Likert-type items, composed of eight Likert-type items under each of the following groups: 
Alignment of aid to country systems; managing aid for results; country ownership of aid; 
mutual accountability of aid; and harmonisation of aid. Furthermore, inferential data analysis 
was conducted utilizing Chi-square test of independence. From this analysis, it was 
determined that participants’ geographic region of origin, as well as their region of residence 
had statistically significant impact on ‘Country ownership of aid’. Thus, ANOVA was 
conducted to verify the result. ANOVA showed that geographic region of origin had 
statistically significant impact on country ownership of aid. In order to increase statistical rigor 
and control for biases, Kruskal Wallis test of variance and Mantel-Haenszel procedures were 
conducted. 
Detailed, step-by-step presentation of data analysis, presentation and description of findings 
are shown below, with each presented according to the following format: location of the 
element; a summary of the information presented; and a highlighting statement to point out 
what is significant in the data presented. 
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4.1 Demographic characteristics of participants 
 
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of participants that took part in the study. 
Table 1 is sub-divided into nine items, labelled items 1.1 through 1.9, respectively. It shows 
that there were 300 (72.1%) male and 116 (27.9%) female participants involved in the study. 
Up to 95.7 per cent of the participants were within the age group of 25 to 54 years. Majority 
of the participants (316, 78.1%) were ever married while 86 (21.9%) were never married. Up 
to 337 (81.0%) participants were Christians while 72 (17.3%) were affiliated to the Islamic 
religion. The study tells us that over half of the participants - 225 (54.1%) – reported having 
over 5 years’ duration of affiliation with aid funding. The majority (251, 60.3%) of participants 
did not belong to any social or cultural association. The survey also tells us that among the 
participants studied, 234 (56.3%) holds pre-degree and graduate qualifications, while 182 
(43.8%) holds post-graduate qualifications. Up to 382 (91.8%) participants were employed 
by non-governmental organisations (NGO) and 31 (7.5%) by the host government. Majority 
of the participants – 234 (56.3%) – were affiliated to other professions other than medical 
(104, 25.0%) and paramedical (78, 18.8%) professions, respectively. 
These variables are necessary in this study for the purpose of advanced analysis, to decipher 
whether any serves as confounding variable to the key findings of the study.  
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TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS (N=416) 
  Characteristics Southern Nigeria Northern Nigeria Total 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1.1 Duration of affiliation with aid 
funding 
          
 
More than five years 145 64.4 80 35.6 225 54.1 
Less than five years 130 68.1 61 31.9 191 45.9 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.2 Current employer           
 
Governmental organization 28 90.3 3 9.7 31 7.5 
Non-governmental organisation  247 64.2 138 35.8 385 92.5 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.3 Religious affiliation           
 
Christianity 216 64.1 121 35.9 337 81.0 
Islam 54 75.0 18 25.0 72 17.3 
Other 5 71.4 2 28.6 7 1.7 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.4 Professional association           
 
Medical  60 57.7 44 42.3 104 25 
Paramedical 57 73.1 21 26.9 78 18.8 
Other 158 67.5 76 32.5 234 56.3 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.5 Age group           
 
18 to 34 years 97 64.2 54 35.8 151 36.3 
35 to 54 years 165 66.5 83 33.5 248 59.6 
55 years and over 13 76.5 4 23.5 17 4.1 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.6 Marital status           
 
Never married 61 67.0 30 33.0 91 21.9 
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Ever married 214 65.8 111 34.2 325 78.1 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.7 Highest educational qualification           
 
Pre-degree and graduate qualifications 161 68.8 73 31.2 234 56.3 
Post graduate qualification 114 62.6 68 37.4 182 43.8 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.8 Affiliation with social or cultural 
association 
          
 
No 166 66.1 85 33.9 251 60.3 
Yes 109 66.1 56 33.9 165 39.7 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
1.9 Gender           
 
Male 195 65.0 105 35.0 300 72.1 
Female 80 69.0 36 31.0 116 27.9 
Total 275 66.1 141 33.9 416 100 
 
 
4.2 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PE‘CEPTION OF COUNT‘Y͛S OWNE‘SHIP OF AID IN NIGE‘IA 
  
Table 2 shows the participants’ response to eight items relating to their perception of 
country’s ownership of aid in Nigeria. The table presents items 2.1 through 2.8, highlighting 
frequencies (n) and proportion (%), as well as missing data of participants responding to each 
item. Table 2 also shows the grand total (frequency and percentage) of participants who 
agreed or disagreed, respectively, to each item listed. 
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TABLE 2: PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF AID (N=416) 
 
Item    
   Responses 
  Agree Disagree Missing 
data 
Total 
2.1 The aid donors are promoting practices that are alien and unwanted 
to the local tradition and culture. 
f 65 323 28 416 
% 15.6 77.6 6.7 100 
2.2 Foreign aid donor countries select places they wish to support 
based on their interests and not the country's strategic interest or the 
interest of the local people they support. 
f 162 225 29 416 
% 38.9 54.1 7.0 100 
2.3 Foreign aid to my country consists of specifications that a certain 
proportion of the financial assistance must be provided in kind (i.e., 
expatriate staff, consultants, equipment, commodities) by the aid 
provider. 
f 278 101 37 416 
% 66.8 24.3 8.9 100 
2.4 Foreign aid supports the country to develop own strategies, improve 
institutional capacities and tackle corruption using locally driven 
strategies.  
f 339 45 32 416 
% 81.5 10.8 7.7 100 
2.5 Foreign aid resources get to the rightful beneficiaries, with minimal 
leakages. 
f 285 101 30 416 
% 68.5 24.3 7.2 100 
2.6 Foreign aid resources are distributed equally between people in 
need in the rural and urban areas.  
f 211 173 32 416 
% 50.7 41.6 7.7 100 
2.7 Regional and country 'experts' are not experienced to lead 
opportunities in foreign aid supported research and intervention 
programmes in Nigeria.  
f 42 340 34 416 
% 10.1 81.7 8.2 100 
2.8 I trust my leaders will make the right decisions and negotiations with 
aid donors on my behalf. 
f 251 135 30 416 
% 60.3 32.5 7.2 100 
NOTE. f = Number of participants. % = Per cent.  
 
Table 2 shows that 323 (77.6%) respondents perceive that donors do not promote practices 
that are alien or unwanted by the local tradition and culture (See Appendix E1). Also, 225 
(54.1%) of the respondents opine that foreign aid donor countries select places they wish to 
support based on recipient country’s strategic interests and the interest of the local people 
they support (See Appendix E2). The study further reveals that 278 (66.8%) of the study 
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respondents perceive that foreign aid to the recipient country consists of specifications that 
a proportion of the financial assistance must be provided in kind (i.e., expatriate staff, 
consultants, equipment, commodities) by the donors (See Appendix E3).  Up to 339 (81.5%) 
of respondents expressed that foreign aid supports recipient countries to develop own 
strategies, improve institutional capacities and tackle corruption using locally driven 
strategies (See Appendix E4). The study also tells us that 285 (68.5%) respondents reported 
that foreign aid resources get to the rightful beneficiaries with minimal leakages (See 
Appendix E5). This study further indicates that 211 (50.7%) respondents reported that foreign 
aid resources are distributed equally between people in need in the rural and urban areas 
(See Appendix E6). Furthermore, the study elucidates that 340 (81.7%) perceive that 
regional and country ‘experts’ are experienced to lead opportunities in foreign aid supported 
research and intervention programmes in Nigeria (See Appendix E7). The study tells us that 
251 (60.3%) respondents assert that the aid recipient countries have confidence in their 
leaders and trust that their leaders will make the right decisions and negotiations with aid 
donors on their behalf (See Appendix E8). 
 
4.2.9 Summary of mean scores of vaƌiaďle iteŵs ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg to paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
peƌĐeptioŶ of ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s oǁŶeƌship of aid.  
 
Figure 3 shows a summary of the mean scores of variable items contributing to participants’ 
perception of recipient country’s ownership of aid. The Figure presents the mean scores, 
scaled from ‘0’ to ‘1’ on the ‘y’ axis and 1 through 8 variable items on the ‘x’ axis. A midline 
is drawn to separate variable items with mean scores below 0.5 from those above 0.5. 
Variable items below the midline depicts ‘Agree’ while those above the midline indicates 
‘Disagree’ with the statement (variable item). The strength of agreement or disagreement to 
the statement depends on how close the mean score is to ‘0’ or ‘1’, respectively.  
The survey shows that majority of participants perceive that: a certain proportion of aid to the 
recipient country are provided in kind[3]; aid supports the country to develop institutional 
capacities and tackle corruption using locally driven strategies[4]; aid resources get to the 
rightful beneficiaries with minimal leakages[5]; aid resources are distributed equally to the 
needy in rural and urban areas[6]; and people in the recipient country trust their leaders will 
make the right decisions and negotiations with aid donors on their behalf[8].  
The variable item with the greatest strength of agreement in this category is: “aid supports 
the country to develop institutional capacities and tackle corruption using locally driven 
strategies” (mean score, 0.12). The weakest strength of agreement is: “aid resources are 
distributed equally to the needy in rural and urban areas” (mean score, 0.45).  
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FIGURE 3: MEAN SCORES OF VARIABLE ITEMS CONTRIBUTING TO PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION 
OF COUNTRY’S OWNERSHIP OF AID (N=416) 
The survey shows in Figure 3 that majority of participants indicated ‘Disagree’ to the following 
three variable items listed under country ownership of aid: aid donors are promoting practices 
that are alien and unwanted by the local culture and tradition[1]; aid donors select places 
they wish to support based on their interests and not the recipient country’s strategic 
interests[2]; and regional and country experts are not experienced to lead aid programmes[7]. 
The participants’ greatest strength of disagreement was with the notion that: “regional and 
country experts are not experienced to lead aid programmes” (mean score, 0.89).  
4.2.10 Hypothesis testing: H0: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ 
peƌĐeptioŶ of ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s oǁŶeƌship of aid iŶ Nigeƌia 
 
Table 3 shows the contrast between participant’s geographic region of origin and their 
perception of country’s ownership of aid in Nigeria. The study tells us that 189 (51.5%) 
participants agrees that local ownership of aid is demonstrated in Nigeria, while 178 (48.5%) 
disagrees. The researcher utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged 
from the study that 134 (55.4%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was 
southern Nigeria indicated ‘Agree’ while 108 (44.6%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to 
the country ownership of aid in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was 
northern Nigeria, 55 (44.0%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 70 (56.0%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items 
related to the country ownership of aid in Nigeria. 
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TABLE 3: CROSSTAB SHOWING PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF AID 
(N=416) 
  
   Geographic region of origin  
 Southern Nigeria Northern 
Nigeria 
Total 
 Agree 
 
 
 
Count 134 55 189 
% within Country ownership of aid 70.9 29.1 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 55.4 44.0 51.5 
% of Total 36.5 15.0 51.5 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Missing 
data 
Count 108 70 178 
% within Country ownership of aid 60.7 39.3 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 44.6 56.0 48.5 
% of Total 
Count 
% Missing data 
29.4 
32 
65.3 
19.1 
17 
34.7 
48.5 
49 
100 
 Total Count 274 142 416 
% within Country ownership of aid 65.9 34.1 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of Total 65.9 34.1 100.0 
NOTE: % = Percentage.  
 
As shown in Table 4, Chi-square test of independence supported the existence of a 
relationship between participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of country 
ownership of aid in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=367) = 0.047, p = < 0.05. When compared with 
participants’ region of residence, the Chi-square test of independence still supported the 
existence of an association between participants region of residence and their perception of 
country ownership of aid in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=367) = 0.032, p = < 0.05.  
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TABLE 4: CHI-SQUARE TEST OF PARTICIPANTS’ GEOGRAPHIC REGION OF ORIGIN AND THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF AID (N=416) 
 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.268a 1 .039   
Continuity Correctionb 3.824 1 .051   
Likelihood Ratio 4.273 1 .039   
Fisher's Exact Test    .047 .025 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.256 1 .039   
N of Valid Cases 
N of Missing Cases 
Grand Total 
367 
49 
416 
    
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 60.63. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
To validate the results that were statistically significant with Chi-square test, the researcher 
repeated the analysis using ANOVA. A one-way between subjects’ ANOVA was conducted 
to compare the impact of geographic region of origin on participants’ perception of country 
ownership of aid in Nigeria. There was a significant impact of participants’ geographic region 
of origin on their perception of country ownership of aid at the p < 0.05 level [F (1,365) = 
4.294, p = 0.039]. As shown in Table 5, a one-way between subjects’ ANOVA was also 
conducted to compare the impact of geographic region of residence on participants’ 
perception of country ownership of aid in Nigeria. There was no significant impact of 
participants’ geographic region of residence on participants’ perception of country ownership 
of aid at the p < 0.05 level [F (1,365) = 3.846, p = 0.051]. 
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TABLE 5: ONE-WAY BETWEEN SUBJECTS ANOVA COMPARING THE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHIC 
REGION OF RESIDENCE ON PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF AID 
(N=416) 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .956 1 .956 3.846 .051 
Within Groups 90.712 365 .249   
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
91.668 
- 
- 
366 
50 
416 
   
NOTE: df = Degree of freedom. F = Frequency. Sig. = Significant level. 
 
Table 6 shows responses from the participants as further analysed using the Kruskal Wallis 
test of variance in order to eliminate any extraneous variables. The researcher compared 
results from various Likert-type items to decipher the item that had more significant impact 
on the participants’ perception of country ownership of aid. From the study, it was found that 
no particular item had significant impact on the participants’ perception of country ownership 
of aid in Nigeria 
 
TABLE 6: KRUSKAL WALLIS TEST OF VARIANCE OF THE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHIC REGION OF 
ORIGIN ON OWNERSHIP OF AID IN NIGERIA (N=416) 
  
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Aid supports locally 
driven strategies 
Between 
Groups 
0.089 1 0.089 0.86 0.36 
Within Groups 39.638 382 0.104 
  
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
39.727 383 
33 
416 
   
Aid resources get to the 
rightful beneficiaries 
Between 
Groups 
0.006 1 0.006 0.03 0.86 
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Within Groups 74.567 384 0.194 
  
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
74.573 385 
31 
416 
   
Aid resources are 
distributed equally to 
rural and urban areas 
Between 
Groups 
0.103 1 0.103 0.41 0.52 
Within Groups 94.957 382 0.249 
  
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
95.06 383 
33 
416 
   
I trust my leaders will 
make the right 
decisions on my behalf 
Between 
Groups 
0.117 1 0.117 0.51 0.47 
Within Groups 87.668 384 0.228 
  
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
87.785 385 
31 
416 
   
Aid donors promote 
unwanted practices to 
local cultures 
Between 
Groups 
0.014 1 0.014 0.1 0.75 
Within Groups 54.097 386 0.14 
  
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
54.111 387 
29 
416 
   
Donors select places 
against local interests 
and priorities 
Between 
Groups 
0.69 1 0.69 2.84 0.09 
Within Groups 93.497 385 0.243 
  
Total 
Missing data 
94.186 386 
30 
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NOTE: df = Degree of freedom. F = Frequency. Sig. = Significant level.   
 
In order to reduce errors and address any bias, the researcher increased analytic rigor of the 
study by adopting the Mantel-Haenszel procedure. This was aimed to combine the various 
strata into a summary statistic that describes country ownership of aid by the level of the 
confounding factors. These confounding factors include participants’ highest educational 
qualification, gender, marital status, age group, duration of affiliation with aid funding, 
professional association, and affiliation with social or cultural association. Others were 
religious affiliation, current employer, and geographic region of residence. The study tells us 
that the participants’ perception of country ownership of aid was more statistically significant 
among participants who were ever married, X2 (1, n = 367) = 6.378, p = < 0.05; participants 
aged 35 to 54 years old,  X2 (1, n = 367) = 4.191, p = < 0.05; participants whose duration of 
affiliation with aid funding was greater than 5 years, X2 (1, n = 367) = 3.911, p = < 0.05, 
participants who were associated to the paramedical profession, X2 (1, n = 367) = 4.099, p = 
< 0.05; participants whose religious affiliation was Christianity, X2 (1, n = 367) = 5,956, p = < 
0.05; and participants who were employed by a non-governmental association, X2 (1, n = 
367) = 4.968, p = < 0.05. Variables that were not statistically significant; thus, confounding 
factors, were as follows: educational qualification (pre-degree and post-graduate 
qualifications); marital status (participants who were never married); age group (ages 18 to 
34 years, and greater than 55 years); duration of affiliation with aid funding (less than 5 
Grand Total 416 
Aid to my country is 
provided in kind 
Between 
Groups 
0.053 1 0.053 0.27 0.61 
Within Groups 74.032 377 0.196 
  
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
74.084 378 
38 
416 
   
Regional and country 
experts are not 
experienced to lead aid 
Between 
Groups 
0.034 1 0.034 0.35 0.56 
Within Groups 37.348 380 0.098 
  
Total 
Missing data 
Grand Total 
37.382 381 
35 
416 
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years); professional association (medical and any other profession, other than the 
paramedical profession); religious affiliation (Islam and any other religion other than 
Christianity); current employer (governmental organisations); gender, and affiliation with 
social and cultural associations. 
Therefore, the study reveals that majority of those who perceive that country ownership of 
aid was demonstrated in Nigeria were paramedical professionals, working for aid funded non-
governmental organisations for over 5 years. Also, participants who were mostly Christians, 
in their middle ages of 35 to 54 years, and ever married.  Major biases in the study were 
educational qualification, gender and affiliation with socio-cultural associations. The lack of 
statistical significance is a consequence of their role as confounding factors to the study. 
The original relationship between participants’ geographic region of origin and their 
perception of country ownership of aid was significant. When adjusted with the Mantel-
Haenszel procedure, the relationship remained significant. Therefore, we conclude that there 
is significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of country ownership of aid in 
Nigeria. 
 
4.3 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF AID IN NIGERIA 
 
Table 7 shows the participants’ response to eight items relating to their perception of mutual 
accountability of aid in Nigeria. The table presents items 7.1 through 7.8, highlighting 
frequencies (n), proportion (%) and missing data of participants responding to each item. 
Table 7 also shows the grand total (frequency and percentage) of participants who agreed 
or disagreed, respectively, to each item listed. 
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TABLE 7: PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF AID (N=416) 
Item    
   Responses 
  Agree Disagree Missed 
data 
Total 
7.1 The government should enforce punitive measures against people 
who undermine policies guiding administration and management of aid 
funds. 
f 374 13 29 416 
% 89.9 3.1 7.0 100 
7.2 Organisations implementing aid projects invest maximally on 
beneficiaries, within reasonable Company/Organisational overheads. 
f 333 50 33 416 
% 80.0 12.0 7.9 100 
7.3 Foreign aid donors do not build on in-country evaluation programs, 
in order that the evaluations occur at regular intervals in coordination 
with in-country evaluations. 
f 152 227 37 416 
% 36.5 54.6 8.9 100 
7.4 Donors and the government of my country understand that they are 
mutually accountable for transparency of development results, 
therefore, they provide public access to information on the operations of 
the aid programme. 
f 275 109 32 416 
% 66.1 26.2 7.7 100 
7.5 Organisations implementing aid projects regularly use a plausibility 
design to provide evidence of impact, both positive and negative impact, 
and taking into account nonprogramme influences. 
f 317 59 40 416 
% 76.2 14.2 9.6 100 
7.6 Foreign aid programmes usually fail to demonstrate the value of 
integrated development approaches where the interrelatedness of 
activities necessary for human development can be demonstrated. 
f 114 266 36 416 
% 27.4 63.9 8.7 100 
7.7 While foreign aid donors have systems to monitor what exactly had 
been done and how many people had been reached, they are unable to 
measure impact and demonstrate value added to the country.  
f 151 233 32 416 
% 36.3 56.0 7.7 100 
7.8 The country is usually given insufficient or no time to change existing 
systems in order to adopt new 'improved' systems perpetrated by the 
donors; therefore, parallel systems tend to operate at the same time. 
f 234 153 29 416 
% 56.3 36.8 7.0 100 
NOTE. f = Number of participants. % = Per cent 
 
This study reveals that 374 (89.9%) study respondents urge for the rule of law and punitive 
measures to be enforced against people who mismanage aid funds and undermine policies 
guiding administration and management of aid funds (See Appendix E9). It also tells us that 
333 (80.0%) respondents reported that aid implementing partners invest maximally on aid 
beneficiaries without putting undue strain on the resources through their overhead charges 
(See Appendix E10). The study reveals that 227 (54.6%) study respondents perceive that 
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foreign aid donors build on in-country evaluation programmes and ensure that evaluations 
occur at regular intervals in coordination with in-country evaluation programmes (See 
Appendix E11). The study further shows that 275 (66.1%) respondents opine that donors 
and recipient country government understand that they are mutually accountable for 
transparency of development results, therefore, they provide public access to information on 
the operations of the aid programme (See Appendix E12). It was also espoused from the 
study that 317 (76.2%) respondents perceive that aid implementing agencies regularly use 
plausibility design to provide evidence of their programmes’ positive and negative impacts, 
and take account of non-programme influences (See Appendix E13). The survey result 
shows that 266 (63.9%) study respondents assert that foreign aid programmes usually 
demonstrate the value of integrated development approaches, especially, where the 
interrelatedness of activities necessary for human development can be demonstrated (See 
Appendix E14). The survey result indicates that 233 (56.0%) respondents espouse that 
foreign aid is in addition to monitoring programme outputs and outcomes, also able to 
measure impact and demonstrate value added to the country (See Appendix E15). The 
survey result tells us that 234 (56.3%) of study respondents assert that the aid recipient 
country is usually given insufficient or no time to change existing systems in order to adopt 
newly introduced systems, perpetrated by the donors. Thus, two or more systems tend to 
operate parallel to one another. 
 
4.3.9 Summary of mean scores of variable items contributing to participaŶts͛ 
perception of mutual accountability of aid.  
 
Figure 4 shows a summary of the mean scores of variable items contributing to participants’ 
perception of mutual accountability of aid. The Figure presents the mean scores, scaled from 
‘0’ to ‘1’ on the ‘y’ axis and 1 through 8 variable items on the ‘x’ axis. A midline is drawn to 
separate variable items with mean scores below 0.5 from those above 0.5. Variable items 
below the midline depicts ‘Agree’ while those above the midline indicates ‘Disagree’ with the 
statement (variable item). The strength of agreement or disagreement to the statement 
depends on how close the mean score is to ‘0’ or ‘1’, respectively.  
The survey shows that majority of participants perceive that: the government should enforce 
punitive measures against people who undermine policies guiding the administration of aid 
funds[1]; aid implementing partners invest maximally on beneficiaries, within reasonable 
Company/organizational overheads[2]; aid donors and the recipient country understand that 
they are mutually accountable for transparency of development results and provide public 
access to information on the operations of the aid programme[4]; aid implementing partners 
regularly use plausibility design to provide evidence of both negative and positive programme 
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impact[5]; aid recipient country is usually given insufficient or no time to change existing 
systems in order to adopt new systems perpetrated by the donors, thereby operating parallel 
systems at the same time[8]. The strongest strength of agreement in this category was: “the 
government should enforce punitive measures against people who undermine policies 
guiding the administration of aid funds” (mean score, 0.03). This finding emerged with the 
strongest strength of agreement during the entire survey.  
 
 
FIGURE 4: MEAN SCORES OF VARIABLE ITEMS CONTRIBUTING TO PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION 
OF MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF AID (N=416) 
 
As you can see from Figure 4, majority of participants indicated ‘Disagree’ to the following 
three variable items listed under mutual accountability of aid: aid donors do not build on in-
country evaluation programmes[3]; aid fails to demonstrate the value of integrated 
development approaches where the interrelatedness of activities necessary for human 
development are demonstrated[6]; and aid programmes are unable to measure impact and 
demonstrate value added to the country[7]. The strongest strength of disagreement that 
emerged from the study was: “aid fails to demonstrate the value of integrated development 
approaches where the interrelatedness of activities necessary for human development are 
demonstrated.”  
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4.3.10 Hypothesis testing: H0: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ 
perception of mutual accountability of aid in Nigeria 
 
Table 8 shows Chi square test of participant’s geographic region of origin and their perception 
of mutual accountability of aid in Nigeria. It can be seen from the survey that 209 (57.7%) 
participants agree that mutual accountability of aid is demonstrated in Nigeria. The 
researcher utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged from the study 
that 140 (59.1%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was southern 
Nigeria indicated ‘Agree’ while 97 (40.9%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to the mutual 
accountability of aid in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was northern 
Nigeria, 69 (55.2%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 56 (44.8%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related 
to the mutual accountability of aid in Nigeria. 
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TABLE 8: CROSSTAB SHOWING PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION OF MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
AID (N=416) 
  
   Geographic region of 
origin 
 
   Southern 
Nigeria 
Northern 
Nigeria 
Total 
 Agree Count 140 69 209 
% within mutual accountability of aid 67.0 33.0 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 59.1 55.2 57.7 
% of Total 38.7 19.1 57.7 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Missing data 
Count 97 56 153 
% within mutual accountability of aid  63.4 36.6 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 40.9 44.8 42.3 
% of Total 
Count 
% Missing data 
26.8 
35 
64.8 
15.5 
19 
35.2 
42.3 
54 
100 
 Total Count 272 144 416 
% within mutual accountability of aid 65.5 34.5 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of Total 65.5 34.5 100.0 
 
As shown in Table 9, Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a relationship 
between participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of mutual 
accountability of aid in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=362) = 0.503, p = > 0.05. When compared with 
participants’ region of residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the 
existence of an association between participants region of residence and their perception of 
mutual accountability of aid in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=362) = 2.925, p = > 0.05.  
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TABLE 9: CHI SQUARE TEST OF PARTICIPANTS’ GEOGRAPHIC REGION OF ORIGIN AND THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF AID (N=416) 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .503a 1 .478   
Continuity Correctionb .357 1 .550   
Likelihood Ratio .502 1 .479   
Fisher's Exact Test    .503 .275 
Linear-by-Linear Association .501 1 .479   
N of Valid Cases 
N of Missing Cases 
Grand Total 
362 
54 
416 
    
NOTE: df = Degree of freedom. Sig. = Significant level. 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 52.83. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table  
 
4.4 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF AID ALIGNMENT TO COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN NIGERIA 
  
Table 10 shows the participants’ response to eight items relating to their perception of aid 
alignment to country systems in Nigeria. The table presents items 10.1 through 10.8, 
highlighting frequencies (n) and proportion (%), as well as missing data of participants 
responding to each item. Table 10 also shows the grand total (frequency and percentage) of 
participants who agreed or disagreed, respectively, to each item listed. 
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TABLE 10: PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF AID ALIGNMENT TO COUNTRY SYSTEMS (N=416) 
Item    
   Responses 
  Agree Disagree Missing 
data 
Total 
10.1 Foreign aid activities have deliberately tried to change cultural 
norms or practices that are considered to be negative 
f 295 91 30 416 
% 70.9 21.9 7.2 100 
10.2 Foreign aid objectives are well aligned to my country's priorities, 
systems, national development strategies, and preferences 
f 287 100 29 416 
% 69.0 24.0 7.0 100 
10.3 Donor's capacity building interventions are integrated into host 
government's capacity development plans and implemented through 
country-led strategies 
f 278 107 31 416 
% 66.8 25.7 7.5 100 
10.4 Foreign aid facilitates improvement in entrepreneurship and job 
creation in my country 
f 346 37 33 416 
% 83.2 8.9 7.9 100 
10.5 Foreign aid programmes are not scientifically sound and usually 
designed beyond the capacity of the host country to implement 
f 60 320 36 416 
% 14.4 76.9 8.7 100 
10.6 Foreign aid funding to my country has increased dependency, 
substitution of already earmarked government spending, and increased 
corruption among local leadership. 
f 201 184 31 416 
% 48.3 44.2 7.5 100 
10.7 I trust that my country's government and community members has 
sufficient funds to overcome poverty; thus, does not need to depend on 
foreign aid. 
f 209 176 31 416 
% 50.2 42.3 7.5 100 
10.8 Foreign aid funding has devalued the quality of bureaucracy and 
undermined the rule of law in my country. 
f 32 349 35 416 
% 7.7 83.9 8.4 100 
NOTE. f = Number of participants. % = Per cent 
 
It emerged from this study that 295 (70.9%) of the study respondents tells us that foreign aid 
activities have deliberately tried to change cultural norms or practices that are considered to 
be negative (See Appendix E17). The study tells us that 287 (69.0%) of the participants opine 
that foreign aid activities are well aligned to the aid recipient country’s priorities, systems, 
national development strategies and preferences (See Appendix E18). The study also 
reveals that 278 (66.8%) participants perceive that donors’ capacity building interventions 
are integrated into aid recipient country government’s capacity development plans and 
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implemented through country-led strategies (See Appendix E19). Up to 346 (83.2%) 
participants report that foreign aid facilitates improvement in entrepreneurship and job 
creation in Nigeria (See Appendix E20). Majority of study participants, 320 (76.9%), reported 
that foreign aid programmes are scientifically sound and usually designed within the capacity 
of the host country to implement (See Appendix E21). About 184 (44.2%) participants 
expressed that foreign aid funding to the aid recipient countries has increased dependency, 
substitution of already earmarked government spending, and increased corruption among 
local leadership (See Appendix E22). Up to 176 (42.3%) participants disagrees with the 
opinion that aid recipient government and community members has sufficient funds to 
overcome poverty, thus, does not need to depend on foreign aid (See Appendix E23). The 
study shows that 349 (83.9%) participants opine that foreign aid funding neither devalued the 
quality of bureaucracy nor undermined the rule of law in aid recipient countries (See Appendix 
E24). 
 
4.4.9 SuŵŵaƌǇ of ŵeaŶ sĐoƌes of ǀaƌiaďle iteŵs ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg to paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
perception of aid alignment to country systems.  
 
Figure 5 shows a summary of the mean scores of variable items contributing to participants’ 
perception of aid alignment to country systems. The figure presents the mean scores, scaled 
from ‘0’ to ‘1’ on the ‘y’ axis and 1 to 8 variable items on the ‘x’ axis. As can be seen from the 
figure, a midline is drawn to separate variable items with mean scores below 0.5 from those 
above 0.5. Variable items below the midline depicts ‘Agree’ while those above the midline 
indicates ‘Disagree’ with the statement (variable item). The strength of agreement or 
disagreement to the statement depends on how close the mean score is to ‘0’ or ‘1’, 
respectively.  
From the study, we can see that majority of participants opine that: foreign aid change 
negative cultural norms or practices [1]; aid objectives are aligned to recipient country’s 
priorities and national development strategies [2]; aid capacity building interventions are 
country led[3]; and aid facilitates improvement in entrepreneurship and job creation[4]. “Aid 
facilitates improvement in entrepreneurship and job creation,” obtained the strongest 
agreement in this category (mean score 0.10) from the participants. 
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FIGURE 5: MEAN SCORES OF VARIABLE ITEMS CONTRIBUTING TO PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION 
OF AID ALIGNMENT TO COUNTRY SYSTEMS (N=416) 
 
The study also tells us in  Figure 5 that majority of participants indicated ‘Disagree’ to the 
following four variable items: aid programmes are not scientifically sound and usually 
designed beyond the capacity of the host country to implement[5]; aid increases dependency, 
substitution of already earmarked government spending, and corruption[6]; recipient country 
has sufficient funds to overcome poverty [7]; and aid devalues the quality of bureaucracy and 
undermines the rule of law in the recipient country[8]. The strongest disagreement in this 
category (mean score 0.92) relates to the opinion that “aid devaluates the quality of 
bureaucracy and undermines the rule of law in the recipient country.   
 
4.4.10 Hypothesis testing: H0: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ 
perception of aid alignment to country systems in Nigeria 
 
Table 11 shows the contrast between participant’s geographic region of origin and their 
perception of aid alignment to country systems in Nigeria. A large proportion of the 
participants – 239 (64.9%) – agreed that aid to Nigeria was aligned to country systems, while 
129 (35.1%) disagreed. The researcher utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. 
It emerged from the study that 161 (65.4%) participants whose reported geographic region 
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of origin was southern Nigeria indicated ‘Agree’ while 85 (34.6%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the 
items related to the alignment of aid to country systems in Nigeria. Of those whose 
geographic region of origin was northern Nigeria, 78 (63.9%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 44 
(36.1%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to the alignment of aid to country systems in 
Nigeria. 
 
TABLE 11: CROSSTAB SHOWING PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION OF ALIGNMENT OF AID TO 
COUNTRY SYSTEMS (N=416) 
  
   Geographic region of origin  
   Southern 
Nigeria 
Northern 
Nigeria 
Total 
 Agree Count 161 78 239 
% within alignment of aid to country systems 67.4 32.6 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 65.4 63.9 64.9 
% of Total 43.8 21.2 64.9 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Missing Data 
Count 85 44 129 
% within alignment of aid to country systems 65.9 34.1 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 34.6 36.1 35.1 
% of Total 
Count 
% Missing data 
23.1 
32 
66.7 
12.0 
16 
33.3 
35.1 
48 
100.0 
 Total Count 278 138 416 
% within alignment of aid to country systems 66.8 33.2 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of Total 66.8 33.2 100.0 
NOTE: % = Percentage 
 
As shown in Table 12, Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a 
relationship between participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of aid 
alignment to country systems in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 0.082, p = > 0.05. When compared 
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with participants’ region of residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the 
existence of an association between participants’ region of residence and their perception of 
aid alignment to country systems in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 3.338, p = > 0.05.  
 
TABLE 12: CHI-SQUARE TEST OF PARTICIPANTS’ GEOGRAPHIC REGION OF ORIGIN AND THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF AID ALIGNMENT OF AID TO COUNTRY SYSTEMS (N=416) 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .082a 1 .775   
Continuity Correctionb .029 1 .865   
Likelihood Ratio .082 1 .775   
Fisher's Exact Test    .817 .431 
Linear-by-Linear Association .082 1 .775   
N of Valid Cases 
N of Missing Cases 
Grand Total 
368 
48 
416 
    
NOTE: df = Degree of freedom. Sig. = Significant level 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 42.77. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
4.5 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF MANAGING AID FOR RESULTS IN NIGERIA 
 
Table 13 shows the participants’ response to eight items relating to their perception of 
managing aid for results in Nigeria. The table presents items 13.1 through 13.8, highlighting 
frequencies (n), proportion (%) and missing data of participants responding to each item. 
Table 13 also shows the grand total (frequency and percentage) of participants who agreed 
or disagreed, respectively, to each item listed. 
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TABLE 13: PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF MANAGING AID FOR RESULTS (N=416) 
 
 
NOTE. f = Number of participants. % = Per cent 
 
It emerged from this study that 265 (63.7%) participants opine that foreign aid donors do not 
use procurement systems that are alien to local business owners. The study also reveals 
that local businesses are not placed at disadvantage of competing for contracts against their 
Item    
  Responses 
  Agree Disagree Missing 
data 
Total 
13.1 Foreign aid donors use procurement systems that are alien 
to local business owners; thereby placing local businesses at 
disadvantage of competing for contracts against their international 
counterparts. 
f 121 265 30 416 
% 29.1 63.7 7.2 100 
13.2 The policies and regulations operating in aid supported 
programmes around here are in conflict with my culture and 
tradition 
f 63 324 29 416 
% 15.1 77.9 7.0 100 
13.3 Transparency, accountability and strict rules and regulations 
are required in order to ensure people in need actually benefit from 
aid support to my country. 
f 371 17 28 416 
% 89.2 4.1 6.7 100 
13.4 Foreign aid donors generate huge databases and constantly 
build local capacity in data use for programme management 
decision making. 
f 372 18 26 416 
% 89.4 4.3 6.3 100 
13.5 The government of my country co-ordinate with donors to 
focus on producing and measuring results, through effective 
programme monitoring and evaluation 
f 337 52 27 416 
% 81.0 12.5 6.5 100 
13.6 My country have transparent, measurable assessment 
frameworks to measure aid progress and assess results. 
f 199 190 27 416 
% 47.8 45.7 6.5 100 
13.7 People around here believe that their wellbeing and security 
lies in the hands of God; therefore, foreign aid programmes can 
do nothing about it. 
f 76 315 25 416 
% 18.3 75.7 6.0 100 
13.8 People around here believe that their time matters so much 
to them; yet, service providers fail to respect their time whenever 
they attend foreign aid supported programmes or services. 
f 132 261 23 416 
% 31.7 62.7 5.5 100 
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international counterparts (See Appendix E25). The study shows that 324 (77.9%) 
participants opine that the policies and regulations operating in aid supported programmes 
in Nigeria are not in conflict with the local culture and tradition (See Appendix E26). The study 
tells us that 371 (89.2%) participants perceive that transparency, accountability and strict 
rules and regulations are required in order to ensure people in need actually benefit from aid 
support to their country (See Appendix E27). Furthermore, the study tells us that 372 (89.4%) 
participants expressed that foreign aid donors generate huge database and constantly build 
local capacity in data use for programme management decision making (See Appendix E28). 
The study tells us that 337 (81.0%) participants alludes that the government of Nigeria 
coordinate with donors to focus on producing and measuring results, through effective 
programme monitoring and evaluation (See Appendix E29). The study also reveals that 199 
(47.8%) participants agree that Nigeria have transparent, measurable assessment 
frameworks to measure aid progress and assess results (See Appendix E30). The study 
reveals the opinion of 315 (75.7%) participants who voiced that although people in Nigeria 
may put their trust in God, they also need foreign aid donations to complement their needs 
(See Appendix E31). Finally, the study reveals the views of 261 (62.7%) participants that 
although people in Nigeria believe that their time matters so much to them, they could not 
recall any intentional failure by foreign aid supported programmes/services to respect their 
time. 
 
4.5.9 SuŵŵaƌǇ of ŵeaŶ sĐoƌes of ǀaƌiaďle iteŵs ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg to paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
perception of managing aid for results.  
 
Figure 6 shows a summary of the mean scores of variable items contributing to participants’ 
perception of managing aid for results. The Figure presents the mean scores, scaled from ‘0’ 
to ‘1’ on the ‘y’ axis and 1 through 8 variable items on the ‘x’ axis. A midline was drawn to 
separate variable items with mean scores below 0.5 from those above 0.5. Variable items 
below the midline depicts ‘Agree’ while those above the midline indicates ‘Disagree’ with the 
statement (variable item). The strength of agreement or disagreement to the statement 
depends on how close the mean score is to ‘0’ or ‘1’, respectively.  
The study tells us that majority of participants perceive that: transparency, accountability and 
strict rules and regulations are required in aid administration [3]; aid generates huge 
databases and builds local capacity in data use[4]; host government coordinate with donors 
to focus on effective programme monitoring and evaluation[5]; and aid recipient country have 
a transparent framework for measuring aid progress[6]. The variable item with the greatest 
strength of agreement in this category is: “transparency, accountability and strict rules and 
regulations are required in aid administration” (mean score, 0.04). The weakest strength of 
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agreement is with: aid recipient country have a transparent framework for measuring aid 
progress (mean score, 0.49).  
 
 
FIGURE 6: MEAN SCORES OF VARIABLE ITEMS CONTRIBUTING TO PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION 
OF MANAGING AID FOR RESULTS (N=416) 
Figure 6 also tells us that majority of participants indicated ‘Disagree’ to the following four 
variable items in this category: donor procurement systems are alien to local business 
owners[1]; donor policies and regulations conflict with local culture and tradition[2]; people in 
the recipient country believe that their wellbeing and security lies in God’s hands and aid 
programmes can do nothing about it[6]; time matters so much to people around here but aid 
programmes fail to respect the time[8].  
 
4.5.10 Hypothesis testing: H0: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ 
perception of managing aid for results in Nigeria 
 
As can be seen from Table 14, up to 266 (70.6%) participants agreed that foreign donors 
were managing aid for results in Nigeria, while 111 (29.4%) disagreed. The researcher 
utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged from the study that 172 
(69.6%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was southern Nigeria 
indicated ‘Agree’ while 75 (30.4%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to managing aid for 
results in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was northern Nigeria, 94 
(72.3%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 36 (27.7%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to managing 
aid for results in Nigeria. 
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TABLE 14: CROSSTAB SHOWING PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION OF MANAGING AID FOR RESULTS 
(N=416) 
  
   Geographic region of 
origin 
 
   Southern 
Nigeria 
Northern 
Nigeria 
Total 
 Agree Count 172 94 266 
% within managing aid for results 64.7 35.3 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 69.6 72.3 70.6 
% of Total 45.6 24.9 70.6 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Missing Data 
Count 75 36 111 
% within managing aid for results 67.6 32.4 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 30.4 27.7 29.4 
% of Total 
Count 
% of Missing data 
19.9 
26 
66.7 
9.5 
13 
33.3 
29.4 
39 
100.0 
 Total Count 273 143 416 
% within managing aid for results 65.5 34.5 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of Total 65.5 34.5 100.0 
NOTE: % = Percentage 
 
As shown in Table 15, Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a 
relationship between participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of 
managing aid for results in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=377) = 0.635, p = > 0.05. When compared with 
participants’ region of residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the 
existence of an association between participants’ region of residence and their perception of 
managing aid for results in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=377) = 0.329, p = > 0.05.  
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TABLE 15: CHI-SQUARE TEST OF PARTICIPANTS’ GEOGRAPHIC REGION OF ORIGIN AND THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF MANAGING AID FOR RESULTS (N=416) 
 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .293a 1 .588   
Continuity Correctionb .178 1 .673   
Likelihood Ratio .294 1 .587   
Fisher's Exact Test    .635 .338 
Linear-by-Linear Association .292 1 .589   
N of Valid Cases 
N of Missing Cases 
Grand Total  
377 
39 
416 
    
NOTE: df = Degree of freedom. Sig. = Significant level 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 38.28. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table  
 
From the study, we can see that no relationship exists between both participants’ geographic 
region of origin and region of residence in Nigeria, thereby, needless to carry out further data 
analysis on this variable. Therefore, we conclude that there is no significant impact of culture 
on aid recipients’ perception of managing aid for results in Nigeria. 
 
4.6 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF HARMONISATION OF AID IN NIGERIA 
 
Table 16 shows the participants’ response to eight items relating to their perception of 
managing aid for results in Nigeria. The table presents items 16.1 through 16.8, highlighting 
frequencies (n) and proportion (%), as well as missing data of participants responding to each 
item. Table 16 also shows the grand total (frequency and percentage) of participants who 
agreed or disagreed, respectively, to each item listed. 
106 
 
 
TABLE 16: PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF HARMONISATION OF AID (N=416) 
Item    
   Responses 
  Agree Disagree Missing 
data 
Total 
16.1 All foreign aid donors rely on the country's culture of reporting and 
monitoring systems, and adopt them as their principle of operation. 
f 92 290 34 416 
% 22.1 69.7 8.2 100 
16.2 There is wide variation in programme incentives, (such as travel 
reimbursement, per diem payment, salary supplementation, etc.) 
provided by donors in the country. 
f 290 89 37 416 
% 69.7 21.4 8.9 100 
16.3 Foreign aid donors have strong respect for each other's tradition, 
knowledge and areas of expertise and avoid duplication of cost and 
effort. 
f 264 116 36 416 
% 63.5 27.9 8.7 100 
16.4 Foreign aid donors’ co-ordinate their financial aid and capacity 
building activities with that of other donors operating in the same 
country 
f 188 190 38 416 
% 45.2 45.7 9.1 100 
16.5 The wide variety of foreign aid donor requirements and 
expectations are generating unproductive transaction costs causing 
confusion among aid recipient countries. 
f 116 264 36 416 
% 27.9 63.5 8.7 100 
16.6 Unco-ordinated foreign aid flow to my country have set confusion 
in planning and decreased government investment in economic 
development and poverty alleviation. 
f 190 190 36 416 
% 45.7 45.7 8.7 100 
16.7 I will prefer that all foreign aid donors pool their resources together 
and handover to the government of my country to decide and administer 
based on priority needs of the country. 
f 48 336 32 416 
% 11.5 80.8 7.7 100 
16.8 There have been too many donors in too many states, stretched 
across many projects, leading to duplication of efforts. 
f 153 234 29 416 
% 36.8 56.3 7.0 100 
NOTE. f = Number of participants. % = Per cent 
 
The study tells us that 290 (69.7%) participants opine that foreign aid donors do not adopt 
the recipient country’s culture of monitoring and reporting systems. Therefore, they set up 
and run parallel systems in the same country (See Appendix E33). The study tells us that 
290 (69.7%) participants assert that foreign aid donors have perpetrated and allowed wide 
variation in programme incentives to thrive in the country (See Appendix E34). This study 
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shows that 264 (63.5%) participants perceive that foreign aid donors recognize each other’s 
competitive advantage and collaborate to avoid duplication of cost and effort (See Appendix 
E35). With 190 (45.7%) participants expressing opinions, the study shows a near neutral 
position on the assertion that foreign aid donors coordinate their financial aid and capacity 
building activities with other donors operating in the same space (See Appendix E36). Up to 
264 (63.5%) study participants opine that foreign aid requirements neither generate 
unproductive transaction costs, nor cause confusion among aid recipient countries (See 
Appendix E37). Furthermore, an equal proportion of study participants (190 (45.7%)) agreed 
and another disagreed that foreign aid flow to aid recipient countries decreased government 
investment in economic development and poverty alleviation (See Appendix E38). The study 
further tells us that 336 (80.8%) participants would not like donor funds to be pooled and 
handed over to the aid recipient country government for purposes of aid administration (See 
Appendix E39). Finally, this study revealed the opinions of 234 (56.3%) participants that too 
many donors in too many states is not obvious in Nigeria (See Appendix E40). 
 
4.6.9 Summary of mean scores of variable iteŵs ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg to paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
perception of harmonisation of aid.  
 
Figure 7 shows a summary of the mean scores of variable items contributing to participants’ 
perception of harmonisation of aid. The Figure presents the mean scores, scaled from ‘0’ to 
‘1’ on the ‘y’ axis and 1 through 8 variable items on the ‘x’ axis. A midline is drawn to separate 
variable items with mean scores below 0.5 from those above 0.5. Variable items below the 
midline depicts ‘Agree’ while those above the midline indicates ‘Disagree’ with the statement 
(variable item). The strength of agreement or disagreement to the statement depends on 
how close the mean score is to ‘0’ or ‘1’, respectively.  
The survey shows that majority of participants agree that: aid brought about wide variations 
in provision of programme incentives [2]; aid donors have respect for each other’s strengths 
and expertise, thereby, avoid duplication of cost and effort [3]. The strongest agreement in 
this category was that “aid brought about wide variations in provision of programme 
incentives” (mean score, 0.23). Participants were however, undecided on the view that 
donors coordinate aid funds and local capacity building activities among themselves [4].   
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FIGURE 7: MEAN SCORES OF VARIABLE ITEMS CONTRIBUTING TO PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION 
OF HARMONISATION OF AID (N=416) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 7, majority of participants indicated ‘Disagree’ against the 
following statements: aid donors rely on local culture of monitoring and reporting[1]; wide 
variety of donor requirement and expectations are generating unproductive transaction costs 
and causing confusion in the aid receiving country [5]; aid decreased government investment 
in economic development and poverty alleviation[6]; pool aid funds and handover to the host 
government to manage [7]; and there are too many donors in too many states, leading to 
duplication of efforts [8]. The strongest disagreement raised by participants was on the call 
to “pool aid funds and hand over to the host government to manage.”  
4.6.10 Hypothesis testing: H0: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ 
perception of harmonisation of aid in Nigeria 
 
From the study, Table 17 shows the contrast between participant’s geographic region of 
origin and their perception of harmonisation of aid in Nigeria. The study tells us that 376 
(100%) participants disagrees that harmonisation of aid is palpable in Nigeria. The 
researcher utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged from the study 
that 248 (100%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was southern 
Nigeria indicated ‘Disagree’ while 0 (0.0%) noted ‘Agree’ to the items related to the 
harmonisation of aid in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was northern 
Nigeria, 128 (100%) indicated ‘Disagree’ while 0 (0%) noted ‘Agree’ to the items related to 
the harmonisation of aid in Nigeria. 
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TABLE 17: CROSSTAB SHOWING PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION OF HARMONISATION OF AID 
(N=416) 
  
   Geographic region of 
origin 
 
   Southern 
Nigeria 
Northern 
Nigeria 
Total 
 Disagree 
 
 
 
Missing Data 
Count 248 128 376 
% within harmonisation of aid 66.0 34.0 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of Total 
Count 
% of Missing data 
66.0 
26 
65.0 
34.0 
14 
35.0 
100.0 
40 
100.0 
 Total Count 274 142 416 
% within harmonisation of aid 66.0 34.0 100.0 
% within Geographic region of origin 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of Total 66.0 34.0 100.0 
NOTE: % = Percentage 
 
As shown in Table 18, Chi-square test of independence could not yield any credible results 
because participants’ perception of harmonization of aid in Nigeria was constant.  
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TABLE 18: CHI-SQUARE TEST OF PARTICIPANTS’ GEOGRAPHIC REGION OF ORIGIN AND THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF HARMONISATION OF AID (N=416) 
 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 
N of Missing Cases 
Grand Total 
376 
40 
416 
a. No statistics are computed because participants’ perception of harmonization of aid in Nigeria was constant.  
 
4.7 MEAN SCORES AND P-VALUES OF PA‘TICIPANTS͛ PE‘CEPTION OF AID 
MEASURED AGAINST EACH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF AID EFFECTIVENESS  
 
Figure 8 shows the mean scores of participants’ perception of aid in Nigeria, measured 
against each of the principles of aid effectiveness. As can be seen from the study, the mean 
scores indicate that participants agree to the effectiveness of aid across four principle areas; 
thus, aid alignment to country systems, managing aid for results, country ownership of aid, 
and mutual accountability of aid. The study also shows through the mean scores that 
participants disagree with the effectiveness of harmonization of aid in Nigeria.  
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Legend: 1). Alignment of aid to country systems. 2). Managing aid for results. 3). Country ownership of aid. 
4). Mutual accountability of aid. 5). Harmonisation of aid 
FIGURE 8: MEAN SCORES OF PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTION OF AID MEASURED AGAINST EACH 
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF AID EFFECTIVENESS (N=416) 
 
To determine the impact of culture on aid workers’ perception of aid effectiveness in Nigeria, 
the Chi-square test of independence rejected all except the existence of a relationship 
between the participants’ geographic region of origin (or residence) and their perception of 
country ownership of aid. When further analysis was conducted using one-way between 
subjects’ ANOVA (see Table 19, below), there was a significant impact of participants’ 
geographic region of origin on country ownership of aid at the p < 0.05 level [F (1,365) = 
4.294, p = 0.039]. There was no significant impact of participants’ geographic region of 
residence on country ownership of aid at the p < 0.05 level [F (1,365) = 3.846, p = 0.051]. 
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TABLE 19: CORRELATION TABLE USING RESULTS FROM ANOVA 
Dimension of culture Geographic region 
of residence 
Geographic region of 
origin 
Alignment of aid to country systems.  Not significant Not significant 
Managing aid for results. Not significant Not significant 
Country ownership of aid. Not significant Significant 
Mutual accountability of aid. Not significant Not significant 
Harmonisation of aid Not significant Not significant 
 
4.8 TEST FOR CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES OF AID 
EFFECTIVENESS  
 
The researcher applied the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to compute the 
relationships between the key variables of the principles of aid effectiveness. The following 
results emerged from the test, as set out on Table 20, below: 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship 
between alignment of aid to country systems and managing aid for results. There was a 
positive correlation between the two variables, r = .510, n = 353, p = .000. Overall, there was 
a perfect, positive correlation between alignment of aid to country systems and managing aid 
for results. Similarly, perfect, positive correlations were observed between alignment of aid 
to country systems and country ownership of aid (r = .488, n = 340, p = .000); mutual 
accountability of aid (r = .498, n = 336, p = .000); and harmonization of aid (r = .300, n = 350, 
p = .000). 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship 
between managing aid for results and country ownership of aid. There was a positive 
correlation between the two variables, r = .500, n = 351, p = .000. Overall, there was a perfect, 
positive correlation between managing aid for results and country ownership of aid. Similarly, 
perfect, positive correlations were also observed between managing aid for results and 
mutual accountability of aid (r = .444, n = 348, p = .000); and harmonization of aid (r = .212, 
n = 359, p = .000). A perfect, positive correlation also existed between country ownership of 
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aid and mutual accountability (r = .512, n = 350, p = .000); and harmonisation of aid (r = .271, 
n = 358, p = .000). 
 
TABLE 20: PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES OF AID 
EFFECTIVENESS (N=416) 
Correlation r n md N p 
Relationsip between alignment of aid 
to country systems and managing aid 
for results 
0.51 335 81 416 0 
Relationship between alignment of aid 
to country systems and country 
ownership of aid 
0.488 340 76 416 0 
Relationship between alignment of aid 
to country systems and mutual 
accountability of aid 
0.498 336 80 416 0 
Relationship between alignment of aid 
to country systems and harmonisation 
of aid 
0.3 350 66 416 0 
Relationship between managing aid for 
results and country ownership of aid 
0.5 351 65 416 0 
Relationship between managing aid for 
results and mutual accountability of 
aid 
0.444 348 68 416 0 
Relationship between managing aid for 
results and harmonisation of aid 
0.212 359 57 416 0 
Relationship between country 
ownership of aid and mutual 
accountability of aid 
0.512 350 66 416 0 
Relationship between country 
ownership of aid and harmonisation of 
aid 
0.271 358 58 416 0 
Relationship between mutual 
accountability of aid harmonisation of 
aid 
0.396 358 58 416 0 
Note: r(correlation coefficient); n(valid data); md(missing data); N(total population of the study); p(result) 
 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship 
between mutual accountability of aid and harmonisation of aid. There was a positive 
correlation between the two variables, r = .396, n = 354, p = .000. Overall, there was a perfect, 
positive correlation between mutual accountability of aid and harmonisation of aid. 
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4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter addressed the analysis, presentation and description of results that emerged 
from this study. It emerged from the study that participants agree to the effectiveness of aid 
across all principles of aid effectiveness, except the effectiveness of harmonization of aid in 
Nigeria. To determine the impact of culture on aid workers’ perception of aid effectiveness in 
Nigeria, the Chi-square test of independence and one-way between subjects ANOVA, shows 
a significant impact of participants’ geographic region of origin (used as proxy for culture) on 
country ownership of aid. No other significant relationship was accepted in this study. 
The next chapter (Chapter 5) concerns discussion of research findings.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter described the analysis, presentation and description of the research 
findings. This chapter discusses the research findings.  
The analytic survey research design was adopted in this study. Data collection was executed 
through computerized self-administered Qualtrics web-based survey, using Likert scale 
questionnaires.  Likert scale questionnaire was distributed to 846 randomly selected aid 
supported project employees that formed the sampling frame across all geographic regions 
of Nigeria. With a response rate of 53.8 per cent, the process of data cleaning left 416 
returned questionnaires valid and analyzable. This was composed of responses from 300 
(72.1%) males and 116 (27.9%) females, respectively.  This represents 49.2 per cent of the 
total questionnaires (846) distributed. Descriptive (frequencies) and inferential (Chi-square 
and ANOVA) statistics were utilized in this study.  
Descriptive statistics (frequencies) was applied across all individual variable items. The Chi-
square test of independence was also applied across all individual variable items. Of all the 
individual variable items analysed, one was found statistically significant and thus, 
specifically reported. Chi-square test results for all other individual variable items were 
therefore, discarded. Furthermore, all individual variable items were grouped into eight 
individual items each, to form a total of five group variable items, in line with the principles of 
aid effectiveness as structured on the conceptual framework. All group variable items were 
then analysed using Chi-square test of independence and the test results reported. Of all the 
five group variable items tested, country ownership of aid was statistically significant with the 
participants’ geographic region of origin, as well as their geographic region of residence. For 
the remaining four group variables where statistical significance was rejected, the results 
were reported as final, and no further analysis was conducted. The results were determined 
sufficient, based on saturation of the analysis to the point that no further changes were 
anticipated in the result. Therefore, no further analysis was deemed necessary, given that 
the result will remain insignificant even with further tests. However, for the one that statistical 
significance was supported, a further analysis was done to validate the result, using one-way 
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between subjects’ ANOVA. Where statistical significance was rejected (i.e, country 
ownership versus participants’ geographic region of residence), the result was recorded as 
final and no further tests conducted. Where statistical significance was supported (i.e, country 
ownership versus participants’ geographic region of origin), a further analysis was conducted. 
Thus, in order to increase statistical rigor and control for biases, the Kruskal Wallis test of 
variance and Mantel-Haenszel procedures were conducted. A Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the various variables 
that compose the principles of aid effectiveness. Overall, there was perfect, positive 
correlation between alignment of aid to country systems and managing aid for results (r = 
.510, n = 353, p = .000); country ownership of aid (r = .488, n = 340, p = .000); mutual 
accountability of aid (r = .498, n = 336, p = .000); and harmonization of aid (r = .300, n = 350, 
p = .000). There was also perfect, positive correlation between managing aid for results and 
country ownership of aid (r = .500, n = 351, p = .000); mutual accountability of aid (r = .444, 
n = 348, p = .000); and harmonization of aid (r = .212, n = 359, p = .000). A perfect, positive 
correlation also existed between country ownership of aid and mutual accountability (r = .512, 
n = 350, p = .000); harmonisation of aid (r = .271, n = 358, p = .000). The Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient also showed perfect, positive correlation between mutual 
accountability of aid and harmonisation of aid (r = .396, n = 354, p = .000). Details of these 
analysis are shown on Table 20. 
The discussion of research findings was guided by the conceptual framework that 
underpinned the study. This cued from the Geert Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture 
which served as the main theoretical framework for the study. To develop the conceptual 
framework, the Geert Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture was blended with the 
Easterly and Pfutze’s best practice dimensions of quality aid (Easterly & Pfutze 2008) as well 
as the five principles that make aid effective (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005). 
Through the conceptual framework, the research findings espouse the interrelationships 
between the dimensions of national culture, the best practices of quality aid and the principles 
of aid effectiveness as perceived by research participants in this study. Throughout the study, 
participants’ geographic region of origin was utilized as proxy for each survey respondent’s 
culture, while controlling for the effects of their geographic region of residence, among other 
confounding factors. The discussion is presented under five original research objectives, 
which reflects the various features of the conceptual framework used in this study. 
5.1.1 Demographic characteristics of participants 
 
There were 300 (72.1%) male and 116 (27.9%) female participants involved in the study. Up 
to 95.7 per cent of the participants were within the age group of 25 to 54 years. Majority of 
the participants (316, 78.1%) were ever married while 86 (21.9%) were never married. Up to 
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337 (81.0%) participants were Christians while 72 (17.3%) were affiliated to the Islamic 
religion. The study tells us that over half of the participants - 225 (54.1%) – reported having 
over 5 years’ duration of affiliation with aid funding. The majority (251, 60.3%) of the 
participants did not belong to any social or cultural association. The survey also tells us that 
among the participants studied, 234 (56.3%) holds pre-degree and graduate qualifications, 
while 182 (43.8%) holds post-graduate qualifications. Up to 382 (91.8%) participants were 
employed by non-governmental organisations (NGO) and 31 (7.5%) by the host government. 
Majority of the participants – 234 (56.3%) – were affiliated to other professions other than 
medical (104, 25.0%) and paramedical (78, 18.8%) professions, respectively.   
 
5.2 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PE‘CEPTION OF COUNT‘Y͛S OWNE‘SHIP OF AID IN NIGE‘IA 
 
In the conceptual framework of this study, the ownership of aid relates to the power distance 
dimension of national culture. The power distance dimension was elaborated by Mooij and 
Hofstede (2010) as the extent to which less powerful members of a society accept and expect 
that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined 
from below, not from above. Hofstede (no date) report that Nigeria scores high on this 
dimension (score of 80) which means that people accept a hierarchical order in which 
everybody has a place and which needs no further justification. An understanding of ‘power 
distance’ dimension of national culture as well as the ‘ownership’ principle of aid 
effectiveness will help donors and developing countries make informed decisions on 
selectivity of aid. That is, allocating aid towards those really in need (pro-poor). Thereby, 
increasing aid impact and yielding aid effectiveness. 
Table 3 shows the contrast between participant’s geographic region of origin and their 
perception of country’s ownership of aid in Nigeria. The study tells us that 189 (51.5%) 
participants agrees that local ownership of aid is demonstrated in Nigeria, while 178 (48.5%) 
disagrees. The researcher utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged 
from the study that 134 (55.4%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was 
southern Nigeria indicated ‘Agree’ while 108 (44.6%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to 
the country ownership of aid in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was 
northern Nigeria, 55 (44.0%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 70(56.0%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items 
related to the country ownership of aid in Nigeria. 
Chi-square test of independence supported the existence of a relationship between 
participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of country ownership of aid in 
Nigeria, X2 (1, n=367) = 0.047, p = < 0.05. When compared with participants’ region of 
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residence, the Chi-square test of independence still supported the existence of an 
association between participants’ region of residence and their perception of country 
ownership of aid in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=367) = 0.032, p = < 0.05.  
To verify the results that were statistically significant with Chi-square test, the researcher 
repeated the analysis using ANOVA. A one-way between subjects’ ANOVA was conducted 
to compare the impact of geographic region of origin on participants’ perception of country 
ownership of aid in Nigeria. There was a significant impact of participants’ geographic region 
of origin on country ownership of aid at the p < 0.05 level [F (1,365) = 4.294, p = 0.039]. A 
one-way between subjects’ ANOVA was also conducted to compare the impact of 
geographic region of residence on participants’ perception of country ownership of aid in 
Nigeria There was no significant impact of participants’ geographic region of residence on 
country ownership of aid at the p < 0.05 level [F (1,365) = 3.846, p = 0.051]. 
Table 6 shows responses from the participants as further analysed using the Kruskal Wallis 
test of variance in order to eliminate any extraneous variables. The researcher compared 
results from various Likert-type items to decipher the item that had more significant impact 
on the participants’ perception of country ownership of aid. From the study, it was found that 
no particular item had significant impact on the participants’ perception of country ownership 
of aid in Nigeria.  
In order to reduce errors and address any bias, the researcher increased analytic rigor of the 
study by adopting the Mantel-Haenszel procedure. This was aimed to combine the various 
strata into a summary statistic that describes country ownership of aid by the level of the 
confounding factors. The study reveals that majority of those who perceive that country 
ownership of aid was demonstrated in Nigeria were paramedical professionals, working for 
aid funded non-governmental organisations for over 5 years. Also, those who were mostly 
Christians, in their middle ages of 35 to 54 years, and ever married.  This finding explains 
that middle aged persons with reasonable years of experience on aid projects perceive aid 
ownership more positively than their contemporaries that are not directly involved in aid work. 
Similarly, the study shows that people’s marital status, religious and professional affiliations 
impact their perception of aid ownership. Major biases in the study were educational 
qualification, gender and affiliation with socio-cultural associations. 
Additionally, eight key findings emerged from this culture dimension of the study, linking the 
power distance dimension of culture to aid focus on those in need (pro-poor). Each finding 
has been supported by a brief description and similar studies from the literature. The eight 
key findings of this dimension of culture are discussed below: 
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5.2.1 Aid donors promote practices that are locally driven and wanted by the local 
tradition and culture. 
 
It emerged from this study that aid donors promote practices that are locally driven and 
wanted by the local tradition and culture. This finding was supported by 77.6 percent of the 
surveyed participants. For example, edutainment initiatives, such as Soul City in South 
Africa, have shown promise in changing cultural and social norms and attitudes associated 
with violent behaviour (WHO 2009). Oxfam Research Report (2015) reports that the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) intends to strengthen partner country 
capacity to implement programmes, enhance local solutions, promote country ownership, 
and increase sustainability. In 2010, only 9.7 percent of USAID funds were provided directly 
to local entities. In 2014, that amount was 19.7 percent. By 2015, USAID hopes to increase 
that amount to 30 percent (Oxfam Research Report 2015). Thereby discountenancing the 
argument by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) that aid donors were simply extending 
their standards of living that were unwanted by the local tradition and culture. This finding is 
also inconsistent with assertions by Bandyopadhyay and Vermann (2009) that aid is focused 
substantially on security concerns, marked especially by the watershed event of September 
2011. 
WHO (2009) alludes that often cultural and social norm interventions are integrated with 
strategies, such as training in conflict resolution skills, role modelling or community-based 
activities (e.g. micro-loans). This makes it difficult to isolate the independent effects of 
interventions for changing norms related to violence. Rarely, however, are they thoroughly 
evaluated, making it currently difficult to assess their effectiveness (WHO 2009).  
 
5.2.2 Foreign aid donor countries select places they wish to support based on the 
ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s stƌategic interest and the interest of the local people they support. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid donor countries select places they wish to support 
based on the country’s strategic interest and the interest of the local people they support. 
This finding was supported by 54.1 per cent of the surveyed participants. ActionAid (2011) 
corroborates that when aid is given in such a way that it supports poor countries to lead their 
own development, be more accountable to their own people, and mobilize more of their own 
resources, then aid itself contributes to reducing aid dependency. Therefore, an aid 
programme can only succeed if programme beneficiaries are substantially involved from the 
visioning phase of the aid support. Thereby, thinking together, planning together, doing 
together and evaluating together will generate greater impact.  ActionAid (2011) maintains 
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that the government of Rwanda mapped government and donor aid projects and spending – 
allowing for identification of overcrowded and poorly funded sectors. Thus, redistributing aid 
across sectors, reducing duplication and transaction costs. Rwanda’s Single Project 
Implementation Unit oversees all domestic and external projects – allowing donors to use 
Rwanda’s own procurement and financial systems, cutting duplicate systems and costs 
(ActionAid 2011). This finding counteracts arguments by certain scholars that aid is used as 
a means to increase the donor country’s exports (Commission for Africa 2005; IMF & World 
Bank 2005; United Nations Development Program 2005; Easterly & Williamson 2011).  The 
finding also debunks assertions by Charron (2011) that aid is argued by many to be tied with 
the political agenda of the donor country and less focused on reducing the gap between the 
rich and the poor through “good governance” reform in the recipient country.  
 
5.2.3 Foreign aid to Nigeria consists of specifications that a proportion of the financial 
assistance must be provided in kind. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid to Nigeria consist of specifications that a proportion 
of the financial assistance must be provided in kind (i.e., expatriate staff, consultants, 
equipment, and commodities) by the aid provider. This finding was supported by 66.8 percent 
of the surveyed participants. In kind or tied aid demoralizes local people’s morale, creates 
brain drain, frustrates economic growth and increases poverty, among others. OECD (2010) 
and ActionAid (2011) advance that there has been some progress in reducing tied aid over 
the last few years – untied aid overall increased from 46 per cent in 2000 to 76 per cent in 
2007. The countries with the highest remaining proportions of substandard tied aid in their 
bilateral ODA are Greece, Portugal and Korea; Italy, the US and Austria do next worst (OECD 
2010, ActionAid 2011). Meanwhile the UK, Ireland, Norway, Luxembourg and Sweden have 
no or virtually no tied aid, and serve as models for other donors in this respect (OECD 2010, 
ActionAid 2011). Shilgba (2014) argues that any foreign aid that frustrates entrepreneurship 
and job creation is bad for Africa. Adding that if a development assistance loan is granted 
that requires importation of a particular commodity from a foreign destination and this stops 
local production of the commodity or results in the shut-down of local industries that produce 
that commodity, then it is bad aid (Shilgba 2014). If foreign aid secures jobs in the donor 
countries while taking away jobs in the recipient countries, then that is bad aid to the recipient 
countries. Shilgba (2014) added that foreign aid that requires bringing in experts and 
technicians from the donor countries to “help” Africa, and yet leaves Africa without any 
addition to her skills base is bad aid.  With tied aid, not only are benefits flowing back to the 
donor country, but consultants hired under these circumstances often have poor incentives 
to respect recipient country’s priorities and lack essential local knowledge (Easterly and 
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Williamson 2011, IMF & World Bank 2010; United Nations Millennium Project 2005). Against 
this background, it is essential for donor countries to respect the guidelines from the Paris 
Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (2005) by avoiding provision of in kind aid. Aid should focus 
on building local capacity for sustainable growth and development. 
 
5.2.4 Foreign aid supports the country to develop own strategies, improve institutional 
capacities and tackle corruption using locally driven strategies. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid supports the country to develop own strategies, 
improve institutional capacities and tackle corruption using locally driven strategies. This 
finding was supported by 81.5 percent of the surveyed participants. The panacea to the 
effectiveness of aid is to assess the country’s architecture and systems for strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Then, utilize the local strengths and opportunities to 
deal with the weaknesses and threats. This means, developing own strategies, improving 
institutional capacities to manage aid (as well as other domestic funds) and tackle corruption. 
The Oxfam Research Report (2015) recommends that donors should adopt a locally driven 
approach to development by working with local partners first, giving them support to take on 
the challenge of reforming dysfunctional institutions. Local stakeholders, especially citizens, 
are critical to fighting corruption because they live and work in the dysfunctional systems in 
which corruption thrives. By exercising formal and informal sources of power via existing 
relationships in countries, villages, towns, and even government institutions, a locally driven 
approach empowers citizens and their state to collaboratively solve problems, reduce 
corruption, and improve government service delivery (Oxfam Research Report 2015). 
The Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (2005) highlights the principle of country 
ownership as that principle which relates to the ability of developing countries to set their own 
development goals and strategies, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. Oxfam 
Research Report (2015) re-iterate that instead of simply seeking to avoid corruption, donors 
should support the local change agents who take great risks to combat it by helping citizens 
find their voices, and helping governments to heed those voices. This approach provides 
vast potential to strengthen accountability, improve governance, and fight corruption. 
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda once said bad aid is that one which creates dependencies 
while good aid is that which is targeted to create capacities in people so that they are able to 
live on their own activities (Shilgba 2014). Against this background, the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that donor countries and organisations bring their 
support in line with developing countries’ strategies and use local systems. The IOM (2014) 
asserts that if you really do want country ownership, you need to have time in which countries 
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can change their management and information systems in line and not have different 
systems.  
 
5.2.5 Foreign aid resources get to the rightful beneficiaries with minimal leakages. 
  
It emanated from this study that foreign aid resources get to the rightful beneficiaries with 
minimal leakages. This finding was supported by 68.5 percent of the surveyed participants. 
ActionAid (2011) reports that since the end of the Cold War, research has shown that better 
quality aid remains more targeted towards the poorest countries and people. The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that donor countries and organisations 
co-ordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication, 
leakages or unsustainable aid programmes. As pointed out by Easterly and Williamson 
(2011), aid agencies lack the normal feedback loops available to democratic or market 
actors, who can observe dissatisfaction of voters or customers. Aid beneficiaries have no 
vote and no purchase decisions by which they could communicate dissatisfaction to aid 
agencies. This finding therefore, serves as useful feedback to aid donors and recipient 
countries alike.  
 
5.2.6 Foreign aid resources are distributed equally between people in need in the rural 
and urban areas. 
 
This study tells us that foreign aid resources are distributed equally between people in need 
in the rural and urban areas. This finding was supported by 50.7 percent of the surveyed 
participants. Despite the wide geographic space and cultural diversity covered by this study, 
there was common opinion, albeit weak that aid resources are reaching beneficiaries at both 
rural and urban areas. This is a good pointer that aid programmes are not just selectively 
sited for donors’ and implementing partners’ operational convenience, but aimed at meeting 
the needs of beneficiaries. Conversely, the gap between the rich and the poor continues to 
widen. Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) examine the long-run effect of foreign aid on income 
inequality for 21 recipient countries using panel co-integration techniques to control for 
omitted variable and endogeneity bias. They reported that aid exerts an increasing inequality 
effect on income distribution. Van, Kristen, Bruce and Douglas (2005) contends that their 
results provide evidence of foreign aid ineffectiveness for recipient nations and that foreign 
aid negatively impacts changes in income equality over time. Against this background, 
Easterly and Pfutze (2008), resound the need for aid selectivity and prioritisation, to make 
informed decisions on allocating aid towards those really in need (pro-poor). Moyo (2009) 
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stresses that in the early stages of development aid should be tailored towards the immediate 
needs of beneficiaries. 
  
5.2.7 ‘egioŶal aŶd ĐouŶtƌǇ ͚eǆpeƌts͛ aƌe eǆpeƌieŶĐed to lead oppoƌtuŶities iŶ foƌeigŶ 
aid supported research and intervention programmes in Nigeria. 
  
As can be seen from this study, regional and country ‘experts’ are experienced to lead 
opportunities in foreign aid supported research and intervention programmes in Nigeria. This 
finding was supported by 81.7 percent of the surveyed participants. Therefore, recipient 
country and regional experts should be allowed to participate in programme designs, to equip 
them with the abilities to implement the programme. Foreign aid that requires bringing in 
experts and technicians from the donor countries to “help” Africa, and yet leaves Africa 
without any addition to her skills base is bad aid (Shilgba 2014). Overall, ActionAid (2011) 
postulates that around a third of global aid is spent on technical assistance. The proportion 
counted as substandard aid ranged from 51 to 76 per cent (ActionAid 2011). Some donors 
continue to provide extremely high proportions of their bilateral aid as technical assistance. 
While Australia, Canada and the US score particularly badly in this category, Ireland, Italy 
and Luxembourg do well (ActionAid 2011). There is huge variation on how much substandard 
aid donors provide, partly reflecting the proportion of their aid given as technical assistance. 
Akire (2004) observes that the decision-making authority as regards poverty-reduction aid 
activities are usually partly or purely held by an external institution or individual. This is not 
an acceptable practice. Also, IOM (2014) reports that when you look at clinical trials, they are 
not led by Africans, and PEPFAR does not always support their participation at scientific 
meetings. Adding that while donors often receive grant applications that list African 
investigators, foreign investigators do not sufficiently involve their African colleagues once a 
grant is secured or in publications as co-authors. This practice is equally bad aid. Aside from 
calling for aid recipient countries or at most, the region, to manage their own people, it will 
be appropriate to recognize any contribution made by a local expert. A practice where locals 
are made to collect data while donors analyse and publish off-shore is not a good practice of 
aid and should be condemned (IOM 2014). Regional and country experts should be given 
their rightful places in aid management and research. 
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5.2.8 Participants trust their leaders will make the right decisions and negotiations with 
aid donors on their behalf 
 
It emerged from this study that participants trust their leaders will make the right decisions 
and negotiations with aid donors on their behalf. This finding was supported by 60.3 percent 
of the surveyed participants. ActionAid (2011) corroborates that aid achieves much better 
and more sustainable results when development is led by the developing countries 
themselves. Thus, Santiso (2001) suggests a more radical approach in which donors cede 
developing countries greater control over the use of aid, within the framework of agreed-upon 
objectives. Donors who do worse in this regard have more of their aid counted as 
substandard aid; donors who do better, less (ActionAid 2011). ActionAid (2011) postulates 
that the proportion counted as substandard varies between 7 and 18 percent.  Policies of 
both bilateral and multilateral donors are assessed and the results combined to give the 
overall figures. Looking at their bilateral aid, the UK, Norway and the Netherlands do best for 
aid supporting country leadership, and Italy and Portugal worst (ActionAid 2011). Of the large 
donors, the US and Japan also do relatively badly (ActionAid 2011).  
Unfortunately, African leaders still engage in wide spread corruption in order to keep 
sufficient wealth for their families and themselves (Mooij & Hofstede 2010). Kono and 
Montinola (2013) argues that autocracies are more likely than democracies to divert 
development aid to themselves or the military. Therefore, calling on donors to send aid funds 
to democratic countries, where economic development can be assured (Kono & Moninola 
2013). Against this background, leaders should ensure that only aid that meet the country’s 
developmental objectives are accepted into the country (Kebonang 2006). 
 
5.2.9 Key highlights of the impact of national culture on country ownership of aid 
 
The survey shows that majority of participants perceive the following practices relevant to 
country ownership of aid in recipient countries:  a certain proportion of aid to the recipient 
country is provided in kind; aid supports the country to develop institutional capacities and 
tackle corruption using locally driven strategies; aid resources get to the rightful beneficiaries 
with minimal leakages; aid resources are distributed equally to the needy in rural and urban 
areas; and people in the recipient country trust their leaders will make the right decisions and 
negotiations with aid donors on their behalf.  
Others include: aid donors promote practices that are locally driven and wanted by the local 
culture and tradition; aid donors select places they wish to support based on the recipient 
country’s strategic interests; and regional and country experts are experienced to lead aid 
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programmes. To increase aid ownership and reduce dependency on aid, ActionAid (2011) 
recommends that aid receiving countries take clearer leadership on making aid more 
effective for development results; be fully accountable to domestic stakeholders; and 
mobilise domestic resources. Others include, continue to improve their systems for financial 
management, procurement, monitoring and evaluation and fighting corruption.  
The finding of this study also explains that middle aged persons with reasonable years of 
experience on aid projects perceive aid ownership more positively than their contemporaries 
that are not directly involved in aid work. Similarly, the study shows that people’s marital 
status, religious and professional affiliations impact their perception of aid ownership. 
Therefore, aid receiving countries should consider these variables when designing aid 
programmes in order to achieve country ownership of aid. ActionAid (2011) also suggests 
that they incorporate gender responsive budgeting into their country processes, and base 
national development plans on existing gender equality and women’s empowerment 
commitments. ActionAid (2011) argues that even the most ardent critics of aid acknowledge 
the success stories of countries which have ended their aid dependence. Botswana, Korea 
and Taiwan were all highly aid-dependent in the 1960s and 1970s, as were European 
countries and Japan after World War II, but they all graduated from aid dependence. 
Botswana, cut aid/GNI from 30% to 2%, and aid/expenditure from 60 per cent to 6 per cent, 
between 1975 and 1995 (ActionAid 2011). 
 
5.3 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF AID IN NIGERIA 
 
The conceptual framework of this study categorized mutual accountability of aid around the 
culture dimension of ‘individualism versus collectivism.’ These refers to people looking after 
themselves and their immediate family members only, versus people belonging to in-groups 
that look after them in exchange for loyalty (Santos, Canada & Oliveira 2012; Mooij & 
Hofstede 2010). Hofstede (no date) asserts that Nigeria, with a score of 30 is considered a 
collectivistic society. This is manifest in a close long-term commitment to the member ‘group,’ 
be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. A sound understanding of the 
way individuals in the society value themselves (‘I’) versus the way they value others (‘We’), 
goes a long way in determining the effectiveness of aid. Strategies for developing mutual 
accountability is better appreciated when the donor understands whether they are dealing 
with an individualist or collectivist society. Thus, whether people are more concerned about 
their immediate family members and themselves or for the larger society. With this 
understanding, donors and developing countries develop culturally appropriate and mutually 
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accountable strategies for development results. A good understanding of a developing 
country as either individualist or collectivist society informs the development of strategies for 
mutual accountability between the donor and recipient countries. This in turn, helps in the 
determination of increased cost efficiency and beneficiary focused strategies, such as 
reducing contractors’ overhead costs in order to channel more direct resources to the 
beneficiaries. Individualist cultures are more amenable to allow for high overheads while 
collectivist cultures are more likely to channel more resources towards the poor (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkon 2010).  
Table 8 shows the contrast between participant’s geographic region of origin and their 
perception of mutual accountability of aid in Nigeria. It can be seen from the survey that 209 
(57.7%) participants agree that mutual accountability of aid is demonstrated in Nigeria. The 
researcher utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged from the study 
that 140 (59.1%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was southern 
Nigeria indicated ‘Agree’ while 97 (40.9%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to the mutual 
accountability of aid in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was northern 
Nigeria, 69 (55.2%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 56 (44.8%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related 
to the mutual accountability of aid in Nigeria. 
Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a relationship between 
participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of mutual accountability of aid 
in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=362) = 0.503, p = > 0.05. When compared with participants’ region of 
residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the existence of an association 
between participants’ region of residence and their perception of mutual accountability of aid 
in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=362) = 2.925, p = > 0.05. This shows that there is no impact of national 
culture on participants’ perception of mutual accountability of aid. 
Additionally, eight key findings emerged from this culture dimension of the study, linking the 
individualism/collectivism dimension of culture to an efficient beneficiary focused aid. Each 
finding was supported by a brief description and similar studies from the literature. The eight 
key findings of this dimension of culture are discussed below: 
5.3.1 Government should enforce punitive measures against people who undermine 
policies guiding administration and management of aid funds. 
 
It emerged from this study that the government should enforce punitive measures against 
people who undermine policies guiding administration and management of aid funds. This 
finding was supported by 89.9 percent of the surveyed participants. It is desirable that aid 
funds flow from the rich to the less powerful, less corrupt and poor countries. It is also 
desirable that developing countries set their own strategies, improve their own institutions 
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and tackle corruption (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005). However, effective and 
efficient use of development financing requires both donors and partner countries to do their 
utmost best to fight corruption (Accra Agenda for Action 2008). Odi (2014) recommends 
implementation of policies that enhances economic growth and poverty reduction in 
developing countries. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), IMF and World 
Bank (2005), and Easterly and Williamson (2011) recommends selectivity of aid as a way of 
sanctioning corrupt countries. That is, aid should be channeled only to (a) those countries in 
most need of it, (b) those countries with democratically accountable governments, and (c) 
those countries with less corrupt governments. These measures will reinforce consciousness 
among the led and their leaders to take the fight against corruption seriously. In a similar 
study by Easterly and Williamson (2011), it was reported that the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank and Global Fund had top scores on selectivity; mainly reflecting their 
successes at directing aid funds to “non-corrupt” poor countries. In contrast, the worst 
performers were two major Scandinavian donors – Sweden and Norway – that have a 
strikingly high tolerance for non-democratic recipients, perhaps reflecting the culture of 
Scandinavian aid going to more ideologically socialist regimes that perform badly on 
democracy measures (Easterly & Williamson 2011). The USA was the largest donor in this 
group, perhaps reflecting the primacy of foreign policy objectives rather than aid selectivity 
in a superpower (Easterly & Williamson 2011). It may make sense if selectivity of aid is 
extended to states (or regions), local government area (or district) and even community 
levels, to checkmate institutions that are promoting corruption of aid funds. Thus, any 
government or community institutions found to have weak systems should not be given direct 
aid funds. Rather, such systems should be assessed and fixed, before granting them direct 
access to aid funds, as an incentive for better institutional performance. To do this, public 
sector scorecards should be developed, monitored and disseminated widely, to demonstrate 
accountability and transparency of results. 
 
5.3.2 Organisations implementing aid projects invest maximally on beneficiaries, with 
reasonable Company/organisational overheads. 
 
This study shows that organisations implementing aid projects invest maximally on 
beneficiaries, with reasonable Company/organisational overheads. This finding was 
supported by 80.0 percent of the surveyed participants. ActionAid (2011) espouses that 
excessive administration spending has fallen considerably in the last five years. Adding that 
the donors which still spend most over the threshold are Japan, New Zealand and Finland. 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) note that any organization implementing aid programmes 
must be able to pay her own bills. They must be able to keep their systems working, and 
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perform due diligence functions to eliminate or reduce leakages in aid flow to the 
beneficiaries. Additionally, a well-managed aid requires funding of management activities 
such as fiduciary oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and project design and 
implementation costs (Easterly & Williamson 2011). The duty of care required of the aid 
contractors or grantees include ensuring that aid resources flow maximally through them, to 
the desired beneficiaries. Most agencies agree that extreme overhead costs should be 
avoided (IMF & World Bank 2005, Easterly & Williamson’s 2011). While agencies from 
individualism countries imbibe the ‘economic man’ culture, by promoting extreme overhead 
costs, agencies from collectivism cultures focus on reducing overheads in order to invest 
more on the beneficiary and the welfare of the collective (Hofstede 2001). Although optimal 
overhead ratio is not zero and there is no established benchmark for charging overheads, 
extreme charges on overheads could be considered as diversion of aid funds. Results of 
analysis across agencies demonstrated by Easterly and Williamson (2011) shows that 
bilateral agencies have lower overhead costs than multilaterals, who in turn have lower cost 
ratios than UN agencies. Easterly and Williamson (2011) suggest that the most extreme 
among the latter are United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), who actually spend more on administrative costs than aid 
disbursements (129% and 125%, respectively). The United States has the highest 
administrative costs of the bilateral agencies, plausibly reflecting the much-noted 
phenomenon that Congress has imposed many earmarks and other multiple and conflicting 
mandates on USAID (Easterly & Williamson 2011).  
 
5.3.3 Foreign aid donors build on in-country evaluation programmes, in order that the 
evaluations occur at regular intervals in coordination with in-country evaluation. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid donors build on in-country evaluation programmes, 
in order that the evaluations occur at regular intervals in coordination with in-country 
evaluation. This finding was supported by 54.6 percent of the surveyed participants. IOM 
(2014) asserts that the Global Fund adopts plausibility design as well as programme impact 
review approaches that involve partners and build on in-country evaluation programs, to 
provide evidence for impact. They make the evaluations periodic so they occur at regular 
intervals coordinated with in-country evaluations (IOM 2014). They build country platforms 
that build on national systems and includes programme reviews; and produce practical 
results and recommendations for grant management, grant renewal, and reprogramming 
(IOM 2014). As advocacy to other donors, Oxfam Research Report (2015) urges the US to 
invest more in the capacity of partner country governments and civil society organisations to 
collect, manage, analyze, and publish more of their own data on development investments. 
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A well-managed aid requires funding of management activities such as fiduciary oversight, 
monitoring and evaluation, and project design and implementation costs (Easterly & 
Williamson 2011). IOM (2014) asserts that to achieve good evaluation of a programme, 
donors must invest up to 20 percent of evaluation funds to go towards good design work. 
Plans that falls short of the countries’ evaluation standards should be rejected (Kebonang 
2006). It is therefore advisable that all donors be mandated by recipient countries to share 
their programme monitoring and evaluation costed plans in advance of project start-up. Such 
plans should be reviewed and approved by country experts, before commencement of the 
project.  
 
5.3.4 Donors and the government of Nigeria understand that they are mutually 
accountable for transparency of development results, therefore, they provide public 
access to information on the operations of the aid programme. 
 
It emerged from this study that donors and the government of Nigeria understand that they 
are mutually accountable for transparency of development results, therefore, they provide 
public access to information on the operations of the aid programme. This finding was 
supported by 66.1 percent of the surveyed participants.  Transparency and accountability 
stems from reduction of fear of the unknown, or in Hofstede’s culture axiom, uncertainty 
avoidance (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). When people feel certain about their 
existence and understand their fears, tendencies are that they will be able to develop coping 
mechanisms to address the fears. Dealing with uncertainties can best be done in an 
environment where mutual accountability and transparency of aid results is paramount 
(Easterly & Williamson 2011). Therefore, transparency of aid is required from both the donor 
and recipient countries, to ensure that true values and conditions under which aid is given 
are made available to the general public. ActionAid (2011) asserts that mutual accountability 
involves a clear national aid policy including a locally-driven aid quality and results monitoring 
framework. Others include annual targets for how each individual donor and the government 
should comply with the policy; and annual reports and review meetings to assess donor and 
recipient performance transparently. Mutual accountability has helped countries such as 
Ghana to hold their governments to account by supporting national audit institutions, 
parliaments, community monitoring organisations and a free and independent media 
(ActionAid 2011). Zhao, Seung and Du (2003) report that based on a cross-sectional data of 
40 countries in 7 years, statistical results show that the presence of low transparency (and 
high corruption) significantly hindered the inflow of foreign direct investments to host 
countries. Demelew (2014) adds that except corruption, institutional variables have 
insignificant effect on the flow of foreign direct investments (FDI) into Nigeria. However, 
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Demelew (2014) agrees that transparency, gross domestic product growth and availability of 
natural resources are important determinants of FDI inflows into the region. The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) calls for an international monitoring system to ensure 
that donors and recipients hold each other accountable. Also, that developing countries and 
donors must focus on producing and measuring results, as part of the aid management 
strategies. ActionAid (2011) observes that the US, European Union (EU), Global Alliance for 
Vaccination and Immunisation (GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM) are increasing efforts to coordinate their activities with government and in 
some cases letting governments run their programmes. Thereby, setting a pace for other 
donors and developing countries to develop culturally appropriate and mutually accountable 
strategies for development results. The results must be made open and transparent to all 
stakeholders, in order to expose and reduce corrupt practices. 
 
5.3.5 Organisations implementing aid projects regularly use a plausibility design to 
provide evidence of impact, both positive and negative impact, and taking into account 
nonprogramme influences. 
 
This study reveals that organisations implementing aid projects regularly use a plausibility 
design to provide evidence of impact, both positive and negative impact, and taking into 
account nonprogramme influences. This finding was supported by 76.2 percent of the 
surveyed participants. This finding matches reports that the Global Fund use plausibility 
design to provide evidence of impact, both positive and negative impact, and taking into 
account nonprogramme influences (IOM 2014). Additionally, ActionAid (2011) reports that 
70% of the world’s poor people are women, and aid which supports the social sectors – 
whether health, education, water supply or social protection – is very likely to support women 
in particular, as it provides the services that women otherwise have to provide themselves. 
ActionAid (2011) also argues that aid has contributed to halving the number of people in 
poverty since 1990 and reducing by 10,000 the number of children who die needlessly every 
day. It was further contended that when investors are asked what factors are likely to make 
them invest more, they consistently underline power, water, transport, and healthy and well-
educated workforce – all the things for which real aid and government expenditure are the 
key sources of finance (ActionAid 2011). It was also reported that between 2000 and 2010 
aid support include: HIV/AIDS treatment to 4 million people, 88 million antimalarial bed nets, 
and 40 million more children going to school (ActionAid 2011). 
Contrary to the positive outcomes described above, some literature argues in support of the 
negative outcomes of aid. Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin (1987) supports the criticism which 
has become quite strong in the recent development literature that development projects are 
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too top-down and planned without inputs from beneficiaries. Dijankov, Montalvo and Reynal-
Querolet (2006) note that large literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid has found very 
little evidence that aid has any effect on economic development. Adding that foreign aid 
reduces the level of democracy of the recipient countries. IOM (2014) also observes that a 
lot of the information that donors have in their huge databases was not used by the aid 
recipient countries for programme management decision making. While the programmatic 
performance information was good, evidence of impact was limited (IOM 2014). Some 
groups judge that the negative cultural impacts of aid outweigh the positive outcomes. This 
criticism is common among those who oppose globalization, westernization, or materialism 
on cultural grounds (Alkire 2004). Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) argues that a 
number of donor country political axioms cannot be applied to aid receiving countries and 
are not very helpful as global guidelines for aid effectiveness.  
 
5.3.6 Foreign aid programmes demonstrate the value of integrated development 
approaches and the interrelatedness of activities necessary for human development. 
 
This study espoused that foreign aid programmes demonstrate the value of integrated 
development approaches and the interrelatedness of activities necessary for human 
development. This finding was supported by 63.9 per cent of the surveyed participants. The 
Chi-square test of independence supported the existence of a relationship between 
participant’s geographic region of origin and their perception that foreign aid programmes 
demonstrate the value of integrated development approaches and the interrelatedness of 
activities necessary for human development, X2 (1, n=380) = 0.045, p<0.05. Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) opine that foreign aid are effective only to the extent that they 
can be integrated into existing systems and structures, local knowledge, local context or 
national culture. The dominant philosophy of development cooperation has too rarely 
recognized this need for local integration, at least, in practice. Moreover, as a collectivist 
culture, Nigeria characterize societies in which people are integrated from birth into strong 
cohesive groups that protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Santos, Canada & 
Oliveira 2012). Therefore, any programme aimed to be implemented in the country need to 
adopt collaborative and integrated approaches, in order to keep the group cohesion and 
ensure programme sustainability. For example, ActionAid (2011) espouses that aid funding 
channeled to microfinance, if development interventions are integrated well into other 
services, can increase savings, investment and smooth consumption for the world’s poorest 
citizens. Global aid flows used for this purpose have surged dramatically in the last decade, 
reaching more than $5 billion in 2010. 
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5.3.7 Foreign aid donors have systems to measure impact and demonstrate value 
added to the country. 
 
It emanated from this study that foreign aid donors have systems to measure impact and 
demonstrate value added to the country. This finding was supported by 56.0 percent of the 
surveyed participants. IOM (2014) asserts that the Global Fund adopts programme impact 
review approaches that involve partners and build on in-country evaluation programs. They 
make the evaluations periodic so they occur at regular intervals coordinated with in-country 
evaluations (IOM 2014). IOM (2014) adds that PEPFAR did an extraordinarily good job too. 
While monitoring was target oriented and not designed to measure impact, every year, 
stakeholders could say exactly what had been done and how many people had been reached 
(IOM 2014). The evaluations were used to hold governments, funders, and other 
stakeholders accountable for the use of donor resources that were dedicated to the large 
initiatives that had proliferated and had high political visibility. For example, in reducing 
gender inequality and fulfilling women’s rights, a report by ActionAid (2011) shows that there 
are 96 girls enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys worldwide. Although not directly 
aid related, ActionAid (2011) also shows that women now hold 19 per cent of parliamentary 
seats worldwide. ActionAid (2011) also demonstrates that there are measures that shows 
there are still a lot of substandard aid, and donors vary enormously in their provision of real 
aid. For example, as a proportion of their aid, in 2009 Ireland, the UK and Luxembourg 
provided the most real aid. Greece, France and Austria provided the least (ActionAid 2011). 
To further improve on monitoring aid’s local interventions, Oxfam Research Report (2015) 
recommends that USAID should develop qualitative indicators around the recently launched 
Local Solutions Initiative to measure the impact of local solutions on development outcomes, 
especially as a way to capture best practices within a locally driven approach. 
When impact evaluation is conducted by the actors themselves (donor or recipient country), 
tendencies are that the results may be subjective or skewed to garner undue advantage for 
the actor(s). Also, where impact is not collaboratively pre-determined between the donor and 
the recipient country, the donor may lay claims to any outcome that might not have been 
realized due to the aid programme. In this vein, IOM (2014) recommends that mathematical 
modelling can provide interesting and useful information for understanding the potential 
impact of an intervention in different settings. This type of modeling also can be used to 
create counterfactual situations to predict the course of a situation (such as an epidemic) in 
the absence of a particular intervention. The counterfactual projections can then be 
compared to the projected outcome with the intervention implemented. 
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5.3.8 The country is usually given insufficient or no time to change existing systems in 
oƌdeƌ to adopt Ŷeǁ ͚iŵpƌoǀed͛ sǇsteŵs peƌpetƌated ďǇ the doŶoƌs; theƌeďǇ, paƌallel 
systems tend to operate at the same time. 
 
As can be seen from this study, developing countries are usually given insufficient or no time 
to change existing systems in order to adopt new ‘improved’ systems perpetrated by the 
donors; thereby, parallel systems tend to operate at the same time. This finding was 
supported by 56.3 percent of the surveyed participants. The IOM (2014) asserts that if you 
really do want country ownership, you need to have time in which countries can change their 
management and information systems in line and not have different systems. Oxfam 
Research Report (2015) notes that donors should also focus more on long-term outcomes, 
rather than on delivering short-term outputs. Adding that institutional change takes time; thus 
institutional reform can take years of trial and error. When donors’ success is measured in 
inputs and short-term outputs, policies may fail to reward a sustained effort for institutional 
change (Oxfam Research Report 2015). In Afghanistan, for example, the significant 
improvements in maternal mortality rates were made with over more than a decade of 
international support (Oxfam Research Report 2015). Out of desperate moves to meet 
donors’ pre-determined programme targets, recipient countries are not given sufficient time 
to plan to execute ‘change.’ Thus, parallel systems run side-by-side – aid’s systems and 
country-own systems. Thereby, leading to some duplication of effort and wastages in 
resources. This, donors do at the detriment of local capacity building. The IOM (2014) 
concurs that local capacity building is central to development, because it is not the grand 
outsider who is going to bring about a change. Change can only be achieved when local 
capacity is developed to see the need for the change. The change must therefore, align with 
local interests and initiatives in order to enhance local participation, programme impact and 
sustainability. Any desired change without the local people will not be achieved (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkov 2010). 
 
5.3.9 Key highlights of the impact of national culture on mutual accountability of aid 
 
The survey shows that majority of participants perceive the following practices relevant to 
mutual accountability of aid in recipient countries: the government should enforce punitive 
measures against people who undermine policies guiding the administration of aid funds; aid 
implementing partners invest maximally on beneficiaries, within reasonable 
Company/organizational overheads; aid donors and the recipient country understand that 
they are mutually accountable for transparency of development results and provide public 
access to information on the operations of the aid programme; aid implementing partners 
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regularly use plausibility design to provide evidence of both negative and positive programme 
impact; aid recipient countries are usually given insufficient or no time to change existing 
systems in order to adopt new systems perpetrated by the donors, thereby operating parallel 
systems at the same time.  
Others include: aid donors build on in-country evaluation programmes; aid demonstrate the 
value of integrated development approaches and the interrelatedness of activities necessary 
for human development; and aid programmes are able to measure impact and demonstrate 
value added to the country.  
To increase accountability of aid and reduce aid dependency, ActionAid (2011) recommends 
that citizens in developing and developed countries participate fully in national accountability, 
and demand greater tax justice globally and nationally. 
 
5.4 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF AID ALIGNMENT TO COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN NIGERIA 
 
As can be seen from the conceptual framework of this study, aid alignment to country 
systems is associated with the masculinity/femininity dimension of national culture. Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) highlight that masculinity implies a focus on economic growth, 
competition and a belief in technology; femininity implies a focus on supporting needy people 
in the country (welfare) and in the world (developing cooperation) and on preservation of the 
global environment. The biblical story of the Good Samaritan who helps a Jew in need – 
someone from another ethnic group – is an illustration of feminine and not of collectivist 
values (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). Hofstede (no date) laments that Nigeria scores 
60 on this dimension and is thus a masculine society. An understanding of a country’s ‘ego 
enhancing’ versus ‘caring for others,’ (masculinity versus femininity) characteristics 
determines how aid can be aligned to support local systems. Masculine countries are more 
focused on building egos while feminine countries are concerned about caring for the poor 
(Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). Therefore, an appreciation of a country as a masculine 
or feminine society and aligning strategies to the country’s local context and systems 
prevents ineffective aid channels; thereby, reinforcing local capacity building and eventual 
aid programme sustainability. With this understanding, donor countries need to understand 
the culture (local context) of the countries they wish to support, and use local systems to 
achieve high local capacity for greater impact and sustainability. 
Table 11 shows that a large proportion of the participants – 239 (64.9%) – agreed that aid 
was aligned to country systems in Nigeria, while 129 (35.1%) disagreed. The researcher 
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utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged from the study that 161 
(65.4%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was southern Nigeria 
indicated ‘Agree’ while 85 (34.6%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to the alignment of 
aid to country systems in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was northern 
Nigeria, 78 (63.9%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 44 (36.1%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related 
to the alignment of aid to country systems in Nigeria. 
Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a relationship between 
participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of aid alignment to country 
systems in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 0.082, p = > 0.05. When compared with participants’ 
region of residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the existence of an 
association between participants’ region of residence and their perception of aid alignment 
to country systems in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 3.338, p = > 0.05.  
Additionally, eight key findings emerged from this culture dimension of the study, linking the 
masculinity/femininity dimension of culture to high country capacity for sustainability. Each 
finding was supported by a brief description and by similar studies from the literature. The 
eight key findings of this dimension of culture are discussed below: 
 
5.4.1 Foreign aid activities have deliberately tried to change cultural norms or practices 
that are considered to be negative. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid activities have deliberately tried to change cultural 
norms or practices that are considered to be negative. This finding was supported by 70.9 
percent of the surveyed participants. The findings of this study aligns with similar findings in 
the literature, albeit, also raised controversies from other authors. First, while disagreeing 
with the findings of this study, Alkire (2004) reports that within the World Bank’s operational 
directives (OD) for example, the OD requires that all Bank projects respect persons’ “dignity, 
human rights, and cultural uniqueness” and that participation is to be “informed” – which 
means that particular kinds of knowledge must be gained and/or shared with project 
beneficiaries. It is therefore understood in this line that particular attention to indigenous 
knowledge may increase project effectiveness. Conversely, Moyo (2009) argues that 
development aid itself is the problem of Africa’s underdevelopment. Thus, Alkire (2004) 
asserts that foreign aid activities have had unintended and unanticipated cultural impacts 
that are widely viewed to be negative. For example, the social fabric of mutual caring is 
destroyed and filial duties are disregarded because of individualism; local histories are 
forgotten or devalued; traditional art forms are lost; indigenous institutions of dispute 
resolution, or traditional practices are undermined without a trace (Alkire 2004). Minasyan 
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(2013) alludes that cultural differences between donors and recipients may give rise to 
increased information asymmetry problem between the two and negatively affect aid 
effectiveness. Often, donor objectives are in conflict with local culture and preferences, which 
may result in unsustainable aid projects and failure of development paradigms (Moyo 2009; 
Altaf 2011; Marchesi, Sabani & Dreher 2011; Minasyan 2013). Foreign aid activities should 
inculcate the virtues of the people they serve, and work collaboratively to change only what 
the people themselves see as negative.  
 
5.4.2 Foreign aid activities are well aligned to country priorities, systems, national 
development strategies and preferences 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid activities are well aligned to recipient country’s 
priorities, systems, national development strategies and preferences. This finding was 
supported by 69.0 percent of the surveyed participants. According to Education for all Global 
Monitoring Report (2009) fewer than one-quarter of countries surveyed have national 
development strategies that were clearly linked to the national budget. This is up from 17 per 
cent in 2005, but far short of the 2010 target of 75 per cent (Education for all Global Monitoring 
Report 2009). Collaborative engagement and dialogue should be instituted to make the 
recipient country see reasons for pursuing any desired change. Thus, Clay, Matthew and 
Luisa (2009) contend that as general budgetary support, sectoral basket funding and joint 
pooling by donors, as well as adopting country systems for procurement, were promoting 
ownership and facilitating alignment of aid services. Additionally, the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that donor countries and organisations bring their 
support in line with developing countries’ strategies and use local systems. This is referred 
to as aid alignment. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) further espouses that 
untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for partner 
countries and improving country ownership and alignment.  
 
5.4.3 DoŶoƌs͛ ĐapaĐitǇ ďuildiŶg iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs aƌe iŶtegƌated iŶto host goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
capacity development plans and implemented through country-led strategies. 
 
It emerged from this study that donors’ capacity building interventions are integrated into host 
government’s capacity development plans and implemented through country-led strategies. 
This finding was supported by 66.8 percent of the surveyed participants. Hofstede, Hofstede 
and Minkov (2010) opine that nobody can develop a country but its own population. Adding 
that foreign aid are effective only to the extent that they can be integrated into local 
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knowledge, local context or national culture. Easterly and Pfutze (2008) asserts that 
integrating and aligning donor strategies to recipient country’s local context and systems 
prevents ineffective aid channels. Thereby, reinforcing local capacity building and eventual 
aid programme sustainability. In order to be in alignment, donor countries and organisations 
bring their support in line with local context, and use host government’s capacity development 
plans and local systems to enhance local capacity building for sustainability. The IOM (2014) 
asserts that local capacity building is central to development, because it is not the grand 
outsider who is going to bring about a change. Clay, Matthew and Luisa (2009) contend that 
capacity building and knowledge transfer appear to be more likely where local and regional 
firms of medium capacity undertake project investment activities. However, the linkage 
effects are limited due to the low development of many local markets. 
The Education for all Global Monitoring Report (2009) postulates that progress on aligning 
aid with government programmes has been minimal. Adding that even in countries with good 
systems, donors are not necessarily making more use of them, indicating that quality is not 
the only factor influencing donor choices. For example, although Mongolia’s financial 
management system was ranked one of the highest among the fifty-four countries monitored, 
only 17 per cent of all aid to the country was managed through its national system (Education 
for all Global Monitoring Report 2009). 
 
5.4.4 Foreign aid facilitates improvement in entrepreneurship and job creation 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid facilitates improvement in entrepreneurship and 
job creation. This finding was supported by 83.2 percent of the surveyed participants. The 
study by Puig and Álvaro (2003) shows that aid, along with other associated institutions, had 
a catalyzing effect on economic development. Puig and Álvaro (2003) therefore, support the 
idea that less-developed countries require the cooperation of aid donors to undergo the social 
change necessary for modern economic growth. ActionAid (2011) posits that aid has helped 
the poor to save and invest more in their own businesses through microfinance programmes, 
which from Bangladesh to Bolivia have created thousands of enterprises and millions of jobs. 
Foreign aid programmes have created various economic strengthening opportunities for 
people in Nigeria, as agreed by the participants in this study. Therefore, Shilgba (2014) 
argues that any foreign aid that frustrates entrepreneurship and job creation is bad for Africa.  
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5.4.5 Foreign aid programmes are scientifically sound and designed within the capacity 
of the host country to implement.  
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid programmes are scientifically sound and designed 
within the capacity of the host country to implement. This finding was supported by 76.9 
percent of the surveyed participants. Dietrich (2013) concurs with this finding that a locally 
driven programme approach needs to change the fundamental relationship with partners 
from “control” to “autonomy.” Knack and Eubank (2009) elucidate that within the context of 
the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, donors agreed to set a standard to shift 
ownership of development programs to the country level. The results of this study debunks 
previous arguments by Santiso (2001) and Attaran and Sacks (2001) that donor countries 
package unwanted and non-scientifically sound programmes for recipient countries. They 
elaborated that the aid donor countries do not just give aid and produce ideas; they package 
the ideas and the money together, combining giving with selectivity and conditionalities 
(Santiso 2001). Attaran and Sack (2001) on the other hand, argues that most projects are 
those that are not wanted by the recipient countries; not within the capacity of the host country 
to perform. They added that several are not scientifically sound for a given culture, in that 
there is no scientific evidence that the selected interventions are effective within the local 
context (Attaran & Sachs 2001). In this vein, Oxfam Research Report (2015) suggests that 
donors must take a less restrictive approach and adjust aid policies that support locally driven 
change. Donors should avoid focusing on short-term results, instead, choosing aid 
mechanisms that empower local leadership and context-specific approaches (Oxfam 
Research Report 2015).  All programmes must be designed under the leadership of the host 
country, based on local needs and priorities, and begin with appropriate capacity building to 
manage the project on their own. A locally driven approach requires local leaders to identify 
and find solutions based on their ability to hold local service providers accountable (Oxfam 
Research Report 2015).  Oxfam Research Report (2015) postulates that “Projectizing” aid 
takes both discretion and accountability away from local leaders, undermining their devotion 
to the success of the investment as well as neglecting their agency and expertise. Adding 
that providing services directly, without engaging local power holders, undermines local 
governance.   
 
5.4.6 Foreign aid funding to Nigeria has improved earmarked government spending, 
and reduced corruption among local leadership. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid funding to Nigeria has improved earmarked 
government spending, and reduced corruption among local leadership. This finding was 
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supported by 48.3 percent of the surveyed participants. While this study tells us that aid has 
not contributed to increased dependency, substitution and corruption in Nigeria, diverse 
views has been seen in the literature around this subject. For example, in support of the 
finding of this study, Tavares (2003) asserts that when controlling for such factors as 
economic development, oil resources and political rights, ODA has a strong and statistically 
significant relationship with curbing corruption. Additionally, ActionAid (2011) contends that 
developing country governments are becoming more accountable to their own people, rather 
than donors.  Thus, elucidating that aid is far more effective for poor people – and cost 
effective too – when it is real aid. The kind of aid that helps support dramatic decreases in 
aid dependence is what ActionAid (2011) calls real aid – that’s aid which empowers poor 
women and men to realise their rights, and reduces inequality. By aid dependency, ActionAid 
(2011) mean the proportion of government spending that comes from aid and over the last 
decade it has fallen on average by a third in the poorest countries. In Ghana aid dependency 
fell from 47% to 27%, in Mozambique from 74% to 58% and in Vietnam from 22% to 13%. 
Although aid levels increased, economic growth and the countries’ ability to mobilise their 
own resources increased faster. For Rwanda, aid as a percentage of government spending 
dropped from 85% in 2000 to 45% in 2010.  
On the other hand, Moyo (2009) argues that most aid paradigms and policies have been 
destructive for African economies as they distorted incentives, perpetrated corruption and 
resulted in unaccountable political elites. The use of financial leverage, Santiso (2001) adds, 
is not a substitute for weak domestic institutions or feeble political will, rather, aid has been 
associated with an increase in corruption, deterioration in the quality of bureaucracy and a 
weakening of the rule of law. Njeru (2003) on the other hand, asserts that governments in 
aid recipient countries view foreign aid like any other source of revenue and consequently 
use it for increased consumption, tax reductions or reduced fiscal deficits (future tax 
obligations). Andrews (2009) also cites Bauer (2000) who argued that development aid 
promotes corruption and dependence on others as it creates the impression that emergence 
from poverty depends on external donations rather than on people’s own efforts, motivation, 
arrangements and institutions. The ways in which ODA could potentially exacerbate 
corruption and harm recipient governance has been well documented by Knack (2001, 2004) 
and Charron (2011). For example, when aid dependence increases (measured by ODA as a 
proportion of government consumption), it is expected that recipient states will become less 
accountable for their own actions, that incentives for domestic corruption will be increased 
by increasing conflict over aid funds, and that aid will essentially compensate for poor 
economic policies and weak government institutions by offering a crutch (Knack 2001, 2004; 
Knack and Rahman 2007; Charron 2011).  
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5.4.7 Nigeƌia͛s goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ŵeŵďeƌs has suffiĐieŶt fuŶds to oǀeƌĐoŵe 
poverty, but, does need to complement with aid funding. 
 
It emerged from this study that Nigeria’s government and community members has sufficient 
funds to overcome poverty, but, does need to complement with aid funding. This finding was 
supported by 50.2 percent of the surveyed participants. ActionAid (2011) corroborates that 
even in sub-Saharan Africa, the world’s most aid-dependent region, aid per person has 
averaged only 6 cents a day over the last twenty years.  As one of the world’s major oil 
exporters, a large part of Nigeria’s population lives in poverty and the non-oil economy is 
poorly developed (European Commission 2010). The Nigeria Human Development Report 
(2008-2009) highlights that concerns about inequality is strong in the country. Changes in 
poverty and inequality move in the same direction; economic growth and poverty move in 
opposite directions; and inequality and growth are positively correlated. The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), IMF and World Bank (2005), and Easterly and 
Williamson (2011) posit that aid is more effective at reducing poverty when it goes to (a) 
those countries in most need of it (the poorest countries), (b) those countries with 
democratically accountable governments, and (c) those countries with less corrupt 
governments. When compared across the continent, the need (poverty and inequality) is 
huge, and a democratically elected government is in place, but good governance, 
accountability and corruption are major issues in the country. The European Commission 
(2010) notes that Nigeria is a classical ‘rentier-state’ in which oil revenues are conducive to 
corruption and tend to reduce the dependency of the rulers on the ruled. Although Nigeria 
returned from military dictatorship to democracy in 1999, the political system’s articulation of 
the non-elite population is weak. The Nigeria Human Development Report (2008-2009) hints 
that the quality and effectiveness of governance in Nigeria is a major obstacle to 
development. The rentier nature of the State also reduces the Government’s dependency on 
foreign aid and sets the scene for a cooperation programme filled with challenges (European 
Commission 2010). To achieve sustainable development in Nigeria, the democratic 
government must demonstrate good governance, institute rule of law, accountability and 
transparency; and reduce the gap between the poor and the rich, by aggressively curbing 
corruption. Then, set the stage for quality aid flow to the country, focusing only on the most 
critical areas.  
ActionAid (2011) reports that across Africa, aid has contributed to increase in tax revenue 
collection by more than 7 per cent of national income since 2000. As a result of aid 
programmes, Cambodia, Ghana, Guyana, Kyrgyz, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (among others) have increased their revenues by between 
4% and 8% of GNI, allowing them in turn to reduce their dependence on aid (ActionAid 2011). 
A good example of progress is Rwanda. ActionAid (2011) espouses that in 1998, the 
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Government of Rwanda used part of a grant of £20 million from the UK government, to set 
up the Rwandan Revenue Authority. Since then the UK and other donors providing support 
have helped to develop the revenue authority to the point where it now collects the value of 
that original grant every four weeks (ActionAid 2011). 
 
5.4.8 Foreign aid funding has improved the quality of bureaucracy and rule of law in 
Nigeria. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid funding has improved the quality of bureaucracy 
and rule of law in Nigeria. This finding was supported by 83.9 percent of the surveyed 
participants. Erbeznik (2011) notes that it is the presumption of the development industry that 
foreign aid can promote rule of law reform by providing the resources necessary to rewrite 
formal legal codes, train judiciaries and police forces, and introduce technology that may help 
legal institutions function more efficiently. Contrary to what the development industry intends 
to achieve by offering foreign aid, aid often has the unintended consequence of subsidizing 
present institutions, thereby postponing the need to make necessary reforms. Education for 
all Global Monitoring Report (2009) postulates that donor proliferation, the use of projects to 
bypass government structures, weak coordination and disparate reporting systems are 
hallmarks of poor aid governance that have left a deep imprint on many countries. 
Consequences have included weakened policymaking and budgeting processes, 
fragmentation of service delivery, and erosion of capacity and national institutions (Education 
for all Global Monitoring Report 2009). Additionally, Knack and Rahman (2007) estimate the 
effects of several determinants of bureaucratic quality using the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) data and finds that the quality of bureaucratic services is negatively impacted 
as the proportion of a country’s ODA rises relative to Gross National Product (GNP). Santiso 
(2001) posits that aid has been associated with an increase in corruption, deterioration in the 
quality of bureaucracy and a weakening of the rule of law. An influx of aid money provides 
few incentives for political elites to commit themselves to the sacrifices required for real 
reform and democratic accountability, and it enables the elite to remain in power without such 
reform (Erbeznik 2011). One reason contemplated by Erbeznik (2011) is that reform has 
focused solely on formal rule of law institutions, rather than on the informal political or cultural 
norms that are needed to support such institutions. Little is known, however, about how to 
foster such political and cultural norms where they are lacking (Erbeznik 2011). This calls for 
a more critical study of the impact that aid has had on bureaucracy and rule of law in Nigeria, 
as well as other sub-Sahara African countries. 
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5.4.9 Key highlights of the impact of national culture on aid alignment to country 
systems 
 
From the study, we can see that majority of participants opine the following practices relevant 
to alignment of aid to country systems in the recipient countries: foreign aid changes negative 
cultural norms or practices; aid objectives are aligned to recipient country’s priorities and 
national development strategies; aid capacity building interventions are country led; and aid 
facilitates improvement in entrepreneurship and job creation. Others include: aid 
programmes are scientifically sound and designed within the host country’s capacity to 
implement; aid improves earmarked government spending and reduce corruption; recipient 
countries need foreign aid to complement domestic funding and overcome poverty; and aid 
improves the quality of bureaucracy and rule of law in the recipient country.  
To increase aid alignment and reduce aid dependency, ActionAid (2011) recommends that 
aid donors increase real aid sharply; ensure aid benefits women; and increase the value for 
money and results of aid by making aid more predictable and using recipient systems. 
ActionAid (2011) also suggests focus on true policy coherence for development e.g. fair non-
aid policies such as tax co-operation that will support the good work that aid can do, rather 
than undermine it. ActionAid (2011) shows some countries’ progress; thus, aid dependency 
has fallen in Ghana from 46 per cent to 27 per cent; in Mozambique from 74 per cent to 58 
per cent; in Rwanda from 86 per cent to 65 per cent and in Nepal from 53 per cent to 34 per 
cent. 
 
5.5 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF MANAGING AID FOR RESULTS IN NIGERIA 
 
The conceptual framework used in this study links managing aid for results to the uncertainty 
avoidance dimension of culture. The control of uncertainty measures the degree of concern 
of individuals against the unknown or uncertain situations (Santos, Canada & Oliveira 2012). 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) elucidate that stronger uncertainty avoidance implies 
more perceived corruption, after elimination of the effect of national poverty. Nigeria scores 
55 on this dimension and thus has a preference for avoiding uncertainty (Hofstede (no date)). 
People in a country may feel threatened by a variety of uncertainties and take steps to cope 
with the uncertainties. Understanding these fears of the unknown and their coping 
mechanisms relates to uncertainty avoidance dimension of national culture (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkov 2010). In order to improve aid effectiveness, the country must develop 
systems for measuring, reporting and managing aid results, to improve certainty of actions 
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and use information generated for management decision making. Therefore, developing 
countries and donors focus on producing and measuring aid results, to improve transparency 
of aid and reduce corruption (Easterly & Williamson 2011). Where information is used for aid 
management decision making, uncertainties are reduced or avoided, and transparency 
becomes ensured. Also, the unknowns become known and fears are reduced. Thus, 
transparency reduces corrupt practices in aid management; thereby, increasing aid 
effectiveness 
As can be seen from Table 14, up to 266 (70.6%) participants agreed that foreign donors 
were managing aid for results in Nigeria, while 111 (29.4%) disagreed. The researcher 
utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged from the study that 172 
(69.6%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was southern Nigeria 
indicated ‘Agree’ while 75 (30.4%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to managing aid for 
results in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was northern Nigeria, 94 
(72.3%) indicated ‘Agree’ while 36 (27.7%) noted ‘Disagree’ to the items related to managing 
aid for results in Nigeria. 
Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a relationship between 
participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of managing aid for results in 
Nigeria, X2 (1, n=377) = 0.293, p = > 0.05. When compared with participants’ region of 
residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the existence of an association 
between participants’ region of residence and their perception of managing aid for results in 
Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 0.957, p = > 0.05.  
Additionally, eight key findings emerged from this culture dimension of the study, linking the 
uncertainty avoidance dimension of culture to transparency and reduced corruption. Each 
finding is supported by a brief description, supported by similar studies from the literature. 
The eight key findings of this dimension of culture are discussed below: 
5.5.1 Foreign aid donors use procurement systems that are aligned to local business 
owners. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid donors use procurement systems that are aligned 
to local business owners; thereby improving their competitiveness for contracts and trade 
against their international counterparts. This finding was supported by 63.7 percent of the 
surveyed participants. The OECD-DAC, in its 2008 survey of aid practices in fifty-four 
countries, revealed that only 43 per cent of donor-supported projects and programmes 
evaluated were using partner country procurement systems (Education for all Global 
Monitoring Report 2009). Ali and Isse (2007) strongly suggest that foreign aid and trade are 
strong determinants of gross domestic product per worker, albeit in opposite directions. 
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Likewise, Demelew (2014) contends that foreign direct investments (FDI) has a positive, 
though modest effect on economic development and growth of sub-Sahara African countries. 
Uneze (2012) shows that multilateral aid affects private investment positively, but not bilateral 
aid. Conversely, Uneze (2012) argues that aid uncertainty measured as the standard 
deviation over the mean has a negative impact on private investments and therefore 
weakens the value of foreign aid on domestic private investment. Clay, Matthew and Luisa 
(2009) elucidate that untying aid includes offering local businesses an opportunity to compete 
successfully for contracts. Yet, many formally untied projects were found to be de facto tied 
or to have only some untied components. In most investment projects the primary or head 
contracts and most of the contract components were still procured from the donor country, 
even if procurement was channeled through recipient systems. Clay, Matthew and Luisa 
(2009) contend that untied aid is cost-effective (value for money). Adding that in most cases 
procurement costs were competitive with local and international market prices. Occasionally 
costs were higher, reflecting small-scale tendering processes and social networks (Clay, 
Matthew & Luisa 2009). Miquel-Florensa (2007) reports an evaluation of the differential 
effects of Tied and Untied aid on growth, and how these effects vary with the policy 
environment of the recipient country. It was found that aid effectiveness is not significantly 
different for the two types of aid. However, when conditioned on policies, untied aid had a 
greater impact on growth than tied aid. More critical analysis is required to check the long 
term value of local sourcing and procurements.  
 
5.5.2 The policies and regulations operating in aid supported programmes around 
Nigeria are in alignment with the local culture and tradition. 
 
It emerged from this study that policies and regulations operating in aid supported 
programmes around Nigeria are in alignment with the local culture and tradition. This finding 
was supported by 77.9 percent of the surveyed participants. Excessive emphasis on rules 
and regulations apply where there is high uncertainty avoidance scores in the national culture 
dimension scoring system (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010).  Therefore, the aid 
receiving countries must focus on producing and measuring the impact of policies and 
regulations that are culturally appropriate, in order to improve the transparency of aid. When 
aid regulations are flouted and dependence increases, it is expected that recipient states will 
become less accountable for their own actions, that incentives for domestic corruption will be 
increased by increasing conflict over aid funds, and that aid will essentially compensate for 
poor economic policies and weak government institutions by offering a crutch (Knack 2001, 
2004; Knack and Rahman 2007; Charron 2011). 
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5.5.3 Transparency, accountability and strict rules and regulations are required in order 
to ensure people in need actually benefit from aid support to Nigeria. 
 
It emerged from this study that transparency, accountability and strict rules and regulations 
are required in order to ensure people in need actually benefit from aid support to Nigeria. 
This finding was supported by 89.2 percent of the surveyed participants. Easterly and 
Williamson (2011) notes that transparency entails the ability for those outside the 
organization to obtain access to information about the operations of the agency. The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that developing countries and donors 
must focus on producing and measuring results, as part of the aid management strategies. 
African Development Bank (2009) posits that accountability has worked best when it has 
combined strong community based monitoring with high-level representatives such as 
parliamentarians, policymakers or officials being prepared to be held to account. Evidence 
for these successes comes from sources as diverse as the African Development Bank (ADB) 
on Ghana and Senegal; Oxfam on Malawi and the World Bank on Uganda (ADB 2009). 
Where donors are unwilling to comply with making aid results public, they should be 
sanctioned by the aid receiving countries, as donors must coordinate among themselves and 
respect the rights of aid receiving countries. The results must be made open and transparent 
to all stakeholders, in order to expose and reduce corrupt practices. Without transparency, 
independent commentators cannot monitor aid agencies, aid recipients have no mechanism 
to hold agencies responsible and taxpayers in donor countries cannot monitor aid practices, 
as it is virtually impossible to track where the money goes (Easterly and Williamson 2011). 
Aid monitoring, evaluation and reporting also helps the receiving countries to refocus on other 
priority areas that has not been covered by the aid funding, to avoid duplication of costs and 
fungibility of aid. The IOM (2014) argues that having both programmatic and financial 
information publicly accessible was crucial for value for money given the large number of 
actors in the aid giving space. While programmatic data is useful to assess the effectiveness 
of activities, financial data helps to assess the efficiency and value for money for all 
investments. Therefore, transparency is the most important component of aid agency best 
practices (Easterly and Williamson 2011). These reinforces the need for transparent and 
strict rules and regulations guiding administration of aid funds. 
 
5.5.4 Foreign aid donors generate huge databases and constantly build local capacity in 
data use for programme management decision making. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid donors generate huge databases and constantly 
build local capacity in data use for programme management decision making. 
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This finding was supported by 89.4 percent of the surveyed participants. Programme 
monitoring and evaluation and use of data for management decision making are essential 
components of ensuring aid programme impact and effectiveness in Nigeria. The Education 
for all Global Monitoring Report (2009) espouses that fewer than 10 per cent of the aid 
recipients covered in a survey were assessed as having systems capable of monitoring 
development results — a slight increase from 7 per cent in 2005, but the 2010 target is 35 
per cent. Thus, aid recipient countries’ capacity to monitor aid results is still dismal. Also, 
contrary to the findings of this study, the IOM (2014) observes that a lot of the information 
that donors have in their huge databases was not used by the aid recipient countries for 
programme management decision making. While the programmatic performance information 
was good, evidence of impact was limited. These raises questions on how donors expect 
country-level capacity to increase (IOM 2014).  
 
5.5.5 The recipient government co-ordinates with donors to focus on producing and 
measuring results, through effective programme monitoring and evaluation. 
 
It emerged from this study that the government of Nigeria co-ordinates with donors to focus 
on producing and measuring results, through effective programme monitoring and 
evaluation. This finding was supported by 81.0 percent of the surveyed participants. Ohler 
(2013) postulates that the coordination efforts among bilateral donors seem rather limited, 
suggesting that their political and economic interests prevent closer coordination. In addition, 
NGOs appear to cluster in the regional sectoral space although there seems to be some sort 
of coordination among them (Ohler 2013). It is against this background that the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that developing countries and donors 
must focus on producing and measuring results, as part of the aid management strategies. 
The results must be made open and transparent to all stakeholders, in order to expose and 
reduce corrupt practices. A well-managed aid requires funding of management activities such 
as fiduciary oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and project design and implementation 
costs (Easterly & Williamson 2011). Aid receiving countries need to set budgeting for 
monitoring and evaluation as pre-requisite requirement for admittance of aid donors into their 
country. IOM (2014) asserts that if good programme evaluation is desired, the donor must 
invest up to 20 percent of evaluation funds to go towards good design work. This should 
serve as benchmark for developing guidelines for aid effectiveness in sub-Sahara African 
countries. 
 
147 
 
5.5.6 Nigeria have transparent, measurable assessment frameworks to measure aid 
progress and assess results. 
 
It emerged from this study that Nigeria have transparent, measurable assessment 
frameworks to measure aid progress and assess results. This finding was supported by 47.8 
percent of the surveyed participants. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) lays 
out a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on 
development. It also establishes performance indicators that assess progress over time. 
Additionally, it calls for an international monitoring system to ensure that donors and 
recipients hold each other accountable. To ensure aid effectiveness, a transparent, 
measurable assessment framework should be domesticated in Nigeria, to measure aid 
progress and assess results. Results should be widely disseminated across the country, to 
ensure that donors and recipients of aid hold each other accountable at all levels, from the 
federal level down to the ward or community development committee or family levels.  
 
5.5.7 People in Nigeria believe that while their wellbeing and security lies in the hands 
of God; they also need foreign aid programme to complement in meeting their needs. 
 
It emerged from this study that people in Nigeria believe that their wellbeing and security lies 
in the hands of God, but they also need foreign aid programmes to complement their needs. 
This finding was supported by 75.7 percent of the surveyed participants. This opinion was 
stronger in the northern geographic region of Nigeria than the south. There was a general 
acceptance that beyond God, aid support was desirable. This might have stemmed from 
uncertainty avoidance, where people have preference for avoiding uncertainties. Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) elucidate that countries exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance 
maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and 
ideas.  
 
5.5.8 People perceive that aid service providers respect their time which matters so 
much to them. 
 
It emerged from this study that people in Nigeria believe their time matters so much to them 
and service providers respect this time whenever they attend foreign aid supported 
programmes or services. This finding was supported by 62.7 percent of the surveyed 
participants. Lensu (2003) postulates the conceptual and practical implications of the 
commitment to respect culture for international humanitarian assistance both at the level of 
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principles and policy. Thus, countries with high score on uncertainty avoidance (such as 
Nigeria) maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior. In these cultures, there is an emotional 
need for rules, even if the rules never seem to work (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) elucidate that countries exhibiting high uncertainty 
avoidance (such as Nigeria) maintain that time is money, people have an inner urge to be 
busy and work hard, precision and punctuality are the norm, innovation may be resisted, and 
security is an important element in individual motivation. Aid programmes that support value 
re-orientation, precision and punctuality will be desirable to create consciousness towards 
timely delivery of aid supported services in Nigeria.  
 
5.5.9 Key highlights of the impact of national culture on managing aid for results 
 
The study tells us that majority of participants perceive the following practices relevant to 
managing aid for results in recipient countries: transparency, accountability and strict rules 
and regulations are required in aid administration; aid generates huge databases and builds 
local capacity in data use; host government coordinate with donors to focus on effective 
programme monitoring and evaluation; and aid recipient country have a transparent 
framework for measuring aid progress. Others include: donor procurement systems are 
aligned to local business owners; donor policies and regulations align with local culture and 
tradition; people in the recipient country believe that their wellbeing and security lies in God’s 
hands and aid programmes are required to support it; time matters so much to people in 
Nigeria and aid programmes respect the time.  
 
5.6 TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF CULTU‘E ON AID WO‘KE‘͛S 
PERCEPTION OF HARMONISATION OF AID IN NIGERIA 
 
From the conceptual framework used in this study, it can be seen that harmonization of aid 
relates to long/short term orientation dimension of culture. Mooij and Hofstede (2010) refer 
long-term versus short-term orientation as the extent to which a society exhibits a pragmatic 
future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional historic or short-term point of view. 
According to Hofstede (no date), Nigeria scores 16, making it a short term orientation culture. 
Societies with a short-term orientation generally exhibit great respect for traditions, a 
relatively small propensity to save, strong social pressure to “keep up with the joneses,” 
impatience for achieving quick results, and a strong concern with establishing the Truth 
(Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). A sound understanding of people’s ‘pursuit for 
happiness’ versus ‘pursuit for peace of mind’ determines whether the country has a long or 
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short term orientation culture. This background information assists donor countries and 
organisations to co-ordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid 
duplication of actions. Coordination efforts are also necessary to address both short and long 
term country interests, in line with the people’s specific priorities. The pursuit for happiness 
versus pursuit for peace of mind (long versus short-term orientation) makes developing 
countries to either want to enjoy everything ‘now’ or invest for the ‘future’ (Hofstede, Hofstede 
& Minkov 2010).  Thus, an understanding of the long/short-term orientation dimension of 
national culture will reinforce harmonization of aid (aid specialization) towards reducing aid 
fragmentation in the country (Easterly & Williamson 2011). Well-coordinated and harmonized 
aid creates efficiency and effectiveness in the aid space, thereby, reaching many more 
beneficiaries. 
From the study, Table 17 shows the contrast between participant’s geographic region of 
origin and their perception of harmonisation of aid in Nigeria. The study tells us that 376 
(100%) participants disagrees that harmonisation of aid is palpable in Nigeria. The 
researcher utilized Crosstab to do a further analysis of the result. It emerged from the study 
that 248 (100%) participants whose reported geographic region of origin was southern 
Nigeria indicated ‘Disagree’ while 0 (0.0%) noted ‘Agree’ to the items related to the 
harmonisation of aid in Nigeria. Of those whose geographic region of origin was northern 
Nigeria, 128 (100%) indicated ‘Disagree’ while 0 (0%) noted ‘Agree’ to the items related to 
the harmonisation of aid in Nigeria. 
Chi-square test of independence could not yield any valid results because participants’ 
perception of harmonization of aid in Nigeria was constant. 
Additionally, eight key findings emerged from this culture dimension of the study, linking the 
long/short term orientation dimension of culture to reduced fragmentation of aid. Each finding 
was supported by a brief description, supported by similar studies from the literature. The 
eight key findings of this dimension of culture are discussed below: 
 
5.6.1 FoƌeigŶ aid doŶoƌs fail to ƌelǇ oŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s Đultuƌe of ƌepoƌtiŶg aŶd ŵoŶitoƌiŶg 
systems, as their principle of operation. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid donors fail to rely on the country’s culture of 
reporting and monitoring systems as their principle of operation. This finding was supported 
by 69.7 percent of the surveyed participants. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) lays out a practical, action-oriented roadmap for development of international 
monitoring systems to ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable – a 
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feature that is unique among international agreements. The Global Fund for instance, adopts 
programme impact review approaches that involve partners and build on in-country 
evaluation programs. They make the evaluations periodic so they occur at regular intervals 
coordinated with in-country evaluations (IOM 2014). Oxfam Research Report (2015) alludes 
that often local stakeholders and donor country stakeholders have different data needs and 
priorities. IOM (2014) also observes that a lot of the information that donors have in their 
huge databases was not used by the aid recipient countries for programme management 
decision making. However, Oxfam Research Report (2015) argues that stakeholders in a 
locally driven approach can only have the power to identify problems, come up with solutions, 
and monitor progress if there is transparent information and clear data on how officials are 
improving. Thus, donors need to ensure that they are providing the data that local 
stakeholders need, in the manner that is most useful to them (Oxfam Research Report 2015). 
Therefore, recipient countries are encouraged to guide aid programmes to utilize the 
country’s monitoring and evaluation systems, and utilize information by all programmes 
(including aid) for management decision making. Any aid that fails to adopt the country’s 
culture of monitoring and evaluation is bad aid. 
 
5.6.2 There is wide variation of incentives provided by donors in the country. 
 
It emerged from this study that there is wide variation of incentives (such as travel 
reimbursements, per diem payments, salary supplementation, etc) provided by donors in the 
country. This finding was supported by 69.7 percent of the surveyed participants. The 
reasons for the variation are beyond the scope of this study. This relates to weaknesses in 
aid institutional framework and lack of coordination between donors and their implementing 
partners to agree on standards for providing incentives to their beneficiaries.  
 
5.6.3 FoƌeigŶ aid doŶoƌs haǀe stƌoŶg ƌespeĐt foƌ eaĐh otheƌ͛s tƌaditioŶ, kŶoǁledge aŶd 
areas of expertise and avoid duplication of cost and effort. 
 
It emerged from this study that foreign aid donors have strong respect for each other’s 
tradition, knowledge and areas of expertise and avoid duplication of cost and effort. This 
finding was supported by 63.5 percent of the surveyed participants. In contrast with this 
finding, the Education for all Global Monitoring Report (2009) posits that donor coordination 
is still rudimentary. In 2007 for example, fifty-four countries received more than 14,000 donor 
missions, of which only one in five was coordinated on a joint-donor basis. For example, the 
Niger hosted over 600 donor missions in 2007, fewer than 100 of which were joint missions 
151 
 
(Education for all Global Monitoring Report 2009). The Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) notes that a big part of aid’s problem is duplication of efforts, which leads to multiple 
reporting burden on the already overstretched aid recipients. Yet, data generated are not 
used for decision making in the aid recipient country. To this end, the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that donor countries and organisations co-ordinate 
their actions, simplify procedures and share information to minimize transaction costs and 
avoid duplication or unsustainable aid programmes.  
 
5.6.4 Foreign aid donors co-ordinate their financial aid and capacity building activities 
with that of other donors operating in the same country – mixed opinions.  
 
It emerged from this study that participants who originated from southern geographic region 
of Nigeria opined that foreign aid donors co-ordinate their financial aid and capacity building 
activities with that of other donors operating in the same country. This finding was supported 
by 45.7 percent of the surveyed participants. Participants from the northern region disagrees    
with this assertion. Thus, generating an overall, neutral or undecided position on this item. 
With so many donors and their implementing partners doing so many different things, it 
becomes somewhat challenging to coordinate financial aid and capacity building activities. 
Easterly and Williamson (2011) report that most donors are fragmenting aid in response to 
political economy incentives, as well as other short term orientation benefits, such as 
‘planting their flags’ on as many countries, sectors and projects as possible. The IMF and 
World Bank (2010) reports that a recent OECD survey revealed that in 2007 alone, there 
were 15,229 donor missions to 54 countries – more than 800 to Vietnam alone. Each of these 
donor missions came with huge attendant startup costs. Easterly and Williamson (2011) 
lament that if fixed startup costs by country and sector are important at all, then a lot of small 
donors may be having much or all of their aid eaten up by these fixed costs. Therefore, to 
ensure aid effectiveness, fragmentation of aid must be reduced and aid specialization 
increased. 
 
5.6.5 Foreign aid donor requirement and expectations are generating stable 
transaction costs in aid recipient countries 
 
It emerged from this study that despite the wide variety of foreign aid donor requirement and 
expectations, transaction costs in aid recipient countries have remained stable. This finding 
was supported by 63.5 per cent of the surveyed participants. Kenny and Savedoff (2014) 
reports that results-based aid programmes are criticized for being more vulnerable to 
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corruption than input-based programs that monitor inputs and impose specific procedures for 
procurement and financial accounting. The critical factor in choosing among aid modalities 
is to recognize that failure costs, the foregone benefits of a program that has been defrauded, 
are the true costs of corruption (Kenny & Savedoff 2014). By focusing on whether or not a 
programme is achieving results, it is possible to make programmes achieve more and limit 
the impact of corruption on development (Kenny & Savedoff 2014). A common practice that 
increases transaction costs among donors and their implementing partners is fragmentation 
of aid. The Herfindahl coefficients have failed to rise despite increasingly heated criticism 
and reform efforts to reduce fragmentation. This is one of the most conspicuous failures in 
aid practices, both in levels and in trends (Easterly & Williamson 2011). For the bilateral 
agencies, which do not have a specialized mission, fragmentation is rampant, with very low 
Herfindahls for both country and sector. These are indications that most donors are far from 
efficient behavior on specialization of aid (Easterly and Williamson 2011). Coordination 
efforts are also necessary to address both short and long term country interests, in line with 
the people’s specific priorities. 
 
5.6.6 Foreign aid flow to recipient countries have neither improved nor reduced 
planning and government investment in economic development and poverty alleviation. 
 
It emerged from this study that there was undecided opinion regarding whether or not foreign 
aid flow to recipient countries has improved planning and government investment in 
economic development and poverty alleviation. Thus, 45.7 per cent of the surveyed 
participants were for and another 50 per cent against. ActionAid (2011) assert that since the 
1990s, multi-donor budget support – aid pooled by donors and spent by government – has 
increased in Ghana to 33 per cent of its total aid. It has used this flexible and predictable 
money to fund several new initiatives, including (since 2005) the schools’ capitation grant. 
This is a small grant paid per pupil to schools, to abolish fees for exams, with each school 
choosing how to spend the remaining funds (ActionAid 2011).  Additionally, Philip (2013) 
suggests that total foreign aid and food aid impact positively on poverty, while technical aid 
reduces poverty. Education for all Global Monitoring Report (2009) shows that the new aid 
paradigm is intended to address governance problems in aid delivery and highlight 
government responsibility. Respect for national ownership and the pursuit of greater 
efficiency in donors’ contributions to poverty reduction are intrinsically laudable (Education 
for all Global Monitoring Report 2009). Growth is not sufficient to achieve poverty reduction 
or reduction in inequality, but it is necessary and leads to poverty reduction when focussed 
on poor people (ActionAid 2011). However, Omotola (2014) reports that despite huge 
resources such as oil and gas, copper, platinum and diamonds, most African countries are 
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still heavily reliant on aid from western countries to fund projects in almost all sectors of their 
economy. The dependency or rather over-dependency on aid has created a culture and cycle 
of poverty (Omotola 2014). Njeru (2003) reports that foreign aid loans do not fully increase 
total expenditure, but reduce borrowing and taxation while increasing government 
consumption and decreasing government investment. Adding that foreign aid merely 
substitutes for already earmarked government spending. The central government spends 
funds freed by aid on non-development activities. This implies that government expenditure 
choices are unaffected by external sources of finance. Aid merely softens the government’s 
budget constraints (Njeru 2003). 
 
5.6.7 Participants refute use of recipient country government as vehicle to administer 
aid funds. 
 
It emerged from this study that participants refute use of recipient country government as 
vehicle to administer aid funds. This finding was supported by 80.8 percent of the surveyed 
participants. The outcomes of this study bears diverse considerations in the literature. While 
some opine that aid recipient countries lack the capacity to manage aid funds, others insist 
that the core role of aid in the first place is to transfer capacity to developing countries. Oxfam 
Research Report (2015) asserts that for years, donors, including the US, directly funded the 
treasury of the Ministry of Health in Afghanistan to help the institution implement its plans to 
provide basic health services to more Afghans. And, from the standpoint of measuring the 
US’s investment, the results were outstanding. From 2002-2012, life expectancy rose by 20 
years and infant mortality rates were reduced by nearly 100,000 per year (Oxfam Research 
Report 2015).  
The US government typically does not provide a high proportion of funds through partner 
government systems because US officials fear corruption (Oxfam Research Report 2015). 
But if aid was judged primarily on outcomes and not the perceived risk of corruption, the 
results might change a few minds. The lack thereof has made aid recipient countries to 
continue to depend on donor countries, barely 60 years after the commencement of aid flow 
to Africa. Nearly 75 percent of US foreign assistance is given through projects, mostly 
implemented by US-based for-profit contractors or through US-based non-governmental 
organizations (Oxfam Research Report 2015). In 2013, only 19.7 percent of USAID funds 
were given directly to local entities, including governments, civil society, and the private 
sector (Oxfam Research Report 2015). Oxfam Research Report (2015) affirms that most 
donors prefer project-based aid, in which they plan and implement specific projects, and 
maintain control of project finances and management outside the host country budget. 
“Projectizing” aid is one way to protect aid funds against fraud. Officials have also noted that 
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in some countries, donors providing budget support assistance appear to be more influential 
in regard to host country policy-making than project-only donors, even when the value of the 
project aid is much higher than the budget support (Oxfam Research Report 2015). Santiso 
(2001) argues that aid conditionality and selectivity are not the appropriate approaches to 
strengthen good governance and aid effectiveness in developing countries. What is needed, 
Santiso (2001) argues is a more radical approach in which donors cede developing countries 
greater control over the use of aid, within the framework of agreed-upon objectives. Oxfam 
Research Report (2015) affirms that there is no evidence that stopping aid or threatening to 
stop aid to a country with deteriorating governance has no long-term effect on reducing 
corruption in the partner country, nor in building domestic accountability. A few recent studies 
looked at cases from Uganda, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Malawi, and Eritrea (Oxfam Research Report 2015). In each of these cases, aid stoppage 
led to limited, temporary effects but failed to lead to changes that halted corruption (Oxfam 
Research Report 2015). Dijankov, Jose and Reynal-Qurol (2006) contends that the 
conditionality of aid principle does not seem to work because of the lack of credibility of the 
punishment. Often, the aid cuts disproportionately hurt people living in poverty, rather than 
corrupt elites (Oxfam Research Report 2015). Empirical studies show that other sources of 
foreign funds, like loans, remittances and private to private assistance, have proven to be 
quite effective in fostering growth effect on income distribution (Dijankov, Jose and Reynal-
Qurol 2006). 
 
5.6.8 Aid funding is characterized by minimal duplication of efforts 
 
It emerged from this study that duplication of efforts between donors and recipient countries 
is minimal. This finding was supported by 56.3 percent of the surveyed participants. In 
alignment with the findings of this study, Lawson (2013) explains that USAID issued guidance 
to field missions on compliance with Paris Declaration commitments on donor coordination 
in March 2006. The guidance emphasized that the commitments made by the United States 
and other donors in Paris was to “look for ways to complement and mutually reinforce one 
another’s programs in support of partner plans,” and encouraged field staff to “join other 
donors in endorsing local agreements to the fullest extent possible.” A July 2012 update to 
USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS), covering grants and contributions to bilateral 
donors, appears to reflect increasing acceptance of coordination efforts that involve joint 
funding (Lawson 2013). 
Conversely, studies by Easterly and Williamson (2011); Commission for Africa (2005); 
Easterly (2007); Frot and Santiso (2009); IMF and World Bank (2005); and Knack and 
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Rahman (2007) reveals that there have been too many donors in too many countries, 
stretched across too many sectors or projects. Lawson (2013) specifies that the primary 
argument for better donor coordination is that aid effectiveness is becoming increasingly 
undermined by fragmentation. Coordination advocates argue that the profusion of donor 
agencies in many developing countries causes problems for donors and recipients alike. 
They focus on the following types of problems, both observed and potential, which may 
undermine aid efficiency and effectiveness – duplication, cross-purposes, loss of scale, 
administrative burden, and unclear leadership (Lawson 2013). Lawson (2013) elucidates 
each of the problems as follows: Duplication occurs when donors focus on the same needs 
in a country and may duplicate each other’s’ efforts in the absence of coordination. Cross-
purposes refers to activities of various uncoordinated donors which may actually conflict and 
undermine development objectives. Loss of scale happens when donor tend toward 
supporting higher numbers of lower-value projects. Thus, dilutes the impact of aid and 
threatens activities that have high fixed costs and are most efficient on a large scale, such 
as energy and infrastructure improvements. Administrative burden: The presence of more 
donors does not necessarily mean significantly more assistance, but often does mean more 
administrative demands imposed by donors on recipient governments in order to meet their 
own accounting and oversight requirements. Unclear leadership: In many recipient countries, 
there is no longer a majority donor with implied authority to convene other donors. For 
example, while the United States is the largest donor globally, the U.S. bilateral contribution 
was less than 5% of total ODA in one-third of all countries receiving U.S. assistance in 2008, 
giving the U.S missions in those countries little leverage to exercise leadership around 
coordination. 
Lawson (2013) reports that almost half of donors surveyed for the Paris Declaration 
implementation evaluation in 2008 reported facing significant domestic political and 
institutional obstacles to establishing coordinated aid arrangements. Among the recurring 
obstacles, particularly for the United States, are difficulties related to division of labor, 
concerns about direct budget support, personnel disincentives, lack of interagency 
coordination, and conflicting strategic interests (Lawson 2013). Some observers assert that 
there are disincentives for donor coordination at every level of foreign assistance policy 
making and implementation (Lawson 2013). Lawson (2013) provided the following examples 
in support of disincentives for coordination: donors may be reluctant to coordinate efforts for 
fear of diluting their impactor “brand” in a country or sector. Legislators may not want to give 
up control over the direction of assistance programs, which allows them to respond to their 
constituencies. Aid agencies may fear that increased collaboration will mean less 
independence and that more efficiency will mean downsizing. They may also be concerned 
about the difficulty in attributing outcomes to particular contributions, or find it harder to 
demonstrate the value of their contribution on a project in which they do not have full control. 
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Moreover, several aid officials have suggested that aid workers are too busy to devote time 
and attention to coordination, a task that most are not evaluated on as part of their individual 
performance reviews (Lawson 2013). Additionally, host government officials have developed 
relationships with certain donors, and may not be eager to deal with a single donor-selected 
representative, or to cede their own authority to work directly with donors to a coordinating 
committee or agency (Lawson 2013). While there is no clear evidence of the impact of these 
incentives on coordination efforts, it is a recurring theme in discussions with aid experts. The 
growing role of non-traditional donors, as well as private sector investments and philanthropic 
financial flows to developing countries, present additional coordination challenges, but may 
as well become opportunities for a new type of collaboration (Lawson 2013). 
 
5.6.9 Key highlights of the impact of national culture on harmonisation of aid 
 
The survey shows that majority of participants agree that: aid donors have respect for each 
other’s strengths and expertise; aid funding minimize duplication of cost and efforts in 
recipient countries; donor requirement and expectations improve transaction costs in the aid 
receiving country. Others include: aid brought widened variations in provision of programme 
incentives to beneficiaries; aid donors often fail to rely on local culture of monitoring and 
reporting; and participants refute use of recipient country government to administer aid funds 
in their country. It also emanated from this study that participants had undecided stances 
regarding assertions that donors coordinate aid funds and local capacity building activities 
among themselves; and aid improves government investment in economic development and 
poverty alleviation. The overall rating of harmonization of aid was dismal; thus, the only 
principle of aid effectiveness perceived by the participants to be weak.  
To improve harmonization of aid and reduce aid dependency, ActionAid (2011) recommends 
that donors and recipients should jointly design (recipients) and support (donors) strong 
national development strategies based on democratic ownership. Additionally, they should 
give preference to local procurement and accelerate aid delivery (ActionAid 2011). 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter addresses discussion of key findings that emerged from this study. As can be 
seen from the study, participants agree to the effectiveness of aid across four principle areas; 
thus, aid alignment to country systems, managing aid for results, country ownership of aid, 
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and mutual accountability of aid. The study also shows that harmonization of aid was dismal; 
thus, the only principle of aid effectiveness perceived by the participants to be weak. 
To determine the impact of culture on aid workers’ perception of aid effectiveness in Nigeria, 
the Chi-square test of independence rejected all except the existence of a relationship 
between the participants’ geographic region of origin (or residence) and their perception of 
country ownership of aid. When further analysis was conducted using one-way between 
subjects’ ANOVA, there was a significant impact of participants’ geographic region of origin 
on country ownership of aid. The finding further explains that middle aged persons with 
greater than 5 years of experience on aid projects perceive aid ownership more positively 
than their contemporaries that are not directly involved in aid work. Similarly, people’s marital 
status, religious and professional affiliations impact their perception of aid ownership. Finally, 
there was no significant impact of participants’ geographic region of residence on country 
ownership of aid. 
In order to achieve sustained aid effectiveness in Nigeria, the next chapter proposes a culture 
sensitive, aid recipient focused conceptual framework and institutional framework for aid 
effectiveness, based on empirical evidence from this study. These new contributions to the 
body of knowledge in international development and business administration are envisaged 
to improve performance across all principles of aid effectiveness. The conceptual model and 
institutional framework gives particular attention to strengthening the relationship between 
national culture and aid ownership, as well as improving performance on harmonization of 
aid. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
FOR AID EFFECTIVENESS IN NIGERIA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter discussed the key findings that emerged from this study. It emerged 
from the study that Nigeria was on track with the following principles of aid effectiveness: aid 
alignment to country systems, managing aid for results, country ownership of aid, and mutual 
accountability of aid. The study also shows that performance on the harmonization of aid was 
dismal; thus, the principle of aid effectiveness perceived by the participants to be weak. Of 
the five principles of aid effectiveness, country ownership of aid had a significant relationship 
with the national culture. 
This chapter proposes an evidence based, culturally appropriate, recipient country driven 
institutional framework for aid effectiveness in Nigeria. A conceptual model for aid 
effectiveness is also proposed. The conceptual model and institutional framework were 
based on the findings of this study and deductions from the literature that combined ideas 
from several fields of research relevant to culture and aid. A criterion suggested by Chinn 
and Kramer (2005) was used to validate the guidelines. 
In order to attain the purpose of this study the following five objectives were addressed: 
vi. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of country’s ownership 
of aid in Nigeria 
vii. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of mutual accountability 
of aid in Nigeria 
viii. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of aid alignment to 
country systems in Nigeria 
ix. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of managing aid for 
results in Nigeria 
x. To determine the impact of culture on aid worker’s perception of harmonisation of aid 
in Nigeria. 
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6.2 PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
The proposed institutional framework for aid effectiveness was formulated based on the 
conceptual framework developed from the Geert Hofstede’s five dimensions of national 
culture and the five principles of aid effectiveness, in accordance with the Paris declaration 
of aid effectiveness. 
The first step in the development of the institutional framework was the consideration of the 
conceptual framework of this study, developed by the researcher and revised based on 
evidence from this study, as elucidated in Figure 9, below. The concepts of the framework 
were applied to provide structure to the institutional framework for aid effectiveness. The 
conceptual framework was composed of the theoretical framework of the study, Geert 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture (Hofstede 2001; Osoba 2009), the principles of aid 
effectiveness (Paris declaration of aid effectiveness 2005), and the best practices of aid 
(Easterly & Pfutze 2008). The dimensions of national culture are classified as follows: Power 
Distance; Individualism versus Collectivism; Masculinity versus Femininity; Uncertainty 
Avoidance; and Long versus Short-term Orientation (Hofstede 2001; Osoba 2009). The five 
principles of aid effectiveness include; ownership, mutual accountability, alignment, 
managing aid for results and harmonisation of aid. The five best practices of aid is composed 
of; selectivity, moderate overhead cost, preventing ineffective aid channels, transparency of 
aid, and aid specialisation. 
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FIGURE 9: UPDATED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON EVIDENCE - IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURE ON AID 
EFFECTIVENESS 
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The five dimensions of national culture were applied to the five principles of aid effectiveness 
and best practices of aid to guide the description of recommendations for implementation to 
make aid effective, based on the research findings. The tabular matrix in Appendix F, shows 
the Geert Hofstede’s dimension of national culture, a list of findings against each dimension 
of national culture, relevant principle of aid effectiveness, best practices of aid relevant to the 
findings, and the recommended procedures or activities for the implementation of the finding.  
 
6.3 FORMULATION OF INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR AID 
EFFECTIVENESS IN NIGERIA 
 
This section presents the recommendations for the development of institutional framework 
for aid effectiveness in sub-Sahara Africa, based on synthesis of the researcher’s 
conclusions drawn from the study findings, critical analysis and results of literature search. 
Formulation of the recommendations are also guided by the conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks used in this study. A set of eight recommendations was developed from the 
Power Distance dimension of national culture, in line with the principles of aid effectiveness 
and best practices of aid as guided by the conceptual framework of the study. 
The recommendations hinge on the principles of determination of “95 per cent confidence 
interval,” and not the application thereof. In statistic, a confidence interval (CI) is a type of 
interval estimate of a population parameter. More specifically, “confidence level” consist of a 
range of values that act as good estimates of the unknown population parameter however, 
the interval computed from a particular sample does not necessarily include the true value of 
the parameter (Kendall & Stuart 1973; Cox & Hinkey 1974). In this study, 95 per cent was 
applied as a value that the researcher is certain, based on evidence that informs CI (Kendall 
& Stuart 1973; Cox & Hinkey 1974), that when attained in aid administration, will lead to aid 
effectiveness. Therefore, it is correct to say that aid is effective when 95 per cent of surveyed 
participants in aid recipient countries agree that the country ownership of aid principle of aid 
effectiveness aligns with the national culture. Therefore, utilizing the current findings as 
baseline figures, the researcher recommends enhancement of the country ownership of aid 
principle to 95 per cent, in order to achieve the desired aid effectiveness. For the purpose of 
applying the recommendations in this study, the procedure was tagged “the 95 per cent rule, 
in order to differentiate it from the original concept of CI.” 
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6.3.1 Recommendations to address the impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ǁoƌkeƌ͛s peƌĐeptioŶ of 
ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s oǁŶeƌship of aid iŶ Nigeƌia 
 
Eight recommendations, tagged the “95 per cent rule” was developed to address this 
objective: 
• aid practices should be locally driven and wanted by the local culture and tradition. 
This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.1, Table 2 of this report. Up to 
15.5 percent of participants in the current study perceive that aid donors are 
promoting practices that are alien and unwanted to the local tradition and culture. 
Therefore, in order to achieve aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of participants in 
similar surveys should be able to trust that aid practices are locally driven and wanted 
by the local culture and tradition.  • aid donors should select places they wish to support based on the recipient country’s 
strategic interests and priorities. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 
2.2, Table 2 of this report.  Up to 38.9 percent of participants in the current study 
perceive that aid donors do not consider the strategic interest and priorities of 
recipient countries when choosing project sites. To ensure aid effectiveness, at least 
95 percent of participants in similar surveys should be able to express satisfaction 
with donors’ selection of project sites. Thus, places selected for project 
implementation should be aligned with the strategic interests and priorities of the 
beneficiary country. • aid provided to recipient countries should be untied. This recommendation relates to 
the finding in Item 2.3, Table 2 of this report. Up to 66.8 percent of participants in the 
current study believe that foreign aid to Nigeria consists of specifications that a 
certain proportion of the financial assistance must be provided in kind (i.e., expatriate 
staff, consultants, equipment, commodities) by the aid provider. In order to ensure 
aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of participants in similar surveys should be able 
to perceive aid as untied. Thus, a greater proportion of aid should indeed, be untied. • aid interventions should integrate locally driven solutions that supports institutional 
capacities to tackle corruption. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 
2.4, Table 2 of this report. Up to 10.8 percent of participants in the current study 
disagree that aid interventions supports institutional capacities that tackle corruption. 
To achieve aid effectiveness therefore, at least 95 percent of participants in similar 
surveys should be able to express satisfaction that aid interventions integrate locally 
driven solutions that supports institutional capacities to tackle corruption. • aid resources should get to the rightful beneficiaries without leakages. This 
recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.5, Table 2 of this report. Up to 24.3 
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percent of participants in the current study believe that aid resources does not get 
into the hands of their rightful beneficiaries. To achieve aid effectiveness therefore, 
at least 95 percent of participants in similar surveys should be able to express that 
aid resources get to the right beneficiaries for which the aid resources were donated.  • aid interventions should demonstrate equity in distribution of aid resources to the 
needy in both rural and urban areas. This recommendation relates to the finding in 
Item 2.6, Table 2 of this report. More than 41.6 percent of participants in the current 
study perceive deficiencies in equitable distribution of aid resources between rural 
and urban areas. In order to achieve aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of 
participants in future surveys should demonstrate satisfaction with the level of equity 
in distribution of aid resources between people in rural and their counterparts in urban 
areas. • aid programme experts should be sourced within the recipient country or region of 
operation. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.7, Table 2 of this 
report. More than 81.7 percent of participants in the current study believe that 
regional and country 'experts' are experienced to lead opportunities in foreign aid 
supported research and intervention programmes in Nigeria. Therefore, in order to 
achieve aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of participants in similar surveys should 
be able to demonstrate that aid programme experts are sourced within the recipient 
country or region of operation.   • people in recipient countries should trust their leaders in decisions regarding aid 
donation to the country. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.8, Table 
2 of this report. Up to 32.5 percent of participants in the current study does not believe 
that their leaders can make decisions regarding aid donation on their behalf. To 
achieve aid effectiveness therefore, at least 95 percent of participants in similar 
surveys should be able to express trust that their leaders can make decisions 
regarding aid donation to their country.  
 
6.4 ANALYSIS AND VALIDATION OF THE GUIDELINES 
 
Rogers (2002) (in Moleki 2008) described analysis as an objective breakdown of statements 
into components. This was done to identify relationships between statements and relative 
hierarchy of ideas contained in the recommendations.  Moleki (2008) cites Sieber and 
Mackintosh (2001) who report that analysis facilitates: 
• Recognition of stated and unstated assumptions • Identification of motives • Comprehension of the interrelationships among statements 
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• Detection of logical fallacies 
 
In contrast to analysis, Moleki (2008) elucidates that evaluation involves judgment about the 
value and logical structure of the recommendations. It also determines the extent to which 
the recommendations satisfy certain external criteria and/or standards. Moleki (2008) adds 
that evaluation of the recommendations for institutional framework allows the reader or 
evaluator to draw judgment and conclusions about its validity.  
The proposed conceptual and institutional framework for aid effectiveness were validated by 
subjecting them to external peer review, analysis and evaluation by experts in the field of aid 
management. The frameworks were evaluated for clarity, simplicity, generality, rational 
structure and operational adequacy. Moleki (2008) has used these criteria for evaluation of 
guidelines for facilitation of clinical accompaniment of critical care nursing students in open 
and distance learning programme. 
6.4.1 Clarity and relational structure 
 
The frameworks were validated for trustworthiness, semantic clarity and structural clarity. 
Eight persons were selected to serve as reviewers for the proposed conceptual and 
institutional framework for aid effectiveness. The team of reviewers were composed of aid 
programme management experts and local beneficiaries of aid resources in Nigeria. 
Prospective reviewers were discretely contacted face-to-face, in the workplace and 
requested to serve as reviewers for the proposed frameworks for aid effectiveness. On the 
whole, all eight persons accepted to participate in the review and validation process. 
Electronic copies of the proposed institutional framework and a brief description of processes 
followed by the researcher to develop the frameworks were e-mailed to each of the reviewers. 
Reviewers were requested to review and validate the recommendations for trustworthiness, 
semantic clarity and structural clarity.  Reviewers were given options to provide written 
feedback or arrange to discuss their comments with the researcher. Each reviewer was given 
2 weeks to revert with feedback. Reviewers were reminded prior to and on expiration of the 
2-week timeline to revert with their comments. While 5 reviewers provided written feedback, 
3 others opted to discuss their comments with the researcher. One-on-one sessions were 
held with the 3 reviewers and their comments noted. Both the e-mailed comments and those 
obtained from the face-to-face meetings were compiled and used to update the proposed 
conceptual and institutional frameworks.  The frameworks were further subjected to 
additional review by the researcher’s supervisors, and their inputs integrated to enrich the 
quality of the frameworks. As suggested in Moleki (2008), the semantic clarity questioned the 
theoretical meaning of concepts, while structural clarity reflected on the interrelationship and 
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connections between the conceptual framework and the theoretical framework used to 
develop the institutional framework for aid effectiveness. The structural framework further 
looked at the links between the dimensions of national culture, principles of aid effectiveness, 
best practices of aid and the recommended activities for making aid effective. 
6.4.2 Simplicity and operational adequacy 
 
The recommendations in the conceptual and institutional framework for aid effectiveness 
were evaluated to establish their suitability and applicability for making aid effective in 
Nigeria.  
6.4.3 Generality of the recommendations 
 
Moleki (2008) identifies generality as the breath of the scope and purpose of the guidelines. 
The evaluators ensured that the recommendations were culturally appropriate, recipient 
country driven, and that the roles and responsibilities of donor and recipient countries were 
clearly delineated.  
 
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDELINES 
 
6.5.1 Qualifying statements 
 
In some peculiar situations, there may be valid exceptions to the approaches offered in this 
institutional framework. Therefore, the framework should be used as a guide, while sound 
reasons to deviate from the recommendations are documented for reference purposes. 
 
6.5.2 Description of implementation strategy 
 
In most sub-Sahara African countries, the National Planning Commission (or its equivalence) 
are responsible for registration and coordination of aid donor agencies giving aid to the 
country. Therefore, the researcher will disseminate the results of this study, as well as the 
conceptual and institutional frameworks widely, and advocate for the adaptation, adoption, 
domestication and use of the frameworks by sub-Sahara African countries, to improve aid 
effectiveness. 
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6.5.3 Guidelines dissemination 
 
The proposed conceptual and institutional framework for aid effectiveness will be 
disseminated to aid donor agencies, aid implementing partners, academia, aid receiving 
countries and development journalists and researchers, among others. Dissemination shall 
be done through presentation at conferences, seminars, workshops, and pre-service 
trainings.  Distribution methods shall include institutional websites, publication in journals, 
printed and distributed copies for those who have no access to the internet.  
 
6.5.4 Guidelines implementation 
 
The researcher will work with at least a development partner in Nigeria, to promote the 
adoption of the proposed conceptual and institutional frameworks for aid effectiveness. It is 
envisaged that the National/State Planning Commissions or the National/State Assemblies 
will mobilise stakeholders to review, analyse and critic the frameworks, with a view to 
adapting and adopting for implementation in Nigeria. Once adopted, the government of 
Nigeria, development partners and implementing partners will integrate the framework into 
their operations manual and train their staff (and counterparts) on application of same. The 
conceptual and institutional frameworks will also be presented in continuing education 
workshops for aid programme managers. Given the current drive by donors to address 
ownership and sustainability of supported projects, sustainability indicators will be developed 
based on the proposed frameworks, and performance measurement mechanism put in place 
that allows stakeholders (donors and recipients) to know to what extent aid programmes have 
generated outcomes and impact. 
Finally, one pager matrix of the conceptual and institutional frameworks shall be developed, 
printed and distributed widely in both hard and electronic copies, to sensitise stakeholders 
on its existence. This will be aimed at initiating public/community dialogue around the subject, 
to hold both donor and recipient countries accountable for aid resources, activities and 
results.  
6.5.5 Contribution of this study to the body of academic knowledge 
 
Two key contributions emerged from this study. These were the conceptual framework for 
aid effectiveness as well as the institutional framework for aid effectiveness. The conceptual 
and institutional frameworks proposed in this study were based on the findings of the study 
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and deductions from the literature that combined ideas from several fields of research 
relevant to culture and aid. 
The evidence based, culturally appropriate, recipient country driven institutional framework 
for aid effectiveness was developed from this study. This was composed of eight 
recommendations as set out in Section 6.3.1, hinged on the power distance dimension of 
national culture. Power distance describes the extent of inequality that exists between rulers 
and those that are ruled, along with the level of acceptance of inequality within the culture. 
Nigeria scores high on power distance, which means inequalities among people are expected 
and desired; less powerful people are dependent and emotionally polarized between 
dependence and counter dependence (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). The power 
distance dimension of national culture relates to the country ownership of aid, as set out in 
Figure 9, the conceptual framework for aid effectiveness proposed in this study. As shown in 
Section 4.2.10, there is significant influence of culture on aid recipients’ perception of country 
ownership of aid. This means that in order to improve country ownership of aid, aid 
interventions should selectively focus on the poor. Thus, when the recommendations set out 
in Section 6.3.1 are appropriately implemented, the quality of lives of millions of people in aid 
receiving countries will be improved in lasting ways.  
The conceptual and institutional frameworks will be useful to future researchers, students 
and programme managers in the fields of international business administration, charitable 
organizations, and professional management of aid programmes. Researchers will utilize the 
conceptual and/or institutional framework to underpin academic or field based research 
studies relevant to national culture and aid effectiveness, particularly, for improving aid 
management, ownership, or sustainability and international business practice, generally. The 
frameworks will also be useful for influencing policy change in research utilization, education 
and practice, aimed at improving aid performance, sustainability, management and 
effectiveness in Nigeria.  Aid programme managers will utilize the conceptual and/or 
institutional frameworks to design sustainability roadmaps for aid funded programmes, 
implement sustainable programmes, monitor and evaluate, and advocate for positive change 
towards aid effectiveness in the Nigeria.  
Starting from the local, sub-national and national levels, programme managers will utilize the 
conceptual/institutional frameworks to train aid workers, managers, technocrats and policy 
makers on aid policy analysis, stakeholder analysis, advocacy for change and management 
of aid policy change. Universities and graduate schools will develop the 
conceptual/institutional frameworks into modules for training students of business 
administration, development studies and project management, among others. The 
frameworks will also be used to monitor and report aid programme outcomes and impact, 
using pre-set indicators for aid effectiveness. At the community levels, the conceptual and 
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institutional frameworks for aid effectiveness may be used to initiative community dialogues 
around targeted prioritization of needs, strategies for aid implementation, prevention of 
ineffective aid channels, transparency and accountability of aid and overall aid performance. 
This will improve knowledge and skills in participatory monitoring and evaluation of aid 
programmes by community members and service beneficiaries. Thereby, improving 
community participation, transparency and mutual accountability between aid delivery 
agencies, the host government and aid beneficiaries in Nigerian communities. Effective 
participation by community members will in turn galvanize aid ownership and consequent 
sustainability. In addition to the above, a more practical and experience based contribution 
of this study to professional practice is described in Section 6.5.6, below. 
 
6.5.6 Contribution of this study to professional practice 
 
The contributions to the body of academic knowledge set out in Section 6.5.5, as well as the 
recommendations of this study as set out in 6.3.1 were implemented by the researcher while 
on his line of official duties as Country Director for an international non-governmental 
organization in Nigeria. The intervention enabled more than a million people in Akwa Ibom 
State to know their HIV status, and improved their quality of lives in lasting ways through 
targeted interventions. Details of the issue, implementation approach as well as the 
outcomes are discussed below. 
6.5.6.1 Issue 
 
With human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevalence rate of 10.8 percent, Akwa Ibom State 
is one of Nigeria’s states with highest HIV burden. Institutional capacity to address the HIV 
epidemic is weak, despite abundant oil money. Stigma and discrimination ravages the 
population, with people living with HIV preferring to remain in hiding. Health seeking 
behaviors are influenced by religion, with more trust put in spiritual homes than health 
facilities. Thus, uptake of HIV services remains low, despite availability of public, private and 
faith-based health infrastructure and services. 
6.5.6.2 Implementation of recommendations from this study 
 
To address the issues identified in Section 6.5.5.1, above, the researcher implemented the 
recommendations of this study as set out in Section 6.3.1, above, as follows: 
a) Locally driven and wanted interventions: Concerned about the burden of HIV in 
Nigeria, the researcher participated in national dialogues seeking to address the 
169 
 
challenge. Local actors agreed to a more focused intervention to take HIV 
interventions to the right places, at the right time and on the right things. Twelve 
states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) were identified as strategic states for 
focused HIV interventions in Nigeria. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was approached by the government of Nigeria to provide 
financial assistance to the scale up of HIV interventions in Akwa Ibom State. 
b) Local, strategic interests and priorities: Akwa Ibom State was collaboratively 
identified by the Government of Nigeria (recipient) and USAID (donor) as a priority 
state for scale up of HIV/AIDS services. The researcher participated in the planning 
and implementation of statewide health facilities for the delivery of HIV/AIDS 
services. Following further consultations with local stakeholders, five local 
government areas (LGAs) were selected for saturation with HIV/AIDS services. The 
selection was based on the high burden of HIV on the population as well as 
availability of current services. Others were high concentration of persons with high 
risk behaviours or key populations, as evidenced by the HIV prevalence rates in the 
LGAs. 
c) Local leaders make decisions on behalf of communities: The selection of scale up 
LGAs was validated at a stakeholders meeting that attracted key actors from federal, 
state and LGA levels. Others included community leaders, representatives of civil 
society organisations (CSOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs), people living with 
HIV (PLHIV), academia, among others. It emerged from the consultative meeting that 
the LGAs selected were based on local strategic interests and priorities, thus, 
approved for project implementation. 
d) Untied aid: As member of senior leadership team of the project, the researcher 
ensured that all aid resources delivered to Akwa Ibom State were locally 
procured/acquired. They were delivered through the host government service 
delivery mechanism and local private or non-governmental institutions, as well as 
through locally engaged project staff, consultants and community outreach workers. 
All project supplies were locally procured and delivered. Project logistics were 
facilitated through local business owners (e.g., car hire services, hotel services, food 
vendors, vendors for commodities and supplies, etc); thereby, boosting local 
businesses/economy. Country level technical assistance were mainly provided by 
local or regional staff or consultants. 
e) Locally sourced programme expert: Programme experts providing technical 
assistance to the project were locally sourced. These include project staff, 
consultants, facilitators, and community outreach workers. Others include staff of 
implementing agencies, such as public, private and non-governmental organisations. 
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Indigenous country level experts were also relied upon to provide technical 
assistance to the state programme teams. 
f) Building institutional capacities and integrating local solutions: The researcher 
influenced the project to intensify capacity building of host government, private and 
non-governmental institutions to increase impact, improve efficiency and ensure 
sustainability of interventions. Partnerships, collaboration and coordination were 
strengthened with other partners and institutions, including families, communities, to 
promote linkages, referrals and networking, as well as opportunities for wrap around 
services, such as human right interventions. Clinic opening days/hours were aligned 
to the local needs and conveniences of the beneficiaries. Behavior change 
interventions were aligned and integrated into the local culture and activities of the 
target beneficiaries. 
g) Equity in distribution of resources: Under the researcher’s leadership, operational 
structures and systems were strengthened from state and local government, and 
community levels, to ensure all families and communities in focus LGAs were given 
equitable access to HIV services. Community outreach teams were assigned 
geographic clusters and monitored through geographic positioning system (GPS) 
and mobile technology solutions, to ensure effective service coverage at both rural 
and urban areas.  
h) Taking aid to the right beneficiaries: Deliberate efforts were made to increase access 
among key populations, using sexual network testing approaches. Adolescents and 
young adults were given special focus, particularly, seeking to reach young 
girls/women who have more unmet needs. Pregnant women and children were also 
identified for focused interventions, due to their vulnerability status. Clinically prone 
individuals such as those infected with tuberculosis were also given special focus. 
Aid supplies were particularly tracked, recorded and reported using logistics 
management information systems and world class inventory management systems. 
Procurement supply chain management systems and coordination with other 
partners were improved to minimize wastages, expiries, losses/leakages, or stock-
out, due to poor planning. Harmonisation and coordination of interventions were also 
instituted to minimize duplication of efforts on a few beneficiaries, at the detriment of 
others. 
6.5.6.3 Outcomes 
 
a) Increased access to HIV/AIDS services in Akwa Ibom State, covering both rural and 
urban areas – See Figure 10, below. Services grew from less than 10 to over 340 
service delivery sites in the last 1-2 years of improved strategy of aid donation to the 
state. 
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FIGURE 10: INCREASED ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS SERVICES IN AKWA IBOM STATE 
 
b) Improved institutional capacity to provide quality HIV/AIDS services to the right 
beneficiaries (PLHIV) in the right places (5 focus LGAs) and at the right time. As at 
July 31, 2016 in Akwa Ibom State; • Over 1.2 million (representing 25 percent of the state’s population) received 
HIV testing and counseling and obtained their results. • Over 25,000 people were receiving antiretroviral therapy • Over 170,000 pregnant women received HIV testing and counseling and 
obtained their results • Over 9,000 pregnant women were placed on antiretroviral therapy for their 
purpose of their health and those of their baby. 
c)  
d) The state demonstrated palpable political will to sustain the HIV interventions 
e) The project achieved improved economic outcomes • Over 1,200 new adhoc jobs created • Several small-scale businesses strengthened through local purchases and 
contracts • Improved state revenues from Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) and With-holding 
taxes (WHT) 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter explicated the conceptual and institutional frameworks for aid effectiveness. The 
conceptual and institutional framework was based on the findings of this study and 
deductions that combined ideas from the literature and several fields of research relevant to 
culture and aid. The eventual conceptual and institutional frameworks were adjudged 
culturally appropriate and recipient country driven by the team of experts who validated the 
frameworks.  
The next chapter addresses the conclusions drawn from this study, the limitations faced in 
the process of conducting the research as well as recommendations for improving the quality 
of aid and for conducting a future research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter proposed an evidence based, culturally appropriate, recipient country 
driven institutional framework for aid effectiveness in Nigeria. A conceptual model for aid 
effectiveness was also proposed. The conceptual and institutional frameworks were based 
on the findings of this study and deductions from the literature that combined ideas from 
several fields of research relevant to culture and aid.  
As elucidated in Section 4.1, 300 (72.1%) male and 116 (27.9%) female participants, 
predominantly (95.7 per cent) within ages 25 to 54 years, participated in the study. Majority 
of the participants (316, 78.1%) were ever married while 86 (21.9%) were never married. Up 
to 337 (81.0%) participants were Christians while 72 (17.3%) were affiliated to the Islamic 
religion. The study tells us that over half of the participants - 225 (54.1%) – reported having 
over 5 years’ duration of affiliation with aid funding. The survey also tells us that among the 
participants studied, 234 (56.3%) holds pre-degree and graduate qualifications, while 182 
(43.8%) holds post-graduate qualifications. Up to 382 (91.8%) participants were employed 
by non-governmental organisations (NGO) and 31 (7.5%) by the host government. Majority 
of the participants – 234 (56.3%) – were affiliated to other professions other than medical 
(104, 25.0%) and paramedical (78, 18.8%) professions, respectively. 
It emerged from the descriptive analysis of data that of the five principles of aid effectiveness 
deployed in this study, four were perceived by research participants as effective. These 
include aid alignment to country systems, managing aid for results, country ownership of aid 
and mutual accountability of aid. The fifth principle of aid effectiveness, harmonization of aid, 
emerged from this study as ineffective. As set out in Table 19, a Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the various variables 
that compose the principles of aid effectiveness. Overall, there was perfect, positive 
correlation between alignment of aid to country systems and managing aid for results (r = 
.510, n = 353, p = .000); country ownership of aid (r = .488, n = 340, p = .000); mutual 
accountability of aid (r = .498, n = 336, p = .000); and harmonization of aid (r = .300, n = 350, 
p = .000). There was also perfect, positive correlation between managing aid for results and 
country ownership of aid (r = .500, n = 351, p = .000); mutual accountability of aid (r = .444, 
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n = 348, p = .000); and harmonization of aid (r = .212, n = 359, p = .000). A perfect, positive 
correlation also existed between country ownership of aid and mutual accountability (r = .512, 
n = 350, p = .000); harmonisation of aid (r = .271, n = 358, p = .000). The Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient also showed perfect, positive correlation between mutual 
accountability of aid and harmonisation of aid (r = .396, n = 354, p = .000). Details of these 
analysis are shown below. This means all the principles of aid effectiveness are 
interdependent and therefore, necessary for aid effectiveness. 
In order to determine the impact of national culture on aid effectiveness, the data was further 
subjected to rigorous analysis using inferential statistics (ANOVA and Chi square). It 
emerged from the inferential statistical analysis that there was no significant impact of 
national culture on mutual accountability of aid, alignment of aid to country systems, and 
managing aid for results. No further tests were conducted to determine the impact of national 
culture on harmonization of aid since it was already determined ineffective through 
descriptive analysis. Therefore, the results showed significant impact of national culture on 
country ownership of aid. That means a culture that encourages selective focus of aid on the 
poor can improve country ownership of aid by reducing inequality or acceptance of power 
distance between the rich and the poor. Osoba (2009) describes power distance as the extent 
of inequality that exists between the rich and the poor. Nigeria scores high on this dimension 
(score of 80), which means that people accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has 
a place and which needs no further justification (Hofstede – no date). 
In order to apply this new knowledge in international business administration to improve aid 
effectiveness in Nigeria, the researcher recommended a new conceptual framework set out 
in Section 6.2. This led to the recommended institutional framework with a set of eight 
guidelines for improving country ownership of aid, as well as aid effectiveness in Nigeria, as 
set out in Section 6.3. In the guidelines, the researcher recommends enhancement of the 
eight parameters for the country ownership of aid principle from their current observed 
baseline values to 95 per cent, in order to achieve the desired aid effectiveness. For the 
purpose of applying the recommendations in this study, the procedure was tagged “the 95 
per cent rule,” in order to differentiate it from the original concept of Confidence Interval (CI). 
From the new conceptual framework, the researcher further distilled five general conclusions 
which represent the primary output from this study, as set out in Section 7.2, below. 
Finally, the researcher distilled eight general recommendations from the research findings to 
promote country ownership of aid and improve overall aid effectiveness in Nigeria. This has 
been set out in Section 7.4. 
175 
 
This chapter focuses on drawing conclusions. It will also describe the limitations of the study, 
recommendations for improving the quality of aid in Nigeria, as well as recommendations for 
future research. 
Based on the research findings discussed in Chapter 5, the conclusions are used to accept 
or reject the null hypothesis as stated:  
 
i. H01: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of country’s 
ownership of aid in Nigeria 
ii. H02: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of mutual 
accountability of aid in Nigeria 
iii. H03: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of aid 
alignment to country systems in Nigeria 
iv. H04: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of managing 
aid for results in Nigeria 
v. H05: There is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of 
harmonisation of aid in Nigeria 
 
Finally, the conclusions will ascertain whether the aim of the study, which was formulated in 
section 1.4, was achieved. 
 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The research null hypothesis were accepted or rejected through the research findings. 
 
7.2.1 H01: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶ of 
ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s oǁŶeƌship of aid iŶ Nigeƌia 
 
The original relationship between participants’ geographic region of origin and their 
perception of country ownership of aid was significant [F (1,365) = 4.294, p = 0.039]. When 
adjusted with the Mantel-Haenszel procedure, the relationship remained significant. 
Therefore, we conclude that there is significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception 
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of country ownership of aid in Nigeria. Also, aggregate results obtained from descriptive 
statistical analysis in this study portrays participants’ perception of ownership of aid as 
effective in Nigeria (51.5 percent). 
Pursuant to the determination of aid ownership as a principle for the attainment of aid 
effectiveness in Nigeria, participants in this study believe that donors prioritize host country’s 
preferences when selecting places they wish to invest aid funds (54.1 percent), and promote 
locally driven practices (77.6 percent). Adding that donors support the country to develop 
own strategies, improve institutional capacities and tackle corruption (81.5 percent). 
Participants also feel confident that local leaders (60.3 percent) and regional and country 
‘experts’ (81.7 percent) are able to administer aid in their country. Thus, expressed concerns 
that a certain proportion of aid to Nigeria was still being delivered as tied aid (66.8 percent). 
In any case, about half of the participants (50.7 percent) were happy that aid is distributed 
equitably between beneficiaries in rural and urban areas of Nigeria; thus, reaching the right 
beneficiaries (68.5 percent). Details of the result relevant to ownership of aid are presented 
below. 
The ownership of aid relates to the power distance dimension of national culture. The power 
distance dimension was elaborated by Mooij and Hofstede (2010) as the extent to which less 
powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. An 
understanding of ‘power distance’ dimension of national culture as well as the ‘ownership’ 
principle of aid effectiveness help donors and developing countries make informed decisions 
on selectivity of aid. That is, allocating aid towards those really in need (pro-poor). Thereby, 
increasing aid impact and yielding aid effectiveness. The Paris Declaration of Aid 
Effectiveness (2005) highlights the principle of country ownership as that principle which 
relates to the ability of developing countries to set their own development goals and 
strategies, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. Results relevant to ownership of 
aid are presented in Table 2 of this study report. 
As set out on Table 2 of this study report, 77.6 percent of the surveyed participants perceive 
that aid donors promote practices that are locally driven and wanted by the local tradition and 
culture. Thereby discountenancing the argument by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) 
that aid donors were simply extending their standards of living that were unwanted by the 
local tradition and culture. This finding is also inconsistent with assertions by Bandyopadhyay 
and Vermann (2009) that aid is focused substantially on security concerns, marked especially 
by the watershed event of September 2011. 
It also emerged from 54.1 percent of participants in this study that foreign aid donor countries 
select places they wish to support based on the country’s strategic interest and the interest 
of the local people they support. ActionAid (2011) corroborates that when aid is given in such 
177 
 
a way that it supports poor countries to lead their own development, be more accountable to 
their own people, and mobilize more of their own resources, then aid itself contributes to 
reducing aid dependency. Rwanda’s Single Project Implementation Unit oversees all 
domestic and external projects – allowing donors to use Rwanda’s own procurement and 
financial systems, cutting duplicate systems and costs (ActionAid 2011). This finding 
counteracts arguments by certain scholars that aid is used as a means to increase the donor 
country’s exports (Commission for Africa 2005; IMF & World Bank 2005; United Nations 
Development Program 2005; Easterly & Williamson 2011).  The finding also debunks 
assertions by Charron (2011) that aid is argued by many to be tied with the political agenda 
of the donor country and less focused on reducing the gap between the rich and the poor 
through “good governance” reform in the recipient country.  
This study shows that 81.5 percent of the surveyed participants opine that foreign aid 
supports the country to develop own strategies, improve institutional capacities and tackle 
corruption using locally driven strategies. A locally driven approach empowers citizens and 
their state to collaboratively solve problems, reduce corruption, and improve government 
service delivery (Oxfam Research Report 2015). Against this background, the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that donor countries and organisations 
bring their support in line with developing countries’ strategies and use local systems. The 
IOM (2014) asserts that if you really do want country ownership, you need to have time in 
which countries can change their management and information systems in line and not have 
different systems. Therefore, the Oxfam Research Report (2015) recommends that donors 
should adopt a locally driven approach to development by working with local partners first, 
giving them support to take on the challenge of reforming dysfunctional institutions. 
Additionally, Easterly and Pfutze (2008) resound the need for allocating aid towards those 
really in need 
While 81.5 percent of study participants opine that aid resources get to the rightful 
beneficiaries with minimal leakages, 50.7 percent of them perceive that the  resources are 
distributed equally in both rural and urban areas. However, up to 41.6 percent of participants 
still feels aid resources are not equally distributed between the rural poor and the urban 
areas. Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) examine the long-run effect of foreign aid on income 
inequality for 21 recipient countries using panel co-integration techniques to control for 
omitted variable and endogeneity bias. They reported that aid exerts an increasing inequality 
effect on income distribution. Against this background, Easterly and Pfutze (2008), resound 
the need for aid selectivity and prioritisation, to make informed decisions on allocating aid 
towards those really in need (pro-poor). Moyo (2009) stresses that aid should be tailored 
towards the immediate needs of beneficiaries. 
. 
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As can be seen from this study, 81.7 percent of the surveyed participants assert that regional 
and country ‘experts’ are experienced to lead opportunities in foreign aid supported research 
and intervention programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign aid that requires bringing in 
experts and technicians from the donor countries to “help” Africa, and yet leaves Africa 
without any addition to her skills base is bad aid (Shilgba 2014). Also, IOM (2014) reports 
that when you look at clinical trials, they are not led by Africans, and PEPFAR does not 
always support their participation at scientific meetings. Overall, ActionAid (2011) postulates 
that around a third of global aid is spent on technical assistance from the donor countries. 
Up to 60.3 percent of the surveyed participants opine that they trust their leaders will make 
the right decisions and negotiations with aid donors on their behalf. ActionAid (2011) 
corroborates that aid achieves much better and more sustainable results when development 
is led by the developing countries themselves. Thus, Santiso (2001) suggests a more radical 
approach in which donors cede developing countries’ greater control over the use of aid, 
within the framework of agreed-upon objectives. Unfortunately, African leaders still engage 
in wide spread corruption in order to keep sufficient wealth for their families and themselves 
(Mooij & Hofstede 2010). Kono and Montinola (2013) argues that autocracies are more likely 
than democracies to divert development aid to themselves or the military. Therefore, calling 
on donors to send aid funds to democratic countries, where economic development can be 
assured (Kono & Moninola 2013). Against this background, leaders should ensure that only 
aid that meet the country’s developmental objectives are accepted into the country 
(Kebonang 2006). 
Over 66.8 percent of the participants opine that foreign aid to recipient countries consist of 
specifications that a proportion of the financial assistance must be provided in kind (i.e., 
expatriate staff, consultants, equipment, and commodities) by the aid provider. In kind or tied 
aid demoralizes local people’s morale, creates brain drain, frustrates economic growth and 
increases poverty, among others. OECD (2010) and ActionAid (2011) advance that there 
has been some progress in reducing tied aid over the last few years – untied aid overall 
increased from 46 per cent in 2000 to 76 per cent in 2007. Foreign aid that requires bringing 
in experts and technicians from the donor countries to “help” Africa, and yet leaves Africa 
without any addition to her skills base is bad aid (Shilgba 2014). ActionAid (2011) 
corroborates that aid achieves much better and more sustainable results when development 
is led by the developing countries themselves. Thus, Santiso (2001) suggests a more radical 
approach in which donors cede developing countries’ greater control over the use of aid, 
within the framework of agreed-upon objectives. 
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7.2.2 H02: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶ of 
mutual accountability of aid in Nigeria 
 
Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a relationship between 
participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of mutual accountability of aid 
in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=362) = 0.503, p = > 0.05. When compared with participants’ region of 
residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the existence of an association 
between participants’ region of residence and their perception of mutual accountability of aid 
in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=362) = 2.925, p = > 0.05. Therefore, we conclude that there is no 
significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of mutual accountability of aid in 
Nigeria. However, aggregate results obtained from descriptive statistical analysis in this study 
portrays participants’ perception of mutual accountability of aid as effective in Nigeria (57.7 
percent). 
Pursuant to the determination of mutual accountability of aid as a principle for the attainment 
of aid effectiveness in Nigeria, it emerged from this study that both donor and recipient 
countries are mutually accountable for aid funds (66.1 percent). Thus, participants 
recommend punitive measures against people who mismanage aid funds (89.9 percent), and 
recommend reasonable overhead costs for aid implementing agencies, in order to channel 
more funds to beneficiaries (80.0 percent). It also emanated from the study that aid agencies 
provide evidence of programme impact (76.2 percent), with limited value add to beneficiaries 
(36.3 percent). Also, few participants see aid building on in-country evaluation programs 
(36.5 percent) with limited time given to host country actors to adapt to new system changes 
(56.3 percent). Thus, limited number of participants think aid has demonstrated the capacity 
to integrate development programmes into existing platforms for improved effectiveness 
(27.4 percent). These trends can be reversed to improve aid effectiveness in Nigeria. Details 
of the result relevant to mutual accountability of aid are presented below. 
The conceptual framework of this study categorized mutual accountability of aid around the 
culture dimension of ‘individualism versus collectivism.’ These refers to people looking after 
themselves and their immediate family members only, versus people belonging to in-groups 
that look after them in exchange for loyalty (Santos, Canada & Oliveira 2012; Mooij & 
Hofstede 2010). Individualist cultures are more amenable to allow for high overheads while 
collectivist cultures are more likely to channel more resources towards the poor (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkon 2010). To increase accountability of aid and reduce aid dependency, 
ActionAid (2011) recommends that citizens in developing and developed countries 
participate fully in national accountability, and demand greater tax justice globally and 
nationally.  
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Table 7 of this report shows that majority of participants perceive the following practices 
relevant to mutual accountability of aid in recipient countries. Up to 89.9 percent of 
participants opine that the government should enforce punitive measures against people who 
undermine policies guiding the administration of aid funds. In this light, the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005), IMF and World Bank (2005), and Easterly and Williamson 
(2011) recommends selectivity of aid as a way of sanctioning corrupt countries.  
No fewer than 80.0 percent of participants also perceive that aid implementing partners invest 
maximally on beneficiaries, within reasonable Company/ organizational overheads. While 
most agencies agree that extreme overhead costs should be avoided (IMF & World Bank 
2005), Easterly and Williamson (2011) note that any organization implementing aid 
programmes must be able to pay her own bills. ActionAid (2011) espouses that excessive 
administration spending has fallen considerably in the last five years.  
It further emerged from 66.1 percent of participants in this study that aid donors and the 
recipient country understand that they are mutually accountable for transparency of 
development results and provide public access to information on the operations of the aid 
programme. Mutual accountability has helped countries such as Ghana to hold their 
governments to account by supporting national audit institutions, parliaments, community 
monitoring organisations and a free and independent media (ActionAid 2011). Also, Zhao, 
Seung and Du (2003) report that based on a cross-sectional data of 40 countries in 7 years, 
statistical results show that the presence of low transparency (and high corruption) 
significantly hindered the inflow of foreign direct investments to host countries.  
The current study unveils opinions of 76.2 percent of participants that aid implementing 
partners regularly use plausibility design to provide evidence of both negative and positive 
programme impact. ActionAid (2011) argues that aid has contributed to halving the number 
of people in poverty since 1990 and reducing by 10,000 the number of children who die 
needlessly every day. It was also reported that between 2000 and 2010 aid support include: 
HIV/AIDS treatment to 4 million people, 88 million antimalarial bed nets, and 40 million more 
children going to school (ActionAid 2011).  
It also emerged from 56.3 percent of participants in this study that aid recipient countries are 
usually given insufficient or no time to change existing systems in order to adopt new systems 
perpetrated by the donors, thereby operating parallel systems at the same time. Against this 
background, the IOM (2014) asserts that if you really do want country ownership, you need 
to have time in which countries can change their management and information systems in 
line and not have different systems. Oxfam Research Report (2015) notes that donors should 
focus more on long-term outcomes, rather than on delivering short-term outputs. Adding that 
institutional change takes time; thus institutional reform can take years of trial and error. 
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When donors’ success is measured in inputs and short-term outputs, policies may fail to 
reward a sustained effort for institutional change (Oxfam Research Report 2015). 
Participants in this study also expressed the following about mutual accountability of aid: 
Fewer than 36.3 percent of participants perceive that aid donors build on in-country 
evaluation programmes. A well-managed aid requires funding of management activities such 
as fiduciary oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and project design and implementation 
costs (Easterly & Williamson 2011). IOM (2014) asserts that to achieve good evaluation of a 
programme, donors must invest up to 20 percent of evaluation funds to go towards good 
design work. Therefore, plans that fall short of the countries’ evaluation standards should be 
rejected (Kebonang 2006).  
No more than 63.9 percent of participants in this study agrees that aid demonstrate the value 
of integrated development approaches and the interrelatedness of activities necessary for 
human development. Hofstede and Minkov (2010) opine that foreign aid are effective only to 
the extent that they can be integrated into existing systems and structures, local knowledge, 
local context or national culture. The dominant philosophy of development cooperation has 
too rarely recognized this need for local integration, at least, in practice. For example, 
ActionAid (2011) espouses that aid funding channeled to microfinance, if development 
interventions are integrated well into other services, can increase savings, investment and 
smooth consumption for the world’s poorest citizens.  
Fewer than 36.3 percent of participants opine that aid programmes are able to measure 
impact and demonstrate value added to the country. In this vein, IOM (2014) recommends 
that mathematical modelling can provide interesting and useful information for understanding 
the potential impact of an intervention in different settings. 
 
7.2.3 H03: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶ of aid 
alignment to country systems in Nigeria 
 
Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a relationship between 
participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of aid alignment to country 
systems in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 0.082, p = > 0.05. When compared with participants’ 
region of residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the existence of an 
association between participants’ region of residence and their perception of aid alignment 
to country systems in Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 3.338, p = > 0.05. Therefore, we conclude that 
there is no significant impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of aid alignment to 
country systems in Nigeria. However, aggregate results obtained from descriptive statistical 
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analysis in this study portrays participants’ perception of alignment of aid to country systems 
as effective in Nigeria (64.9 percent). 
In order to determine the impact of aid alignment on aid effectiveness in Nigeria, it emerged 
from this study that aid donors align aid objectives with recipient country’s priorities (69.0 
percent), and change negative cultural norms and practices in recipient countries (70.9 
percent). Aid capacity building activities are country led (66.8 percent), scientifically sound 
(76.9 percent) and facilitates entrepreneurship and job creation (83.2 percent). Aid improves 
the quality of bureaucracy and rule of law (83.9 percent), increase earmarked government 
spending (48.3 percent), and complement domestic funding to overcome poverty in recipient 
countries (50.2 percent). Details of the result relevant to alignment of aid to country systems 
are presented below. 
Aid alignment to country systems is associated with the masculinity/femininity dimension of 
national culture. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) highlight that masculinity implies a 
focus on economic growth, competition and a belief in technology; femininity implies a focus 
on supporting needy people in the country (welfare) and in the world (developing 
cooperation) and on preservation of the global environment. To increase aid alignment and 
reduce aid dependency, ActionAid (2011) recommends that aid donors increase real aid 
sharply; ensure aid benefits women; and increase the value for money and results of aid by 
making aid more predictable and using recipient systems. ActionAid (2011) also suggests 
focus on true policy coherence for development e.g. fair non-aid policies such as tax co-
operation that will support the good work that aid can do, rather than undermine it. Results 
relevant to alignment of aid to country systems are set out in Table 10 of this study report. 
From Table 10 of the study report, we can see that 70.9 percent of participants opine that 
foreign aid change negative cultural norms and practices in recipient countries. Alkire (2004) 
reports that within the World Bank’s operational directives (OD) for example, the OD requires 
that all Bank projects respect persons’ “dignity, human rights, and cultural uniqueness” and 
that participation is to be “informed” – which means that particular kinds of knowledge must 
be gained and/or shared with project beneficiaries. Conversely, Moyo (2009) argues that 
development aid itself is the problem of Africa’s underdevelopment. Additionally, Moyo 
(2009); Altaf (2011); Marchesi, Sabani, Dreher (2011); and Minasyan (2013) argue that donor 
objectives themselves are in conflict with local culture and preferences, which may result in 
unsustainable aid projects and failure of development paradigms.  
It emerged from 69.0 percent of the participants that aid objectives are aligned to recipient 
country’s priorities and national development strategies. Clay, Matthew and Luisa (2009) 
contend that as general budgetary support, sectoral basket funding and joint pooling by 
donors, as well as adopting country systems for procurement, were promoting ownership and 
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facilitating alignment of aid services. Additionally, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) recommends that donor countries and organisations bring their support in line with 
developing countries’ strategies and use local systems.  However, the Education for all 
Global Monitoring Report (2009) reports that fewer than one-quarter of countries surveyed 
have national development strategies that were clearly linked to the national budget. This is 
up from 17 per cent in 2005, but far short of the 2010 target of 75 per cent (Education for all 
Global Monitoring Report 2009).  
Table 10 depicts 66.8 percent of participants as saying aid capacity building interventions 
are country led. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) opine that nobody can develop a 
country but its own population. Adding that foreign aid are effective only to the extent that 
they can be integrated into local knowledge, local context or national culture. The IOM (2014) 
asserts that local capacity building is central to development, because it is not the grand 
outsider who is going to bring about a change. The Education for all Global Monitoring Report 
(2009) postulates that progress on aligning aid with government programmes has been 
minimal. Adding that even in countries with good systems, donors are not necessarily making 
more use of them, indicating that quality is not the only factor influencing donor choices. For 
example, although Mongolia’s financial management system was ranked one of the highest 
among the fifty-four countries monitored, only 17 per cent of all aid to the country was 
managed through its national system (Education for all Global Monitoring Report 2009). 
Up to 83.2 percent of participants indicate that aid facilitates improvement in 
entrepreneurship and job creation. The study by Puig and Álvaro (2003) shows that aid, along 
with other associated institutions, had a catalyzing effect on economic development. Puig 
and Álvaro (2003) therefore, support the idea that less-developed countries require the 
cooperation of aid donors to undergo the social change necessary for modern economic 
growth. ActionAid (2011) posits that aid has helped the poor to save and invest more in their 
own businesses through microfinance programmes, which from Bangladesh to Bolivia have 
created thousands of enterprises and millions of jobs. Therefore, Shilgba (2014) argues that 
any foreign aid that frustrates entrepreneurship and job creation is bad for Africa. 
Up to 76.9 percent of participants opine that aid programmes are scientifically sound and 
designed within the host country’s capacity to implement. Dietrich (2013) concurs with this 
finding that a locally driven programme approach needs to change the fundamental 
relationship with partners from “control” to “autonomy.” A locally driven approach requires 
local leaders to identify and find solutions based on their ability to hold local service providers 
accountable (Oxfam Research Report 2015).  Knack and Eubank (2009) elucidate that 
within the context of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, donors agreed to 
set a standard to shift ownership of development programs to the country level. The results 
of this study debunks previous arguments by Santiso (2001) and Attaran and Sacks (2001) 
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that donor countries package unwanted and non-scientifically sound programmes for 
recipient countries.   
It emerged from 48.3 percent of participants that aid improves earmarked government 
spending and reduce corruption in aid recipient countries. ActionAid (2011) contends that 
developing country governments are becoming more accountable to their own people, rather 
than donors. On the other hand, the contention by up to 48.1 percent of participants in this 
study that aid increases corruption is however, worthy of note. Moyo (2009) argues that most 
aid paradigms and policies have been destructive for African economies as they distorted 
incentives, perpetrated corruption and resulted in unaccountable political elites. When aid 
dependence increases, it is expected that recipient states will become less accountable for 
their own actions, that incentives for domestic corruption will be increased by increasing 
conflict over aid funds, and that aid will essentially compensate for poor economic policies 
and weak government institutions by offering a crutch (Knack 2001, 2004; Knack and 
Rahman 2007; Charron 2011).  
No fewer than 50.2 percent of participants perceive that recipient countries need foreign aid 
to complement domestic funding and overcome poverty. ActionAid (2011) corroborates that 
even in sub-Saharan Africa, the world’s most aid-dependent region, aid per person has 
averaged only 6 cents a day over the last twenty years.  Also, as one of the world’s major 
oil exporters, a large part of Nigeria’s population lives in poverty and the non-oil economy is 
poorly developed (European Commission 2010). The European Commission (2010) notes 
that Nigeria is a classical ‘rentier-state’ in which oil revenues are conducive to corruption and 
tend to reduce the dependency of the rulers on the ruled. This contributed to the up to 44.6 
percent of participants in this study, who argues that domestic resources are sufficient and 
Nigeria does not need foreign aid to overcome poverty. ActionAid (2011) reports that across 
Africa, aid has contributed to increase in tax revenue collection by more than 7 per cent of 
national income since 2000. As a result of aid programmes, Cambodia, Ghana, Guyana, 
Kyrgyz, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (among 
others) have increased their revenues by between 4% and 8% of GNI, allowing them in turn 
to reduce their dependence on aid (ActionAid 2011). A good example of progress is Rwanda. 
ActionAid (2011) espouses that in 1998, the Government of Rwanda used part of a grant of 
£20 million from the UK government, to set up the Rwandan Revenue Authority. Since then 
the UK and other donors providing support have helped to develop the revenue authority to 
the point where it now collects the value of that original grant every four weeks (ActionAid 
2011). 
As seen in Table 10 of this report, 83.9 percent of participants believe that aid improves the 
quality of bureaucracy and rule of law in the recipient country. Erbeznik (2011) notes that it 
is the presumption of the development industry that foreign aid can promote rule of law reform 
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by providing the resources necessary to rewrite formal legal codes, train judiciaries and 
police forces, and introduce technology that may help legal institutions function more 
efficiently. Conversely, the Education for all Global Monitoring Report (2009) postulates that 
donor proliferation, the use of projects to bypass government structures, weak coordination 
and disparate reporting systems are hallmarks of poor aid governance that have left a deep 
imprint on many countries. Consequences have included weakened policymaking and 
budgeting processes, fragmentation of service delivery, and erosion of capacity and national 
institutions (Education for all Global Monitoring Report 2009). Additionally, Knack and 
Rahman (2007) estimate the effects of several determinants of bureaucratic quality using the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data and finds that the quality of bureaucratic 
services is negatively impacted as the proportion of a country’s ODA rises relative to Gross 
National Product (GNP). 
 
7.2.4 H04: There is no significant impact of Đultuƌe oŶ aid ƌeĐipieŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶ of 
managing aid for results in Nigeria 
 
Chi-square test of independence rejected the existence of a relationship between 
participants’ geographic region of origin and their perception of managing aid for results in 
Nigeria, X2 (1, n=377) = 0.293, p = > 0.05. When compared with participants’ region of 
residence, the Chi-square test of independence still rejected the existence of an association 
between participants’ region of residence and their perception of managing aid for results in 
Nigeria, X2 (1, n=368) = 0.957, p = > 0.05. Therefore, we conclude that there is no significant 
impact of culture on aid recipients’ perception of managing aid for results in Nigeria. However, 
aggregate results obtained from descriptive statistical analysis in this study portrays 
participants’ perception of managing aid for results as effective in Nigeria (70.6 percent). 
Pursuant to understanding the impact that managing aid for results has on the attainment of 
aid effectiveness in Nigeria, it emanated from this study that transparency, accountability and 
strict rules and regulations are required in aid administration (89.2 percent). It also evolved 
from the study that the recipient government coordinate with donors to monitor and evaluate 
aid programmes (81.0 percent); build huge databases and strengthen local capacity in data 
use (89.4 percent). Thereby, generating a transparent framework for measuring aid progress 
(47.8 percent). Participants of this study also opined that donor policies and regulations (77.9 
percent), as well as donor procurement systems (63.7 percent) are already well aligned with 
local the culture; thereby promoting local businesses. Participants also hold that aid donors 
should uphold believes that beneficiaries’ wellbeing lies in the hands of God (75.7 percent) 
and take steps to respect beneficiaries’ time, as it matters so much to them (62.7 percent). 
Details of the result relevant to alignment of aid to country systems are presented below. 
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The conceptual framework used in this study links managing aid for results to the uncertainty 
avoidance dimension of culture. Nigeria scores 55 on this dimension and thus has a 
preference for avoiding uncertainty (Hofstede (no date)). The control of uncertainty measures 
the degree of concern of individuals against the unknown or uncertain situations (Santos, 
Canada & Oliveira 2012). In order to improve aid effectiveness, the country must develop 
systems for measuring, reporting and managing aid results, to improve certainty of actions 
and use information generated for management decision making. Therefore, developing 
countries and donors should focus on producing and measuring aid results, to improve 
transparency of aid and reduce corruption (Easterly & Williamson 2011). Results relevant to 
managing aid for results are set out in Table 13 of this study report.  
As can be seen in Table 13 of this study report, 89.2 percent of participants tells us that 
transparency, accountability and strict rules and regulations are required in aid 
administration. The IOM (2014) argues that having both programmatic and financial 
information publicly accessible was crucial for value for money given the large number of 
actors in the aid giving space. African Development Bank (2009) posits that accountability 
has worked best when it has combined strong community based monitoring with high-level 
representatives such as parliamentarians, policymakers or officials being prepared to be held 
to account. Evidence for these successes comes from sources as diverse as the African 
Development Bank (ADB) on Ghana and Senegal; Oxfam on Malawi and the World Bank on 
Uganda (ADB 2009).  
It emerged from 89.4 percent of participants in this study that aid generates huge databases 
and builds local capacity in data use. The Education for all Global Monitoring Report (2009) 
espouses that fewer than 10 per cent of the aid recipients covered in a survey were assessed 
as having systems capable of monitoring development results — a slight increase from 7 per 
cent in 2005, but the 2010 target was 35 per cent. Additionally, while programmatic 
performance information was good, evidence of impact was limited. The IOM (2014) 
observes that a lot of the information that donors have in their huge databases was not used 
by the aid recipient countries for programme management decision making. 
Up to 81.0 percent of participants in this study opines that host government coordinate with 
donors to focus on effective programme monitoring and evaluation of aid programmes. The 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recommends that developing countries and 
donors must focus on producing and measuring results, as part of the aid management 
strategies. A well-managed aid requires funding of management activities such as fiduciary 
oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and project design and implementation costs (Easterly 
& Williamson 2011). IOM (2014) asserts that if good programme evaluation is desired, the 
donor must invest up to 20 percent of evaluation funds to go towards good design work. On 
the other hand, Ohler (2013) postulates that the coordination efforts among bilateral donors 
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seem rather limited, suggesting that their political and economic interests prevent closer 
coordination. Therefore, aid receiving countries need to set budgeting for monitoring and 
evaluation as pre-requisite requirement for admittance of aid donors into their country. 
Divergent opinions emerged among participants regarding availability of a transparent 
monitoring and evaluation framework in the aid recipient country.  Barely 47.8 percent of 
participants agree that the aid recipient country have a transparent framework for measuring 
aid progress. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) lays out a practical, action-
oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It also 
establishes performance indicators that assess progress over time. These are however, not 
adequately followed by both donors and recipient countries alike. 
No less than 63.7 percent of participants feel that donor procurement systems are aligned to 
partner country procurement systems; thereby improving competitiveness of local business 
owners for contracts and trade against their international counterparts. The OECD-DAC, in 
its 2008 survey of aid practices in fifty-four countries, revealed that only 43 per cent of donor-
supported projects and programmes evaluated were using partner country procurement 
systems (Education for all Global Monitoring Report 2009). Uneze (2012) shows that 
multilateral aid affects private investment positively, but not bilateral aid. Conversely, Uneze 
(2012) argues that aid uncertainty measured as the standard deviation over the mean has a 
negative impact on private investments and therefore weakens the value of foreign aid on 
domestic private investment.   
It emerged from 77.9 percent of participants in this study that donor policies and regulations 
align with local culture and tradition in aid recipient countries. Excessive emphasis on rules 
and regulations apply where there is high uncertainty avoidance scores in the national culture 
dimension scoring system (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010).  Therefore, the aid 
receiving countries must focus on producing and measuring the impact of policies and 
regulations that are culturally appropriate, in order to improve the transparency of aid. When 
aid regulations are flouted and dependence increases, it is expected that recipient states will 
become less accountable for their own actions, that incentives for domestic corruption will be 
increased by increasing conflict over aid funds, and that aid will essentially compensate for 
poor economic policies and weak government institutions by offering a crutch (Knack 2001, 
2004; Knack and Rahman 2007; Charron 2011). 
Up to 75.7 percent of participants opine that people in the recipient country believe that their 
wellbeing and security lies in the hands of God and aid programmes are required to support 
it. There was a general acceptance that beyond God, aid support was desirable. This might 
have stemmed from uncertainty avoidance, where people have preference for avoiding 
uncertainties. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) elucidate that countries exhibiting high 
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uncertainty avoidance maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of 
unorthodox behaviour and ideas.  
It emanated from 62.7 percent of participants in this study that time matters so much to 
people in Nigeria and aid programmes respect the time. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 
(2010) elucidate that countries exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance (such as Nigeria) 
maintain that time is money, people have an inner urge to be busy and work hard, precision 
and punctuality are the norm, innovation may be resisted, and security is an important 
element in individual motivation. Aid programmes that support value re-orientation, precision 
and punctuality will be desirable to create consciousness towards timely delivery of aid 
supported services in Nigeria.  
7.2.5 H05: There is no significant impact of culture oŶ aid recipieŶts͛ perceptioŶ of harŵoŶisatioŶ 
of aid in Nigeria 
 
Chi-square test of independence could not be conducted because participants’ perception of 
harmonization of aid in Nigeria was constant. However, based on aggregate results obtained 
from descriptive statistics applied in this study, participants deemed harmonisation of aid 
ineffective in Nigeria (0 percent). 
Pursuant to the determination of harmonisation of aid as a principle for the attainment of aid 
effectiveness in Nigeria, it emerged from this study that aid donors respect each other’s 
strengths and expertise (63.5 percent) and coordinate local capacity building activities (45.7 
percent) in order to avoid duplication of cost and effort (56.3 percent). However, their 
cumbersome requirement and expectations increases transaction costs in recipient countries 
(63.5 percent) and widens variation in incentive payments to aid workers and beneficiaries 
(69.7 percent). Barely half of the participants agreed that aid improves government 
investment in economic development and poverty alleviation (45.7 percent). Participants also 
opine that donors often fail to adopt local cultures of monitoring and evaluation (69.7 percent). 
They dismissed any suggestions that the host government be used as channel to administer 
aid funds in Nigeria (80.8 percent).   
Harmonization of aid relates to long/short term orientation dimension of culture. Mooij and 
Hofstede (2010) refer long-term versus short-term orientation as the extent to which a society 
exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional historic or short-
term point of view. The pursuit for happiness versus pursuit for peace of mind (long versus 
short-term orientation) makes developing countries to either want to enjoy everything ‘now’ 
or invest for the ‘future’ (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010).  Thus, an understanding of the 
long/short-term orientation dimension of national culture will reinforce harmonization of aid 
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(aid specialization) towards reducing aid fragmentation in the country (Easterly & Williamson 
2011). Well-coordinated and harmonized aid creates efficiency and effectiveness in the aid 
space, thereby, reaching many more beneficiaries. To improve harmonization of aid and 
reduce aid dependency, ActionAid (2011) recommends that donors and recipients should 
jointly design (recipients) and support (donors) strong national development strategies based 
on democratic ownership. Additionally, they should give preference to local procurement and 
accelerate aid delivery (ActionAid 2011). 
Table 16 of this report shows that 63.5 percent of participants opines that aid donors have 
respect for each other’s strengths and expertise and avoid duplication of cost and effort. The 
Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (2005) notes that a big part of aid’s problem is 
duplication of efforts, which leads to multiple reporting burden on the already overstretched 
aid recipients.  Additionally, the Education for all Global Monitoring Report (2009) posits that 
donor coordination is still rudimentary. In 2007 for example, fifty-four countries received more 
than 14,000 donor missions, of which only one in five was coordinated on a joint-donor basis. 
Thereby, bringing to prominence the opinion of the remaining 37.4 percent of the current 
study participants that aid donors fail to coordinate their efforts. 
In Table 16 of this report, 56.3 percent of participants perceive that aid funding minimize 
duplication of cost and efforts in recipient countries. Nearly half of the (36.8 percent) 
participants think otherwise, thereby, raising mixed opinions about this subject. Easterly and 
Williamson (2011) report that most donors are fragmenting aid in response to political 
economy incentives, as well as other short term orientation benefits, such as ‘planting their 
flags’ on as many countries, sectors and projects as possible. The IMF and World Bank 
(2010) reports that a recent OECD survey revealed that in 2007 alone, there were 15,229 
donor missions to 54 countries – more than 800 to Vietnam alone. Each of these donor 
missions came with huge attendant startup costs.   
It emanated from this study that 63.5 percent of participants hold views that donor 
requirement and expectations improve transaction costs in the aid receiving country. Kenny 
and Savedoff (2014) reports that results-based aid programmes are criticized for being more 
vulnerable to corruption than input-based programs that monitor inputs and impose specific 
procedures for procurement and financial accounting. The critical factor in choosing among 
aid modalities is to recognize that failure costs, the foregone benefits of a program that has 
been defrauded, are the true costs of corruption (Kenny & Savedoff 2014). By focusing on 
whether or not a programme is achieving results, it is possible to make programmes achieve 
more and limit the impact of corruption on development (Kenny & Savedoff 2014). A common 
practice that increases transaction costs among donors and their implementing partners is 
fragmentation of aid.   
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It emerged from 69.7 percent of participants in this study that aid brought widened variations 
in provision of programme incentives to beneficiaries. These variations include travel 
reimbursements, per diem payments, salary supplementation, etc., provided by donors in the 
country. The reasons for the variation are beyond the scope of this study. This relates to 
weaknesses in aid institutional framework and lack of coordination between donors and their 
implementing partners to agree on standards for providing incentives to aid beneficiaries.  
Up to 69.7 percent of participants feel that aid donors often fail to rely on local culture of 
monitoring and reporting. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) lays out a 
practical, action-oriented roadmap for development of international monitoring systems to 
ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable – a feature that is unique 
among international agreements. The Global Fund for instance, adopts programme impact 
review approaches that involve partners and build on in-country evaluation programs. They 
make the evaluations periodic so they occur at regular intervals coordinated with in-country 
evaluations (IOM 2014). Oxfam Research Report (2015) alludes that often local stakeholders 
and donor country stakeholders have different data needs and priorities. Thus, donors need 
to ensure that they are providing the data that local stakeholders need, in the manner that is 
most useful to them (Oxfam Research Report 2015).                                                    
It emerged from this study that 80.8 percent of participants refute use of recipient country 
government to administer aid funds in their country. Nearly 75 percent of US foreign 
assistance is given through projects, mostly implemented by US-based for-profit contractors 
or through US-based non-governmental organizations (Oxfam Research Report 2015). 
Oxfam Research Report (2015) affirms that there is no evidence that stopping aid or 
threatening to stop aid to a country with deteriorating governance has no long-term effect on 
reducing corruption in the partner country, nor in building domestic accountability. A few 
recent studies looked at cases from Uganda, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and Eritrea (Oxfam Research Report 2015). In each of these 
cases, aid stoppage led to limited, temporary effects but failed to lead to changes that halted 
corruption (Oxfam Research Report 2015). Dijankov, Jose and Reynal-Qurol (2006) 
contends that the conditionality of aid principle does not seem to work because of the lack of 
credibility of the punishment. 
It also emanated from this study that participants had undecided stances (about 45.7 percent 
each way) regarding assertions that donors coordinate aid funds and local capacity building 
activities among themselves; and aid improves government investment in economic 
development and poverty alleviation. ActionAid (2011) assert that since the 1990s, multi-
donor budget support – aid pooled by donors and spent by government – has increased in 
Ghana to 33 per cent of its total aid. It has used this flexible and predictable money to fund 
several new initiatives, including (since 2005) the schools’ capitation grant. Additionally, 
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Philip (2013) suggests that total foreign aid and food aid impact positively on poverty, while 
technical aid reduces poverty. However, Omotola (2014) reports that despite huge resources 
such as oil and gas, copper, platinum and diamonds, most African countries are still heavily 
reliant on aid from western countries to fund projects in almost all sectors of their economy. 
The dependency or rather over-dependency on aid has created a culture and cycle of poverty 
(Omotola 2014). 
 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study looked at the impact of culture on aid effectiveness in Nigeria. Development 
workers in two purposively selected organisations were used as study participants. 
Therefore, the findings may not translate to ethnicities in the general population. The results 
of this study particularly depicts the influences that culture has in determining the 
effectiveness of aid in Nigeria. All participants of this study were staff of two implementing 
agencies, based in Nigeria, therefore, similar studies are warranted in among other 
organisations and in other countries, to validate the current study’s findings. 
The researcher assumed that the participants’ geographic region of origin in Nigeria was 
sufficient to represent their culture, as well as able to impact their perception of aid 
effectiveness. The study findings support this assumption, where at least one culture 
dimension (country ownership of aid) was found to have significant impact on aid 
effectiveness.   
 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.4.1 Recommendations for implementing the conceptual and institutional frameworks 
for aid effectiveness in Nigeria 
 
As has been seen in Chapters 4 and 5, there are several significant failings in aid 
effectiveness. The conceptual and institutional frameworks in Chapter 6 suggests that 
country ownership of aid is significantly related to the national culture. Meaning that when 
aid is made culturally appropriate, recipient country driven and focused on the poor, country 
ownership will be ensured (see Figure 9, above). Therefore, the recommendations in this 
chapter are key to making aid more effective by promoting factors that improves the country 
ownership of aid. In order to optimize aid effectiveness, the researcher suggests a 95 per 
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cent performance rating by actors. Thus, as set out in Section 6.3 above, eight 
recommendations were developed to improve the impact of culture on recipient country’s 
ownership of aid. When the recommendations are appropriately implemented, the quality of 
lives of millions of people in aid receiving countries will be improved in lasting ways. The 
recommendations include: 
• aid donors should ensure that aid practices are locally driven and wanted by the local 
culture and tradition. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.1, Table 2 of 
this report. Up to 15.6 percent of participants in the current study perceive that aid donors 
are promoting practices that are alien and unwanted to the local tradition and culture. 
Therefore, in order to achieve aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of participants in 
similar surveys should be able to trust that aid practices are locally driven and wanted by 
the local culture and tradition.  • aid donors should select places they wish to support based on the recipient country’s 
strategic interests and priorities. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.2, 
Table 2 of this report.  Up to 54.1 percent of participants in the current study perceive 
that aid donors do not consider the strategic interest and priorities of recipient countries 
when choosing project sites. To ensure aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of 
participants in similar surveys should be able to express satisfaction with donors’ 
selection of project sites. Thus, places selected for project implementation should be 
aligned with the strategic interests and priorities of the beneficiary country. • aid donors should ensure that aid provided to recipient countries are untied. This 
recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.3, Table 2 of this report. Up to 66.8 
percent of participants in the current study believe that foreign aid to their country consists 
of specifications that a certain proportion of the financial assistance must be provided in 
kind (i.e., expatriate staff, consultants, equipment, commodities) by the aid provider. In 
order to ensure aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of participants in similar surveys 
should be able to perceive aid as untied. Thus, a greater proportion of aid should indeed, 
be untied. • aid donors should ensure that aid interventions integrate locally driven solutions that 
supports institutional capacities to tackle corruption. This recommendation relates to the 
finding in Item 2.4, Table 2 of this report. Up to 10.8 percent of participants in the current 
study disagree that aid interventions supports institutional capacities that tackle 
corruption. To achieve aid effectiveness therefore, at least 95 percent of participants in 
similar surveys should be able to express satisfaction that aid interventions integrate 
locally driven solutions that supports institutional capacities to tackle corruption. • aid donors should ensure aid resources get to the rightful beneficiaries without leakages. 
This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.5, Table 2 of this report. Up to 24.3 
percent of participants in the current study believe that aid resources does not get into 
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the hands of their rightful beneficiaries. To achieve aid effectiveness therefore, at least 
95 percent of participants in similar surveys should be able to express that aid resources 
get to the right beneficiaries for which the aid resources were donated.  • aid donors should ensure that aid interventions demonstrate equity in distribution of 
resources to the needy in both rural and urban areas. This recommendation relates to 
the finding in Item 2.6, Table 2 of this report. More than 41.6 percent of participants in 
the current study perceive deficiencies in equitable distribution of aid resources between 
rural and urban areas. In order to achieve aid effectiveness, at least 95 percent of 
participants in future surveys should demonstrate satisfaction with the level of equity in 
distribution of aid resources between people in rural and their counterparts in urban 
areas. • aid donors should source programme experts within the recipient country or region of 
operation. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.7, Table 2 of this report. 
More than 81.7 percent of participants in the current study believe that regional and 
country 'experts' are experienced to lead opportunities in foreign aid supported research 
and intervention programmes in Nigeria. Therefore, in order to achieve aid effectiveness, 
at least 95 percent of of participants in similar surveys should be able to demonstrate 
that aid programme experts are sourced within the recipient country or region of 
operation.   • people in recipient countries should trust their leaders in decisions regarding aid donation 
to the country. This recommendation relates to the finding in Item 2.8, Table 2 of this 
report. Up to 32.5 percent of participants in the current study does not believe that their 
leaders can make decisions regarding aid donation on their behalf. To achieve aid 
effectiveness therefore, at least 95 percent of participants in similar surveys should be 
able to express trust that their leaders can make decisions regarding aid donation to their 
country.  
 
7.4.2 Recommendations for further studies 
 
• Repeat the same study among similar population characteristics, to compare study 
results over time. • This same study should be repeated among other populations (for example, service 
beneficiaries, non-aid workers) in Nigeria, or in another country in sub-Saharan Africa. • Qualitative researchers should consider researching the opinions of chief executive 
officers of aid implementing agencies in Nigeria, to harvest their opinions regarding the 
impact of national culture on aid effectiveness in Nigeria.  
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• The impact of power distance on donors’ decisions to make aid commitments, disburse 
aid or ensure aid effectiveness needs to be investigated. Likewise, the impact of high 
power distance inherent in Nigeria and other sub-Sahara African countries and their 
continued dependency on aid from countries lower on power distance needs to be 
investigated. • Conduct a randomized controlled trial (with treatment and control sites), to test the 
usefulness of the institutional framework developed in this study on attaining aid 
effectiveness among the population of study. 
 
7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The study sought to determine the impact of culture on the effectiveness of aid in Nigeria. It 
emerged from the study that of the five principles of aid effectiveness deployed in the study, 
participants perceived aid as effective across four principles. That is, aid alignment to country 
systems, managing aid for results, country ownership of aid, and mutual accountability of aid. 
Of these four, country ownership of aid had significant relationship with national culture. 
Therefore, a culture sensitive institutional framework, as well as conceptual framework for 
aid effectiveness were proposed for adoption and implementation, in order to improve aid 
ownership and effectiveness in Nigeria. 
As a management staff of an aid implementing partner himself, the researcher applied the 
recommendations of this study as set out in Section 7.4.1, to his day-to-day aid management 
practices in Nigeria, and achieved positive results. Precisely, he applied the 
recommendations to the provision of aid supported comprehensive antiretroviral therapy 
(ART) and prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT), targeting the most vulnerable 
people living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria. Of 
particular reference were HIV positive adults, pregnant women and children accessing 
services in the rural poor communities of Nigeria. These services were provided free of 
charge to the clients (all costs paid by the aid donor); thus, were highly valued and well 
received by the service beneficiaries. Thereby, closing the service access gaps between the 
rural poor and their counterparts in the urban settings. The choice of pregnant women and 
children in this intervention programme was informed by service data which shows low 
uptake of PMTCT and pediatric ART services, as well as consultations with local community 
and host country leaders, aid donor and other key stakeholders. Healthcare workers in public 
and private health facilities were trained to deliver quality ART and PMTCT services to people 
in their target local communities. Health commodities were delivered to focus health facilities 
based on pull methods, where only what was needed was provided, to avoid losses, 
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wastages and expiries. Adequate records were maintained to ensure accountability of 
programme investments, including ensuring that the right quantity and quality of commodities 
were delivered and received by the right beneficiaries, in the right places, at the right time. 
Other than antiretroviral medicines and some laboratory reagents which had to be sourced 
centrally within the host country, all other products and services were sourced locally, in the 
state, to promote local businesses around the target communities. Clinic opening days/hours 
were aligned to the local needs and conveniences of the beneficiaries. Behavior change 
interventions were aligned and integrated into the local culture and activities of the target 
beneficiaries. These approaches were adopted to ensure equity and equality in the 
distribution of aid supported services, thereby reducing the gap (power distance) between 
the rich and the poor; and improving aid ownership by the target beneficiaries of aid. By July 
2016, the state had improved institutional capacity to provide quality HIV/AIDS services to 
the right beneficiaries (PLHIV) in the right places (5 focus LGAs) and at the right time; 
demonstrated palpable political will to sustain the HIV interventions; and improved economic 
outcomes. 
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7.8 APPENDICES 
 
7.8.1 APPENDIX A: Disparities in aid funding to sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov (2010) assert that many aid receiving countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as many donor countries lack the institutional framework to make foreign aid 
effective. As a result, the percentage of gross national income (GNI) that governments of rich 
countries have allocated to development cooperation varies considerably. Appendix A1, 
shows a 6 year (2005 – 2010) mean GNI for the top 20 donor countries in the world.  
 
Appendix A1: Top 20 aid donors by mean gross national income (GNI) per capita between 
2005 – 2010 (data extracted on 02 Jan 2013 09:43 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat) 
 
Luxembourg ranks the richest country in terms of the 6-year mean GNI (with 61,803), closely 
followed by Norway with 55,262 and the United States of America with 45,841. Spain ranked 
20th on the list of richest countries with mean GNI of 30,582, closely following Italy (19th with 
mean GNI of 31,280) and Iceland (18th with mean GNI of 32,115), respectively.  
Despite occupying third position in the 6-year mean GNI, the United States spent only 0.22 
percent of its GNI on aid in 2005, while Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Sweden each spent more than 0.7 percent on aid. This percentage was strongly 
correlated with the rich countries’ femininity culture scores (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 
2010). Development assistance money is allocated according to the (psychological) needs 
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of the donor countries more than according to the material needs of the recipients. For 
example, while the highest needs were in sub-Saharan Africa, most of the top 20 richest 
countries focused their funding elsewhere. Appendix A2, highlights the total funding in 
millions of US dollars disbursed to sub-Saharan Africa by the ODA, between 2007 and 2011. 
 
 
Appendix A2: Top 20 ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in millions of US dollars, 2007 – 2011 (data 
extracted on 02 Jan 2013 09:43 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat) 
 
Although critics accuse the USA of spending only 0.22 percent of her GNI on aid in 2005 
(Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010), sub-Saharan Africa serves one of the greatest 
beneficiary of aid from the USA, compared to other donors. Luxembourg who ranked first 
among countries with highest GNI could barely have a reasonable ranking among rich 
countries who made substantial disbursements in aid to sub-Saharan Africa.   
Appendix A3, shows the level of aid received by countries in sub-Saharan Africa across all 
sectors, from 2005 – 2011. Nigeria ranks highest among the top 20 ODA receiving countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa (in USD millions), closely followed by the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia and Sudan, respectively. It is against this background that Nigeria was 
chosen as proxy for sub-Saharan Africa countries in the study of the impact of national culture 
on aid effectiveness. 
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Appendix A3: Top 20 ODA receiving countries in sub-Saharan Africa (in USD millions) across 
all sectors, between 2005 and 2011 (data extracted on 02 Jan 2013 09:43 UTC (GMT) from 
OECD.Stat 
 
Appendix A4, shows that in 5 years (2007 – 2011), the development needs of Nigeria was 
best met by the USA, United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, and Austria, respectively, 
among others. Other countries that ranked higher than these countries on the mean GNI 
ranking has not shown prominence in disbursing aid to Nigeria, despite the high need. These 
countries include Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Sweden, to mention a few. Thereby, 
suggesting that there are other determinants of aid giving or receiving, beyond the real needs 
of the countries. 
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Appendix A4: Top 20 ODA countries providing assistance to Nigeria (in USD millions) across 
all sectors, between 2007 and 2011 (data extracted on 02 Jan 2013 09:43 UTC (GMT) from 
OECD.Stat) 
 
In Nigeria alone, the OECD Statistical metadata shows that ODA for most sectors peaked in 
2009, totaling and dipped by about half in 2010. Appendix A5, shows the total ODA to Nigeria 
by sector, between 2007 and 2010, in USD. Sectors that conspicuously peaked in 2009 were 
Population, Policy Programs and Reproductive Health (PPPRH), health and education. 
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Appendix A5: Total ODA to Nigeria by sector, 2007-2010, in USD (data extracted on 02 Jan 2013 
09:43 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat) 
 
A cursory analysis of the ODA to Nigeria (Appendix A6) shows positive compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) in fund disbursements between 2007 and 2010 for general environment 
protection (29 percent); agriculture, forestry and fishing (35 percent); government and civil 
society (20 percent); and PPPRH (5 percent) sectors. Within the same period, negative 
CAGR was recorded for water supply and sanitation (-9 percent); health (-26 percent) and 
education (-51 percent).  
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Appendix A6: Compound annual growth rate by sector to Nigeria, 2007-2010, in percentages 
(data extracted on 02 Jan 2013 09:43 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat) 
 
Ghosh and Kharas (2011) added that for 31 recipient countries ODA was greater than 10 
percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For example, between 1970 and 1999, the 
flow of donor funds to Kenya alone averaged about 9 percent of GDP, accounting for about 
20 percent of the annual government budget and financing slightly over 80 percent of 
development expenditures (Njeru 2003). Johri, Chung, Dawson and Schrecker (2012) report 
that in comparative terms, international development assistance for health has enjoyed a 
special priority among donors in recent years. They elaborate that resources quadrupled from 
$5.6 billion in 1990 to $21.8 billion in 2007, and the rate of growth accelerated sharply after 
2002. 
Additionally, the primitive institutional structures in the receiving countries are blamed for lack 
of aid effectiveness, especially, in sub-Saharan Africa countries where traditional institutional 
frameworks did not survive colonization and decolonization. Without institutional frameworks, 
personal interests can prevail unchecked. Politicians are out to enrich themselves and their 
families without being controlled by institutional frameworks. The economic success of 
certain countries of East Asia owes much to the fact that centuries-old institutional 
frameworks existed that were adapted to modern times. 
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Appendix A7: Tying Status of ODA by Individual DAC Member countries, 2012 (data 
extracted on 26 August 2014 21:15 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat) 
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7.8.2 APPENDIX B: Map of Nigeria showing the six geographic zones and study sites 
 
 
 
Appendix B1: The six geopolitical zones of Nigeria 
 
Appendix B2: Geographic map of Nigeria, showing research sites 
Research sites  
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7.8.3 APPENDIX C: Ethical and administrative approvals to conduct the study 
 
The following appendices contain identifiable information of the study institutions. Therefore, 
they have been removed from this thesis to ensure confidentiality of the institutions. They 
were only made available to the examiners. 
Appendix C1: Ethical approval from a local independent review board 
Appendix C2: Application for local IRB’s ethical clearance 
Appendix C3: Research ethics approval from Sheffield Business School 
Appendix C5: Administrative approvals to conduct the study 
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7.8.4 APPENDIX D: Research instrument and data analysis framework utilised in the 
study 
 
Apppendix D1: Research instrument - Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Impact of national culture on aid effectiveness in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Dear ${m://FirstName},    
 
CONSENT INFORMATION 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.  
 
Today, I would like to request that you freely participate in filling this questionnaire which is 
estimated to last 30 minutes, only. This study seeks to investigate the impact of national culture on 
aid effectiveness in sub-Saharan Africa.  The study is being conducted by Dr. Robert J. Chiegil, a 
doctorate degree candidate in International Business Administration at the Sheffield Business 
School, Sheffield Hallam University, UK. Results of the study will be used to inform the 
development of an aid institutional framework that is recipient country driven, culturally appropriate 
and that which explicitly guides aid sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa. Your participation in this 
study is completely voluntary. If you do not wish to participate, you may stop at any time, as 
responding to any questionnaire item implies your consent to participate. You are not required to 
write your name or the name of your employer anywhere on this questionnaire, as your responses 
will be completely anonymous.  Any information obtained from you will be kept confidential; and 
no direct reference shall be made to you or your employer anywhere in the research report. I do not 
therefore foresee any risk or cost implication to you as you fill this questionnaire.  
This research has been approved by the Sheffield Business School Research Ethics Committee, 
Sheffield Hallam University, UK, and the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital Health Research 
Ethics Committee, Enugu, Nigeria. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research 
participant or have concerns that your rights have been violated in the course of your participation 
in this study, please, contact Prof. R.E Umeh, Chairman, Health Research Ethics Committee, UNTH, 
Enugu, using the following address: 024-252022. If you have any questions about your participation 
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in this research, you can contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Robert J. Chiegil via e-mail: 
rjchiegil@yahoo.com, or phone number: +234 8035615573.   
 
Thank you,  
Robert Chiegil 
Ethical clearance certificate  
No.: NHREC/05/01/2008B-F-WA00002458-1RB00002323         
 
 
Q1   I have read and understood the above consent form and desire on my own free will to 
participate in this study.  
 Yes (1)  No (2) 
 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
Q2   Do you work on or implement a foreign aid supported project? 
 Yes (1)  No (2) 
 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
 
Q3 How long have you been working on foreign aid funded projects? 
 Less than 6 months (0)  6 months to a year (1)  1 to 2 years (2)  3 to 5 years (3)  Over 5 years (4) 
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Q4 What is your age? 
 18 - 24 (1)  25 - 34 (2)  35 - 44 (3)  45 - 54 (4)  55 - 64 (5)  65 and over (6) 
 
Q5 What is your Gender? 
 Male (0)  Female (1) 
 
Q6 Do you belong to any social or cultural association? 
 Yes (0)  No (1) 
 
Q7 Please indicate the highest level of education you completed. 
 Primary School (1)  Secondary School or equivalent (2)  Certificate (1 year) (3)  Diploma (ND, RN, RM) (4)  Bachelor's Degree (BSc, BA, etc) (5)  Master's Degree (MS) (6)  Doctoral Degree (PhD) (7)  Professional Degree (MD, JD, etc.) (8)  Other (9) 
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Q8  What is your current marital status? 
 Rather not say (1)  Divorced (2)  Living with another (3)  Married (4)  Separated (5)  Single (6)  Widowed (7) 
 
Q9 What is your religious affiliation? 
 Christianity (1)  Islam (2)  Traditional religion (3)  Other (4)  Rather not say (5) 
 
Q10 In which sector are you employed? 
 Governmental organisation (1)  Non-governmental organisation (2)  Private for profit organisation (3)  Faith based organisation (4)  Unclassified establishments (5) 
 
Q11 What is your professional affiliation? 
 Accountancy (1)  Pharmacy (2)  Medical laboratory science (3)  Medicine (4)  Nursing (5)  Other (6) 
 
Q12 What is your original state of origin? 
 Abia (1)  Adamawa (2)  Akwa Ibom (3)  Anambra (4)  Bauchi (5)  Bayelsa (6)  Benue (7)  Borno (8)  Cross River (9) 
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 Delta (10)  Ebonyi (11)  Edo (12)  Ekiti (13)  Enugu (14)  Federal Capital Territory (15)  Gombe (16)  Imo (17)  Jigawa (18)  Kaduna (19)  Kano (20)  Katsina (21)  Kebbi (22)  Kogi (23)  Kwara (24)  Lagos (25)  Nasarawa (26)  Niger (27)  Ogun (28)  Ondo (29)  Osun (30)  Oyo (31)  Plateau (32)  Rivers (33)  Sokoto (34)  Taraba (35)  Yobe (36)  Zamfara (37)  I do not reside in Nigeria (38) 
 
Q13 In what state do you currently work? 
 Abia (1)  Adamawa (2)  Akwa Ibom (3)  Anambra (4)  Bauchi (5)  Bayelsa (6)  Benue (7)  Borno (8)  Cross River (9)  Delta (10)  Ebonyi (11)  Edo (12)  Ekiti (13)  Enugu (14)  Federal Capital Territory (15) 
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 Gombe (16)  Imo (17)  Jigawa (18)  Kaduna (19)  Kano (20)  Katsina (21)  Kebbi (22)  Kogi (23)  Kwara (24)  Lagos (25)  Nasarawa (26)  Niger (27)  Ogun (28)  Ondo (29)  Osun (30)  Oyo (31)  Plateau (32)  Rivers (33)  Sokoto (34)  Taraba (35)  Yobe (36)  Zamfara (37)  I do not reside in Nigeria (38) 
 
 
Q14 Alignment of aid to country systems: Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the 
following statements... 
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Strongly Agree 
(1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) 
Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
Foreign aid 
activities have 
deliberately tried 
to change cultural 
norms or practices 
that are 
considered to be 
negative (1) 
        
Foreign aid 
objectives are well 
aligned to my 
country's 
priorities, 
systems, national 
development 
strategies, and 
preferences (2) 
        
Donor's capacity 
building 
interventions are 
integrated into 
host government's 
capacity 
development 
plans and 
implemented 
through country-
led strategies (3) 
        
Foreign aid 
facilitates 
improvement in 
entrepreneurship 
and job creation in 
my country (4) 
        
Foreign aid 
programmes are 
not scientifically 
sound and usually 
designed beyond 
the capacity of the 
host country to 
implement (5) 
        
Foreign aid 
funding to my 
country has 
increased 
dependency, 
substitution of 
already 
earmarked 
government 
spending, and 
increased 
corruption among 
local leadership. 
(6) 
        
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I trust that my 
country's 
government and 
community 
members has 
sufficient funds to 
overcome poverty; 
thus, does not 
need to depend on 
foreign aid. (7) 
        
Foreign aid 
funding has 
devalued the 
quality of 
bureaucracy and 
undermined the 
rule of law in my 
country. (8) 
        
 
 
Q15 Managing for results: Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements... 
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Strongly Agree 
(1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) 
Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
Foreign aid 
donors use 
procurement 
systems that are 
alien to local 
business owners; 
thereby placing 
local businesses 
at disadvantage 
of competing for 
contracts against 
their international 
counterparts. (1) 
        
The policies and 
regulations 
operating in aid 
supported 
programmes 
around here are 
in conflict with my 
culture and 
tradition (2) 
        
Transparency, 
accountability 
and strict rules 
and regulations 
are required in 
order to ensure 
people in need 
actually benefit 
from aid support 
to my country. (3) 
        
Foreign aid 
donors generate 
huge databases 
and constantly 
build local 
capacity in data 
use for 
programme 
management 
decision making. 
(4) 
        
The government 
of my country co-
ordinate with 
donors to focus 
on producing and 
measuring 
results, through 
effective 
programme 
monitoring and 
evaluation (5) 
        
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My country have 
transparent, 
measurable 
assessment 
frameworks to 
measure aid 
progress and 
assess results. 
(6) 
        
People around 
here believe that 
their wellbeing 
and security lies 
in the hands of 
God; therefore, 
foreign aid 
programmes can 
do nothing about 
it. (7) 
        
People around 
here believe that 
their time matters 
so much to them; 
yet, service 
providers fail to 
respect their time 
whenever they 
attend foreign aid 
supported 
programmes or 
services (8) 
        
 
 
Q16 Country ownership of aid: Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements... 
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Strongly Agree 
(1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) 
Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
The aid donors 
are promoting 
practices that are 
alien and 
unwanted to the 
local tradition and 
culture. (1) 
        
Foreign aid donor 
countries select 
places they wish 
to support based 
on their interests 
and not the 
country's 
strategic interest 
or the interest of 
the local people 
they support. (2) 
        
Foreign aid to my 
country consists 
of specifications 
that a certain 
proportion of the 
financial 
assistance must 
be provided in 
kind (i.e., 
expatriate staff, 
consultants, 
equipment, 
commodities) by 
the aid provider 
(3) 
        
Foreign aid 
supports the 
country to 
develop own 
strategies, 
improve 
institutional 
capacities and 
tackle corruption 
using locally 
driven strategies 
(4) 
        
Foreign aid 
resources get to 
the rightful 
beneficiaries, 
with minimal 
leakages. (5) 
        
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Foreign aid 
resources are 
distributed 
equally between 
people in need in 
the rural and 
urban areas (6) 
        
Regional and 
country 'experts' 
are not 
experienced to 
lead 
opportunities in 
foreign aid 
supported 
research and 
intervention 
programmes in 
sub-Saharan 
Africa (7) 
        
I trust my leaders 
will make the right 
decisions and 
negotiations with 
aid donors on my 
behalf. (8) 
        
 
 
Q17 Mutual accountability of aid: Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements... 
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Strongly 
Agree (1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) 
Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
The government should 
enforce punitive 
measures against 
people who undermine 
policies guiding 
administration and 
management of aid 
funds. (1) 
        
Organisations 
implementing aid 
projects invest maximally 
on beneficiaries, within 
reasonable 
Company/Organisational 
overheads. (2) 
        
Foreign aid donors do 
not build on in-country 
evaluation programs, in 
order that the 
evaluations occur at 
regular intervals in 
coordination with in-
country evaluations. (3) 
        
Donors and the 
government of my 
country understand that 
they are mutually 
accountable for 
transparency of 
development results, 
therefore, they provide 
public access to 
information on the 
operations of the aid 
programme. (4) 
        
Organisations 
implementing aid 
projects regularly use a 
plausibility design to 
provide evidence of 
impact, both positive and 
negative impact, and 
taking into acount 
nonprogram influences. 
(5) 
        
Foreign aid programmes 
usually fail to 
demonstrate the value of 
integrated development 
approaches where the 
interelatedness of 
activities necessary for 
human development can 
be demonstrated. (6) 
        
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While foreign aid donors 
have systems to monitor 
what exactly had been 
done and how many 
people had been 
reached, they are unable 
to measure impact and 
demonstrate value 
added to the country. (7) 
        
The country is usually 
given insufficient or no 
time to change existing 
systems in order to adopt 
new 'improved' systems 
perpetrated by the 
donors; therefore parallel 
systems tend to operate 
at the same time (8) 
        
 
 
Q18 Harmonisation of aid: Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements... 
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Strongly Agree 
(1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) 
Strongly 
Disagree (4) 
All foreign aid 
donors relire on 
the country's 
culture of reporting 
and monitoring 
systems, and 
adopt them as 
their principle of 
operation. (1) 
        
There is wide 
variation in 
programme 
incentives, (such 
as travel 
reimbursement, 
per diem payment, 
salary 
supplementation, 
etc) provided by 
donors in the 
country. (2) 
        
Foreign aid donors 
have strong 
respect for each 
other's tradition, 
knowledge and 
areas of expertise 
and avoid 
duplication of cost 
and effort. (3) 
        
Foreign aid donors 
co-ordinate their 
financial aid and 
capacity building 
activities with that 
of other donors 
operating in the 
same country (4) 
        
The wide variety of 
foreign aid donor 
requirements and 
expectations are 
generating 
unproductive 
transaction costs 
causing confusion 
among aid 
recipient 
countries. (5) 
        
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Unco-ordinated 
foreign aid flow to 
my country have 
set confusion in 
planning and 
decreased 
government 
investment in 
economic 
development and 
poverty 
alleviation. (6) 
        
I will prefer that all 
foreign aid donors 
pull their 
resources 
together and 
handover to the 
government of my 
country to decide 
and administer 
based on priority 
needs of the 
country. (7) 
        
There have been 
too many donors 
in too many states, 
stretched across 
many projects, 
leading to 
duplication of 
efforts. (8) 
        
 
 
 
Q19 Please, share 1-2 suggestions for improving the quality and cultural appropriateness of aid funds 
to sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
Appendix D2: Continuum of research objectives, hypothesis and data analysis techniques 
 
Objective Hypothesis Analytical model Interpretation 
To determine the 
impact of culture 
on aid worker’s 
perception of aid 
alignment to 
country systems in 
Nigeria 
 
There is no 
significant impact 
of culture on aid 
recipients’ 
perception of aid 
alignment to 
country systems in 
Nigeria 
Use ANOVA to 
examine the potential 
effect of variation of 
culture on aid 
recipients’ perception 
of aid effectiveness 
Level of significance 
set at: α=0.05; β=0.20 
Therefore;  
p-value < α=0.05 
indicates significant 
impact of culture on aid 
recipients’ perception 
of aid alignment to 
country systems in 
Nigeria;  
p-values >α=0.05 
indicates no significant 
difference. 
To determine the 
impact of culture 
on aid worker’s 
perception of 
managing aid for 
results in Nigeria 
There is no 
significant impact 
of culture on aid 
recipients’ 
perception of 
managing aid for 
results in Nigeria 
Use ANOVA to 
examine the potential 
effect of variation of 
culture on aid 
recipients’ perception 
of aid effectiveness 
Level of significance 
set at: α=0.05; β=0.20 
Therefore;  
p-value < α=0.05 
indicates significant 
impact of culture on aid 
recipients’ perception 
of managing aid for 
results in Nigeria;  
p-values >α=0.05 
indicates no significant 
difference. 
To determine the 
impact of culture 
on aid worker’s 
perception of 
There is no 
significant impact 
of culture on aid 
recipients’ 
Use ANOVA to 
examine the potential 
effect of variation of 
culture on aid 
Level of significance 
set at: α=0.05; β=0.20 
Therefore;  
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Objective Hypothesis Analytical model Interpretation 
country’s 
ownership of aid in 
Nigeria 
perception of 
country’s 
ownership of aid in 
Nigeria 
recipients’ perception 
of aid effectiveness 
p-value < α=0.05 
indicates significant 
impact of culture on aid 
recipients perception 
of  country’s 
ownership of aid in 
Nigeria;  
 
p-values >α=0.05 
indicates no significant 
difference. 
To determine the 
impact of culture 
on aid worker’s 
perception of 
mutual 
accountability of 
aid in Nigeria 
There is no 
significant impact 
of culture on aid 
recipients’ 
perception of 
mutual 
accountability of 
aid in Nigeria 
Use ANOVA to 
examine the potential 
effect of variation of 
culture on aid 
recipients’ perception 
of aid effectiveness 
Level of significance 
set at: α=0.05; β=0.20 
Therefore;  
p-value < α=0.05 
indicates significant 
impact of culture on aid 
recipients’ perception 
of mutual 
accountability of aid in 
Nigeria;  
 
p-values >α=0.05 
indicates no significant 
difference. 
To determine the 
impact of culture 
on aid worker’s 
perception of 
harmonisation of 
aid in Nigeria 
There is no 
significant impact 
of culture on aid 
recipients’ 
perception of 
Use ANOVA to 
examine the potential 
effect of variation of 
culture on aid 
recipients’ perception 
of aid effectiveness 
Level of significance 
set at: α=0.05; β=0.20 
Therefore;  
p-value < α=0.05 
indicates significant 
impact of culture on aid 
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Objective Hypothesis Analytical model Interpretation 
 harmonisation of 
aid in Nigeria 
 
recipients’ perception 
of harmonization of aid 
in Nigeria;  
p-values >α=0.05 
indicates no significant 
influence. 
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7.8.5 APPENDIX E: Graphic results of data analysis 
 
 
APPENDIX E1: THE AID DONORS ARE PROMOTING PRACTICES THAT ARE ALIEN AND UNWANTED TO 
THE LOCAL TRADITION AND CULTURE (N=388) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E2: FOREIGN AID DONOR COUNTRIES SELECT PLACES THEY WISH TO SUPPORT BASED 
ON THEIR INTERESTS AND NOT THE COUNTRY’S STRATEGIC INTEREST OR THE INTEREST OF THE 
LOCAL PEOPLE THEY SUPPORT (N=387) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E3: FOREIGN AID TO MY COUNTRY CONSISTS OF SPECIFICATIONS THAT A CERTAIN 
PROPORTION OF THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE MUST BE PROVIDED IN KIND BY THE AID PROVIDER 
(N=379) 
 
APPENDIX E4: FOREIGN AID SUPPORTS THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP OWN STRATEGIES, IMPROVE 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES AND TACKLE CORRUPTION USING LOCALLY DRIVEN STRATEGIES 
(N=384) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E5: FOREIGN AID RESOURCES GET TO THE RIGHTFUL BENEFICIARIES, WITH MINIMAL 
LEAKAGES (N=386) 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E6: FOREIGN AID RESOURCES ARE DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY BETWEEN PEOPLE IN NEED IN 
THE RURAL AND URBAN AREAS (384) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E7: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY ‘EXPERTS’ ARE NOT EXPERIENCED TO LEAD 
OPPORTUNITIES IN FOREIGN AID SUPPORTED RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION PROGRAMMES 
INNIGERIA (N=382) 
 
 
APPENDIX E8: I TRUST MY LEADERS WILL MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH AID 
DONORS ON MY BEHALF (N=386) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E9: THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENFORCE PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST PEOPLE WHO 
UNDERMINE POLICIES GUIDING ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT OF AID FUNDS (N=387) 
 
APPENDIX 10; ORGANISATIONS IMPLEMENTING AID PROJECTS INVEST MAXIMALLY ON 
BENEFICIARIES, WITH REASONABLE COMPANY/ORGANIZATIONAL OVERHEADS (N=383) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E11; FOREIGN AID DONORS DO NOT BUILD ON IN-COUNTRY EVALUATION PROGRAMMES, 
IN ORDER THAT THE EVALUATIONS OCCUR AT REGULAR INTERVALS IN COORDINATION WITH IN-
COUNTRY EVALUATIONS (N=379) 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E12: DONORS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF MY COUNTRY UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE 
MUTUALLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR TRANSPARENCY OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS, THEREFORE, THEY 
PROVIDE PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE AID PROGRAMME (N=384) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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Appendix E13: Organisations implementing aid projects regularly use a plausibility design to 
provide evidence of impact, both positive and negative impact, and taking into account 
nonprogramme influences (n=376) 
 
 
APPENDIX E14: FOREIGN AID PROGRAMMES USUALLY FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE THE VALUE OF 
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES WHERE THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF ACTIVITIES 
NECESSARY FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED (N=380) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E15: WHILE FOREIGN AID DONORS HAVE SYSTEMS TO MONITOR WHAT EXACTLY HAD 
BEEN DONE AND HOW MANY PEOPLE HAD BEEN REACHED, THEY ARE UNABLE TO MEASURE IMPACT 
AND DEMONSTRATE VALUE ADDED TO THE COUNTRY (N=384) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E16: THE COUNTRY IS USUALLY GIVEN INSUFFICIENT OR NO TIME TO CHANGE EXISTING 
SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO ADOPT NEW ‘IMPROVED’ SYSTEMS PERPETRATED BY THE DONORS; 
THEREFORE, PARALLEL SYSTEMS TEND TO OPERATE AT THE SAME TIME (N=387)  
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E17: FOREIGN AID ACTIVITIES HAVE DELIBERATELY TRIED TO CHANGE CULTURAL NORMS 
OR PRACTICES THAT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE NEGATIVE (N=386) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E18: FOREIGN AID ACTIVITIES ARE WELL ALIGNED TO MY COUNTRY’S PRIORITIES, 
SYSTEMS, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND PREFERENCES (N=387) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E19: DONORS’ CAPACITY BUILDING INTERVENTIONS ARE INTEGRATED INTO HOST 
GOVERNMENT’S CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND IMPLEMENTED THROUGH COUNTRY-LED 
STRATEGIES (N=385) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E20: FOREIGN AID FACILITATES IMPROVEMENT IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND JOB 
CREATION IN MY COUNTRY (N=383) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E21: FOREIGN AID PROGRAMMES ARE NOT SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND AND USUALLY 
DESIGNED BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF THE HOST COUNTRY TO IMPLEMENT (N=380)  
 
 
 
APPENDIX E22: FOREIGN AID FUNDING TO MY COUNTRY HAS INCREASED DEPENDENCY, 
SUBSTITUTION OF ALREADY EARMARKED GOVERNMENT SPENDING, AND INCREASED CORRUPTION 
AMONG LOCAL LEADERSHIP (N=385) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E23: I TRUST THAT MY COUNTRY’S GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS HAS 
SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO OVERCOME POVERTY, THUS, DOES NOT NEED TO DEPEND ON FOREIGN AID 
(N=385) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E24: FOREIGN AID FUNDING HAS DEVALUED THE QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY AND 
UNDERMINED THE RULE OF LAW IN MY COUNTRY (N=381) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E25: FOREIGN AID DONORS USE PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS THAT ARE ALIEN TO LOCAL 
BUSINESS OWNERS; THEREBY PLACING LOCAL BUSINESSES AT DISADVANTAGE OF COMPETING FOR 
CONTRACTS AGAINST THEIR INTERNATIONAL COUNTERPARTS (N=386) 
  
 
 
APPENDIX E26: THE POLICIES AND REGULATIONS OPERATING IN AID SUPPORTED PROGRAMMES 
AROUND HERE ARE IN CONFLICT WITH MY CULTURE AND TRADITION (N=387) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E27: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND STRICT RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE 
REQUIRED IN ORDER TO ENSURE PEOPLE IN NEED ACTUALLY BENEFIT FROM AID SUPPORTS TO MY 
COUNTRY (N=388) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E28: FOREIGN AID DONORS GENERATE HUGE DATABASE AND CONSTANTLY BUILD LOCAL 
CAPACITY IN DATA USE FOR PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING (N=390) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E29: THE GOVERNMENT OF MY COUNTRY CO-ORDINATE WITH DONORS TO FOCUS ON 
PRODUCING AND MEASURING RESULTS, THROUGH EFFECTIVE PROGRAMME MONITORING AND 
EVALUATION (N=389) 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E30: MY COUNTRY HAVE TRANSPARENT, MEASURABLE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS TO 
MEASURE AID PROGRESS AND ASSESS RESULTS (N=389) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E31: PEOPLE AROUND HERE BELIEVE THAT THEIR WELLBEING AND SECURITY LIES IN THE 
HANDS OF GOD; THEREFORE, FOREIGN AID PROGRAMME CAN DO NOTHING ABOUT IT (N=391) 
 
 
APPENDIX E32: PEOPLE AROUND HERE BELIEVE THAT THEIR TIME MATTERS SO MUCH TO THEM; 
YET, SERVICE PROVIDERS FAIL TO RESPECT THEIR TIME WHENEVER THEY ATTEND FOREIGN AID 
SUPPORTED PROGRAMMES OR SERVICES (N=393) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E33: ALL FOREIGN AID DONORS RELY ON THE COUNTRY’S CULTURE OF REPORTING AND 
MONITORING SYSTEMS, AND ADOPT THEM AS THEIR PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION (N=382) 
 
 
APPENDIX E34: THERE IS WIDE VARIATION IN PROGRAMME INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY DONORS IN 
THE COUNTRY (N=381) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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APPENDIX E35: FOREIGN AID DONORS HAVE STRONG RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER’S TRADITION, 
KNOWLEDGE AND AREAS OF EXPERTISE AND AVOID DUPLICATION OF COST AND EFFORT (N=380) 
 
 
 
Appendix E36: Foreign aid donors co-ordinate their financial aid and capacity building activities with 
that of other donors operating in the same country (n=380) 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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Appendix 37: The wide variety of foreign aid donor requirement and expectations are generating 
unproductive transaction costs, causing confusion among aid recipient countries (n=378) 
 
Appendix E38: Unco-ordinated foreign aid flow to my country have set confusion in planning and 
decreased government investment in economic development and poverty alleviation (n=380) 
 
Response Response 
Response Response 
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Appendix E39: I will prefer that all foreign aid donors pull their resources together and handover 
to the government of my country to decide and administer based on priority needs of the country 
(n=384) 
 
 
Appendix E40: There have been too many donors in too many states, stretched across many 
projects, leading to duplication of efforts (n=383) 
  
Response Response 
Response Response 
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7.8.6 APPENDIX F: Matrix showing institutional framework for aid effectiveness 
 
Geert 
Hofstede’s 
dimension 
of national 
culture 
Research findings: The 
survey shows that… 
Principles of 
aid 
effectiveness 
relevant to 
the finding(s) 
Best 
practices of 
aid relevant 
to the 
finding(s) 
Recommendations 
for implementation 
to make aid 
effective 
Power 
Distance 
• 54.4% of the surveyed 
respondents perceive 
that aid resources are 
distributed equally to 
the needy in rural and 
urban areas;  • 56.7% perceive that 
aid donors select 
places they wish to 
support based on the 
recipient country’s 
strategic interests;  • 64.5% perceive that 
people in the recipient 
country trust their 
leaders will make the 
right decisions and 
negotiations with aid 
donors on their behalf.  • 73.7% perceive that a 
certain proportion of 
aid to the recipient 
country is provided in 
kind;  • 73.7% perceive that 
aid resources get to 
the rightful 
beneficiaries with 
minimal leakages;  
Ownership of 
aid 
Selectivity of 
aid 
• 95% of aid 
programmes 
should 
demonstrate 
equity in 
distribution of 
aid resources 
to the needy in 
both rural and 
urban areas. 
 • 95% of the 
time, aid 
donors should 
select places 
they wish to 
support based 
on the recipient 
country’s 
strategic 
interests and 
priorities. 
 • 95% of people 
in recipient 
countries 
should trust 
their leaders in 
decisions 
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• 83.5% perceive that 
aid donors promote 
practices that are 
locally driven and 
wanted by the local 
culture and tradition;  • 87.8% perceive that 
aid supports the 
country to develop 
institutional capacities 
and tackle corruption 
using locally driven 
strategies;  • 88.7% perceive that 
regional and country 
experts are 
experienced to lead 
aid programmes.  
regarding aid 
donation to the 
country. 
 • 95% of aid 
provided to 
recipient 
countries 
should be 
untied.  
 
 
• 95% of aid 
resources 
should get to 
the rightful 
beneficiaries 
without 
leakages. 
 
• 95% of aid 
practices 
should be 
locally driven 
and wanted by 
the local 
culture and 
tradition. 
 • 95% of aid 
interventions 
should 
integrate 
locally driven 
solutions that 
supports 
institutional 
capacities to 
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tackle 
corruption. 
 • 95% of aid 
programme 
experts should 
be sourced 
within the 
recipient 
country or 
region of 
operation.  
Individualis
m versus 
Collectivis
m 
• 59.5% of the surveyed 
respondents perceive 
that aid donors build 
on in-country 
evaluation 
programmes;  • 60.0% perceive that 
aid programmes are 
able to measure 
impact and 
demonstrate value 
added to the country. • 61.2% perceive that 
aid recipient countries 
are usually given 
insufficient or no time 
to change existing 
systems in order to 
adopt new systems 
perpetrated by the 
donors, thereby 
operating parallel 
systems at the same 
time. • 68.4% perceive that 
aid demonstrate the 
value of integrated 
development 
Mutual 
accountabilit
y of aid  
Moderate 
overhead 
cost of aid 
• 95% of aid 
interventions 
should build on 
in-country 
evaluation 
programmes. 
 • 95% of aid 
programmes 
should be 
designed to 
measure 
impact and 
demonstrate 
value added to 
the country. 
 • 95% of aid 
implementation 
plans should 
allow sufficient 
time for 
recipient 
countries to 
change 
existing 
systems in 
order to adopt 
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approaches and the 
interrelatedness of 
activities necessary 
for human 
development;  • 70.9% perceive that 
aid donors and the 
recipient country 
understand that they 
are mutually 
accountable for 
transparency of 
development results 
and provide public 
access to information 
on the operations of 
the aid programme;  • 83.9% perceive that 
aid implementing 
partners regularly use 
plausibility design to 
provide evidence of 
both negative and 
positive programme 
impact;  • 87.1% perceive that 
aid implementing 
partners invest 
maximally on 
beneficiaries, within 
reasonable 
Company/organizatio
nal overheads;  • 96.3% perceive that 
the government 
should enforce 
punitive measures 
against people who 
undermine policies 
guiding the 
the new, 
improved 
systems. 
 • 95% of aid 
interventions 
should 
demonstrate 
the value of 
integrated 
development 
approaches. 
 • 95% of aid 
programme 
operational 
information 
should be 
made 
accessible to 
the recipient 
country. 
 
 
 • 95% of aid 
implementing 
partners 
should use 
plausibility 
designs to 
provide 
evidence of 
both negative 
and positive 
programme 
impact. • 95% of aid 
implementing 
partners 
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administration of aid 
funds;  
should invest 
maximally on 
beneficiaries, 
within 
reasonable 
organisational 
overheads. • 95% of the 
time, the 
government 
should exhaust 
full 
enforcement of 
punitive 
measures 
against people 
who undermine 
policies guiding 
administration 
of aid funds 
Masculinity 
versus 
Femininity 
• 51.9% of surveyed 
respondents perceive 
that aid improves 
earmarked 
government spending 
and reduce 
corruption;  • 54.4% perceive that 
recipient countries 
need foreign aid to 
complement domestic 
funding and overcome 
poverty;  • 70.9% perceive that 
aid capacity building 
interventions are 
country led;  • 73.6% perceive that 
aid objectives are 
aligned to recipient 
Alignment of 
aid to country 
systems  
Preventing 
ineffective 
aid channels 
• 95% of aid 
programmes 
should 
integrate 
activities that 
improves 
earmarked 
government 
spending and 
reduce 
corruption. • 95% of aid 
programmes 
should only 
complement 
and not replace 
any domestic 
funding 
towards 
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country’s priorities 
and national 
development 
strategies;  • 76.6% perceive that 
foreign aid change 
negative cultural 
norms or practices;  • 83.9% perceive that 
aid programmes are 
scientifically sound 
and designed within 
the host country’s 
capacity to 
implement;  • 90.3% perceive that 
aid facilitates 
improvement in 
entrepreneurship and 
job creation.  • 92.5% perceive that 
aid improves the 
quality of bureaucracy 
and rule of law in the 
recipient country.  
 
poverty 
alleviation. • 95% of aid 
capacity 
building 
interventions 
should be 
country led • 95% of aid 
objectives 
should be 
aligned to 
recipient 
country’s 
priorities and 
national 
development 
strategies. 
 • 95% of aid 
interventions 
should 
integrate 
activities to 
change 
negative 
cultural norms 
or practices. • 95% of aid 
programmes 
should be 
scientifically 
sound and 
designed 
within the host 
country’s 
capacity to 
implement. • 95% of aid 
interventions 
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should 
integrate 
activities that 
improves 
entrepreneursh
ip and job 
creation in 
recipient 
countries. • 95% of aid 
interventions 
should 
integrate 
activities that 
improves the 
quality of 
bureaucracy 
and rule of law 
in the recipient 
country. 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
• 50.7% of surveyed 
respondents perceive 
that aid recipient 
country have a 
transparent 
framework for 
measuring aid 
progress.  • 65.5% perceive that 
time matters so much 
to people in the 
recipient country and 
aid programmes 
respect the time. • 69.1% perceive that 
donor procurement 
systems are aligned 
to local business 
owners;  
Managing aid 
for results  
Transparenc
y of aid 
• 95% of aid 
programmes 
should have a 
transparent 
framework for 
measuring aid 
progress in the 
recipient 
country • 95% of aid 
interventions 
should respect 
beneficiaries’ 
time. 
 • 95% of donor 
procurement 
systems 
should be 
aligned to local 
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• 81.3% perceive that 
people in the recipient 
country believe that 
their wellbeing and 
security lies in God’s 
hands and aid 
programmes are 
required to support it;  • 84.4% perceive that 
donor policies and 
regulations align with 
local culture and 
tradition;  • 85.7% perceive that 
host government 
coordinate with 
donors to focus on 
effective programme 
monitoring and 
evaluation;  • 95.2% perceive that 
transparency, 
accountability and 
strict rules and 
regulations are 
required in aid 
administration;  • 95.5% perceive that 
aid generates huge 
databases and builds 
local capacity in data 
use;  
business 
owners to 
improve their 
participation. 
 
 • 95% of aid 
interventions 
should 
integrate the 
beneficiaries’ 
religion and 
belief systems. 
 • 95% of donor 
policies and 
regulations 
should align 
with local 
culture and 
tradition. • 95% of aid 
programme 
monitoring and 
evaluation 
activities 
should include 
the host 
government • 95% of aid 
programmes 
should comply 
with the host 
government’s 
rules and 
regulations 
guiding 
transparency 
and 
268 
 
accountability 
of aid. • 95% of aid 
interventions 
should include 
local capacity 
building for use 
of information 
for 
management 
decision 
making. 
Long 
versus 
Short-term 
Orientation 
• 50.0% of surveyed 
respondents perceive 
that aid improves 
government 
investment in 
economic 
development and 
poverty alleviation;  • 51.6% perceive that 
donors coordinate aid 
funds and local 
capacity building 
activities among 
themselves. • 61.2% perceive that 
aid funding minimize 
duplication of efforts 
in recipient countries;  • 68.6% perceive that 
aid donors have 
respect for each 
other’s strengths and 
expertise, thereby, 
avoid duplication of 
cost and effort.  • 68.6% perceive that 
donor requirement 
and expectations 
Harmonisatio
n of aid. 
Aid 
specialisatio
n 
• 95% of aid 
programmes 
should 
integrate 
interventions 
that improves 
government 
investment in 
economic 
development 
and poverty 
alleviation. 
 • 95% of donors 
in a recipient 
country should 
coordinate aid 
funds and local 
capacity 
building among 
themselves. 
 • 95% of aid 
programmes 
should avoid 
duplication of 
efforts between 
donors or with 
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improve  transaction 
costs in the aid 
receiving country;  • 76.5% perceive that 
aid brought widened 
variations in provision 
of programme 
incentives;  • 76.5% perceive that 
aid donors rely on 
local culture of 
monitoring and 
reporting;  • 87.6% perceive that 
participants refute use 
of recipient country 
government to 
administer aid funds 
in their country. 
the host 
government. • 95% of donors 
should 
collaborate to 
leverage on 
each other’s 
strengths and 
expertise, to 
avoid 
duplication of 
costs/effort. 
 • 95% of donor 
requirements 
should 
reinforce 
improvements 
in transaction 
costs in the aid 
recipient 
countries 
 • 95% of aid 
programmes 
should 
collaborate to 
harmonise 
incentives for 
staff, 
volunteers and 
beneficiaries. 
 • 95% of aid 
donors should 
adopt (and 
improve on) the 
local culture of 
monitoring and 
reporting. 
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 • 95% of people 
in aid recipient 
countries 
should trust 
their country 
government to 
administer aid 
funds in their 
country. 
